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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that the Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, who was 
Queensland Premier from 1968 to 1987, did not advance the cause of 
States' Rights in the Austrahan Federation. Bjelke-Petersen had a 
controversial role in the 1975 Constitutional crisis with his constant 
criticisms of the Whitlam Government and his use of the Senate as a States' 
House. The media journalists and some academics have referred to Bjelke-
Petersen as a States' Rights champion however a closer look disproves this 
claim. Despite his advocacy for a return to the Founders original intention 
for a co-ordinate federal system, where the Commonwealth and the States 
are independent of each other, Bjelke-Petersen did not negotiate with the 
Commonwealth for greater State legal and fmancial responsibility. 
The shift in the federal balance away from the States toward the 
Commonwealth has been mainly due to the decisions of the High Court and 
the Vertical Fiscal Imbalance between the Commonwealth and the States 
that has been upheld by the High Court. I use the High Court decisions to 
demonstrate the background to the development of States' Rights 
arguments against the increasing centralising of power in Australia of the 
Commonwealth Government at the expense of the legal and fmancial 
independence of the States. 
n 
The origin and development of States' Rights is evaluated in the four 
stages of the development of the shifting federal balance: (1) the Original 
Intentions of the Founders for co-ordinate federalism; (2) the Drift Away 
from the Original Intention of the Founders for co-ordinate federalism; (3) 
the Fight Back in the 1970s by the States, led by the Queensland Premier 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen, against Commonwealth interference in the 
constitutional functions of the States; (4) The Queensland National Party 
Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen and his views on States' Rights in Australia's 
co-ordinate federal system, which were in reaUty anti-Commonwealth 
Government and anti-Labor party political ideology. 
I conclude that after the end of the Bjelke-Petersen era of 
confrontationist style federalism, there have been some encouraging signs 
of cooperation in intergovernmental relations. Recent developments in 
Austrahan federalism have shown some success with a cooperative 
approach between the Commonwealth and the States. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is to determine to what extent the States' Rights views of the 
former Queensland Premier Johannes Bjelke-Petersen and other similar States' Rights 
advocates had an impact on the development of co-ordinate federalism in the Austrahan 
federation. The Australian founders intended to set up a system of co-ordinate federalism, 
under the Australian Constitution; this meant that powers and policy responsibilities of the 
Commonwealth and the States remained separate and distinct. Co-ordinate (classic or dual) 
federahsm involved the notion of equality between the governments of the federation. Each 
State was to have a status comparable with the central government. There was to be no 
formal subordination of one government to another. 
It has, however, become evident that since Federation in 1901 the Australian federal 
balance has shifted in favour of the Commonwealth at the expense of the States. The 
judicial decisions of the High Court since the landmark Engineers Case: Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers V. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (1920), 28 C.L.R. 129 along with the 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance of taxing and spending powers in favour of the Commonwealth, 
has tipped the federal balance overwhelmingly against the States. The assertion of States' 
Rights by State pohticians, such as Bjelke-Petersen in the 1970s, in an attempt to fight back 
against the Whitlam Government has not prevented the shift in the federal balance toward 
the Commonwealth. The position of States' Rights in the Australian federal system 
remains ambiguous but a recent cooperative approach to federalism is producing better 
results than the confrontational style of Bjelke-Petersen. 
This thesis examines the argument that the advocacy of States' Rights by a 
spokesperson such as Bjelke-Petersen did not advance its cause for the future of Austrahan 
federalism. The thesis examines the founding of Australia as a co-ordinate federal system 
and its shift of power to the Commonwealth despite the efforts of Bjelke-Petersen and his 
States' Rights views in the 1970s. The argument that this thesis makes covers the 
following eight general areas: First, Australia was founded as a federation. The 
Constitution envisages co-ordinate federalism; second. The federal principle strives to 
balance between the national and State governments; third. It is evident, however, that 
economic/judicial forces have tipped the balance of Australia's federation; fourth. The result 
has been strident assertion of States' Rights by State politicians such as Bjelke-Petersen; 
fifth. The high point of States' Rights occurred in the 1970s with Bjelke-Petersen as its 
most strident advocate; sixth. It is possible to make a philosophical defence of the federal 
principle but Bjelke-Petersen (and other Premiers) engaged in a rhetorical exercise by using 
the States' Rights language for political purposes; seventh. Hence, 'States' Rights' was 
surrounded in ambiguity and remains that way; eighth. Recent cooperative federalism 
initiatives are creating reforms that Bjelke-Petersen's States' Rights rhetoric did not. 
Discussion Of The Federal Principle. 
A preliminary discussion of federalism theory is required in order to clarify the 
federal principle and the Australian form of federalism adopted by the founders, that is, co-
ordinate federalism. This is necessary in order to understand the advocacy of States' 
Rights in Australia as a response to increasing centralism. Four political scientists and 
lawyers: Dicey, Wheare, Riker, and Sawer, have made significant contributions to our 
understanding of federalism. They have theorised about the notion of co-ordinate 
federalism so there is a theoretical foundation to the philosophy of States' Rights as 
advocated by advocates such as the former Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen and 
that is the classical notion of co-ordinate federalism. 
It is, however, difficult to find, or to give, a clear statement of what the concept of 
States' Rights entails. There are often a range of ideas that might be associated with the 
term and ideas change according to the context in which the term is used. States' Rights or 
Colonial Rights meant something to the Colonial politicians who attended the Constitutional 
Conventions in the 1890s and meant something else to State and Commonwealth pohticians 
after Federation in 1901. Similariy the politicians in the 1970's had a different view again. 
In times of political and economic crisis the States' pohticians wanted greater concessions 
from the Commonwealth and in times of booming economies and financial growth the 
States' politicians wanted greater independence from the Commonwealth. 
A.V. Dicey (1915: 137), in his book Introduction to the Study of Law of the 
Constitution, describes federalism as being motivated by a desire for 'union without unity'. 
Dicey presented a proposition that a successful federal system required at the same time a 
desire for unity for some purposes and separateness for others, he listed the main factors 
causing these desires, and in so doing distinguished between the desire for federation and 
the capacity to make it work. Federalism is, as a result, a symbol of both unity and 
diversity. In an attempt to compare unitary and federal systems. Dicey observed that 
The distribution of all the powers of the state among 
coordinate authorities necessarily leads to the result that no 
one authority can wield the same amount of power as under 
a unitarian constitution is possessed by the sovereign. A 
scheme again checks and balances in which the strength of 
the common government is so to speak pitted against that of 
the state government leads, on the face of it, to a certain 
waste of the energy. A federation therefore will always be at 
a disadvantage in a contest with unitarian states of equal 
resources (1915: 171-2). 
The Australian constitutional lawyer and political scientist Sir Kenneth C. Wheare 
(1947), wrote the classic postwar account of federal government in his book Federal 
Goverament. The 'federal principle', according to Wheare (1947: 11), meant 'the methods 
of dividing power so that the general and regional governments are, each, within a sphere 
co-ordinate and independent'. Geoffrey Sawer (1969), another constitutional lawyer and 
political scientist in his book Modem Federalism, proposes a similar definition when he 
speaks of federalism as 'geographical devolution with guarantees for the autonomy of the 
units' (1969: 179). According to Wheare's criteria, there were only four 'classic' 
federations: the United States, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland. Wheare's mainly 
legalistic and formal attitude toward federalism, which emphasises the separate and distinct 
spheres of federal and State (or provincial) power, retains political significance today. 
Wheare's relevance is seen in his views that within a federation, the governments are co-
equal in status; that the two tiers of government must respect each other's presence; and that 
Equality among the States influence the process, and eventually the outcome of decision-
making CWheare 1947). Wheare divided the factors promoting federalism into two 
categories. First he identifies factors favouring a desire for unitv: 
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(a) Geographical closeness. 
(b) A sense of military insecurity and a consequent need for 
common defence. 
(c) The presence of a common market, and expected 
economic advantages. 
(d) A history of previous associations or common 
subjection. 
(e) A sufficient degree of natural sympathy among the 
people, including common language, ethnicity, religion and 
political institutions, involving similar levels of political and 
administrative sophistication. 
(f) At least a desire for, and a drive towards, the forms of 
democracy appropriate to a plural society. It has been 
suggested that 'effective federalism can exist only in nations 
with a democratic form of government'. 
(g) A sufficient number of federalising units [Sawer 
suggests five], probably without 'a very marked inequality 
of strength among the several contrasting States' (1947: 37). 
Second, Wheare points to factors favouring a desire for separateness: 
(a) Natural geographic divisions. 
(b) Some divergence of economic interest. 
(c) A history of autonomy or regional self-government. 
(d) Some disparity of social and political structures. 
(e) A sufficient population (including expertise), resources 
and economic development to provide for the various States 
or provinces or cantons to conduct their own affairs (1947: 
41-2). 
W.H. Riker (1964), in his book Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, 
defines federalism in a simple and formal way by saying that a constitution is federal if it 
provides for two levels of govemment, each of which has at least one area of action in 
which it is autonomous, and each of which has 'some guarantee (even though merely a 
statement in the constitution)' of its contained autonomy within its sphere (1964: 11). For 
Riker this is the result of a political bargain within a historically unique situation. After an 
examination of these situations, he concludes that there are always two conditions present 
leading toward the federal 'bargain'. The first condition is the existence of politicians who 
wish to expand the area of territorial control, either 'to meet an extemal mihtary or 
diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression' (1964: 12). The 
second condition is the willingness of the assenting pohticians to surrender part of their 
independence, either because 'they desire protection from an extemal threat' or because 
'they desire to participate in the potential aggression of the federation' (1964: 12). The 
other question which Riker deals is the conditions for the maintenance of a federal system. 
He arrives at a single and tentative conclusion: that whether or not a federal system survives 
depends on the nature of the party system that develops (1964: 136) (Riker 1964 cited in 
Wildavsky 1967: 62). 
The Australian, Geoffrey Sawer, one of the most eminent modem commentators on 
the concept of federalism, is reluctant to define federalism, partly due to the problem of 
'sovereignty'. The sovereignty problem is ~ where does the final power reside, with the 
Commonwealth or with the States? As Sawer says, 'federalism ... takes risks in this 
regard' (1976: 96). Sawer prefers to speak of 'a federal situation' or 'spectrum of 
federalism. This approach differs from the approach adopted by Wheare. Sawer outlines 
six basic federal principles: 
(1) A country which, taken as a whole, is a nation state, an 
independent unit..., is provided with a set of institutions 
required for the work of govemment, having authority over 
the whole of that country. (... a CENTRE.) 
(2) This country is also divided into a number of 
geographical areas, each of which is also equipped with a 
set of institutions required for the work of govemment in 
that area, (...a REGION) 
(3) The power to govern is distributed between the centre 
and the regions ... each set of governmental institutions has 
a direct impact on the individual citizens... 
(4) The distribution of competence between centre and 
regions is effected by a constitution (usually written) having 
a fair degree of rigidity, ... This implies the inability of a 
region to secede, unless the terms of the constitution 
specifically authorise such a step. 
(5) The constitution provides rules to determine any conflict 
of authority between centre and regions ... the general rule is 
that the centre law prevails. 
(6) The distribution of competence between centre and 
regions is interpreted and policed by a judicial authority 
...(Sawer 1976: 1). 
The views of Dicey, Riker, Wheare, and Sawer on federalism have been used to 
bring together some of the views of the major federalism theorists who have contributed 
greatly to our understanding of the theoretical foundation of federalism from which we can 
gain a greater understanding of Australian federalism. Dual federalism or co-ordinate 
federalism, is the general theoretical conception of the theorists mentioned above; it was 
this form of federalism, that is, co-ordinate federalism that the founders of Austrahan 
federalism intended to entrench in the Australian Constitution. The founders of Austrahan 
federalism followed the American federal system with a division of powers between the 
Commonwealth or national govemment and the States or sub-national (regional/provincial) 
governments, each level of govemment was independent with its own constitutional 
functions and the national govemment was to have a limited role with specific powers and 
the State governments were to have all other unnamed or reserved powers. 
Co-ordinate Federalism And The Theoretical Premise Of Australian States' Rights. 
There are two schools of thought: (1) the co-ordinate view, and (2) the concurrent 
view. There has been a tradition of Australian legal authority from the time of Sir Samuel 
Griffith Chief Justice [CJ] of the High Court supporting the view that Australian federalism 
is essentially co-ordinate in design. Griffith viewed the governmental stmcture in die 
Constitution as co-ordinate federalism, where the Commonwealth and the States were each 
'sovereign' within their respective fields and each was to be free to perform its functions 
and exercise its powers without interference, burden or hindrance from the other 
government The Griffith view created and developed the Australian doctrine of the 
immunity of instrumentalities, which was taken from principles in the United States in the 
nineteenth century. The Australian Constitution was seen as an agreement among 
sovereign powers to give up some of their power to a new central body (the 
Commonwealth), and preserve their sovereignty over the rest. The original intention of the 
Australian founders, including the vision of Sir Samuel Griffith, was a co-ordinate federal 
system. Leslie Zines, an eminent Australian academic lawyer and constitutional authority, 
restated the conventional wisdom thus: 'The co-ordinate position of the States and the 
Commonwealth was seen as part of the essence of a federation, which was the description 
given by the preamble to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act to the new pohty 
it created' (1981: 1). High Court decisions under Griffith CJ which supported this view 
of federalism were D'Emden v. Pedder (1904) 1 C.L.R. 91; Deakin v. Webb (1904) 1 
C.L.R. 585; the Railway Servants' Case: Federated Amalgamated Government RaHwav 
and Tramway Service Association v. New South Wales Railway Traffic Employees 
Association (1906) 4 C.L.R. 488 (Zines 1981: 1). 
In Australia the co-ordinate attitude was the one most consistent with their general 
objectives of transferring specific responsibihties to the centre, while leaving the regions to 
mn their own affairs (Sawer 1976: 51: 54). James Bryce (1888), an English authority on 
American federalism, wrote the book The American Commonwealth: it was this book_ 
which put forward a co-ordinate view of American federalism. This was the authority for 
the Australian Constitutional authors. To illustrate his extreme model of co-ordinacy, 
Bryce used the graphic imagery of two sets of machines operating within the one factory 
(Bryce Vol. 1, 1888: 432). A similar view of federalism is adopted by Keimeth Wheare. 
For him the test of whether a regime is tmly federal and not just decentralised, is whether 
the system embodies 'predominantly a division of powers between general and regional 
authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the others and 
mdependent of them' (1947: 32-3). 
It may be said, with some authority, that the founders of Australian federahsm 
intended and wrote into the Constitution a co-ordinate federal system. The founders 
intention for a co-ordinate federal system in Australia has presented problems for the States 
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who claim to be sovereign within a divided sovereignty. Sir Edmund Barton, one of the 
founders of Australian federalism, stated in 1897 modifying the resolutions of the 1891 
convention for brevity and simplicity that the first of the principal conditions of federation 
was: 
That powers privileges and territories of the several existing 
colonies shall remain intact, except in respect of such 
surrenders as may be agreed upon to secure uniformity of 
law and administration in matters of common concem 
(quoted in Norris 1975, 4). 
One of Australia's authorities on the Australian Constitution and the division of powers 
between the Commonwealth and the States and the co-ordinate nature of Austrahan 
federalism is Sir John Quick. In his book The Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth 
and the States of Australia with Proposed Amendments, Quick wrote the following: 
Generally speaking the Australian Constitution, following 
the model of the Constitution of the United States, has given 
specific subject matters to the Federal Parhament and the 
residue of possible subject matters to the state Parhaments. 
This method of distribution leaves the states a mass of 
exclusive powers which cannot be invoked or interfered with 
by the Federal Authority and it also leaves to the states, in 
addition to their exclusive powers, certain concurrent powers 
as to matters within the federal sphere to pass laws not 
inconsistent with federal laws (1919: 268-9). 
The States' Premiers, since federation, have been constant critics of the 
development of Australian federahsm and have claimed that the Commonwealth has 
expanded its policy role at the States expense. This has particularly been the situation 
during the postwar decades where Australian federalism has become cluttered and confused 
by intergovernmental arrangements. These arrangements have led to duplication and 
overlap of functions between levels of government. One possible solution to this problem 
is to return to a more co-ordinate approach by reallocating roles and responsibilities 
unambiguously to one level of govemment or the other. To ensure that each level of 
govemment is properly responsible and accountable for its actions, it is necessary to sort 
out the specific roles and functions of the Commonwealth and the States (Galligan 1995: 
192). 
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On the other hand, federalism is not only about dividing power; it is also about 
sharing it(Emy 1978: 82). It is argued by Brian Galhgan (1995: 192) that the co-ordinate 
view of Australian federahsm is misconceived. He argues that both levels of goverament 
share most areas of policy and fiscal jurisdiction and that the Australian Constitution's 
structural design of the federal division of powers is essentially concurrent. Firmly 
grounded in the Constitution, according to Galligan, is the concurrency of the division of 
powers between the Commonwealth and the States and the allocation of taxing and 
spending powers. The many intergovernmental arrangements, and especially the recent 
Special Premiers' Conference process, has demonstrated that Australian federahsm is 
concurrent and capable of achieving results through cooperation. Galhgan further argues 
that the division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States, in the Austrahan 
Constitution, is essentially concurrent rather than co-ordinate because the Commonwealth's 
powers are predominantly concurrent, not exclusive. Section 51 of the Constitution sets 
out most of the Commonwealth's powers in the thirty-nine heads of power which are 
mostly concurrent. In a federation, decentrahsed administration is an obvious reason for 
preserving an area of guaranteed regional autonomy. 
As common sense suggests, Wheare (1947) was correct in assigning defence, 
foreign policy, and some taxation powers as the minimum competence for a federal centre. 
The powers of the centre have expanded largely in the field of economic and social welfare 
policy (Sawer 1976: 107). On the other hand, writers such as Michael Crommehn (1992), 
lament that there are no enumerated State powers in the Constitution. The States' residual 
powers however include everything that is not 'exclusively vested in the Parhament of the 
Commonwealth or withdrawn from the parliament of the State' (section 107). Galhgan 
probably overstates the case for concurrency rather than co-ordinacy in Austrahan 
federahsm but makes an important point about concurrency when he notes that the 
advantage of concurrency may be summarised by the adage 'Two governments are better 
than one'(1995: 199,202). 
The basic assumption throughout the thesis that will be presented below is that the 
founders of the Australian federal system in the Constitution envisaged a co-ordinate 
federahsm with a minimum number of exclusive Commonwealth powers and the States 
having both residual and concurrent powers. 
Economic/Judicial Forces Have Tipped The Federal Balance. 
Over the years since federation there have been High Court decisions and federal -
State financial arrangements made that have shifted the federal balance toward the 
Commonwealth and away from the States. The High Court in the Engineers Case (1920) 
moved away from an essentially States' Rights approach or a co-ordinate federal balance 
approach, toward an approach favourable to the increase of federal powers. The effect of 
the Engineers Case was that while it enhanced central power in Australia, the result was 
produced by emphasising the rules of constmction and what later was to be called 
'legalism' (Zines 1981: 14). The Engineers doctrine has dominated the High Court's 
approach to interpreting the Constitution ever since, though there have been occasional 
blips. The powers given to the Commonwealth in s.51 were given, in the introductory 
clause, 'subject to this Constitution'. The High Court has held that all of the 
Commonwealth's powers were limited by s.92, and there had to be read into the 
Constitution hmits on the Commonwealth's powers to make laws with respect to interstate 
trade and commerce, under s.51 (i) (Solomon 1992: 139). 
The First Uniform Tax Case: South Australia v. Commonwealth (1942) 65 C.L.R. 
373, gave the Commonwealth financial superiority over the States. The Tasmanian Dam 
Case: Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1, 46 A.L.R. 625, continued the 
process of shifting away from a States' Rights or co-ordinate federalism approach and gave 
the Commonwealth sweeping powers on almost any issue due to the extemal affairs 
power. In the Uniform Tax Case (1942i,Chief Justice Latham noted that the matter before 
the court was stricdy 'a legal controversy, not a political controversy' (Uniform Tax Case 
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1942: 409). All members (Latham CJ, Rich, Starke, McTieman, and WiUiams JJ) of the 
High Court held that the Income Tax Act 1942 was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth 
power. Latham CJ noted for the majority that by tying conditions to section 96 grants the 
Commonwealth could destroy the independence of the States: 
Thus, if the Commonwealth Parliament were prepared to 
pass such legislation, all State powers would be controlled 
by the Commonwealth - a result which would mean the end 
of the political independence of the States. Such a result 
cannot be prevented by any legal decision (Uniform Tax 
Case 1942: 429). 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983), the majority of the judges went out of their 
way to reaffirm the Engineers orthodoxy of no imphed restrictions to Commonwealth 
powers regardless of the extent of their invasion of State jurisdiction. Mason J, the senior 
majority judge who was subsequently appointed CJ, acknowledged that Commonwealth 
legislation would be invahdif it 'inhibited or impaired the continued existence of a State or 
its capacity to function' (Tasmanian Dam Case 1983: 139) but the World Heritage 
Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) did not achieve that result, despite the Act's 
prohibition of a wide range of activities on land owned by the State (Hanks 1991: 198). 
Mason J affirmed 'that there are virtually no limits to the topics which may hereafter 
become the subject of international co-operation and international treaties or conventions' 
(Tasmanian Dam Case 1983: 486). In dissent, Gibbs CJ expressed concem that the: 
division of powers between the Commonwealth and the 
states which the Constitution effects could be rendered quite 
meaningless if the Federal Govemment could, by entering 
into treaties with foreign governments on matters of 
domestic concem, enlarge the legislative powers of 
Parliament so that they embraced literally all fields of activity 
(Tasmanian Dam Case 1983: 475). 
The Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) demonstrates the length that the High Court's 
strict 'legalism' and reliance on the rules of statutory interpretation in the Engineers Case 
(1920) had travelled in extending the powers of the Commonwealth at the expense of co-
ordinate federahsm and the doctrine of reserved powers and the implied immunity of the 
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States in Australia. The importance of the Engineers Case (1920) in overturning States' 
Rights was acknowledged in an earlier High Court decision: Strickland v. Rocla Concrete 
Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 C.L.R. 468 at 485, in which Barwick CJ was able to say: "This was 
the so-called reserved powers doctrine which was exploded and unambiguously rejected by 
this court in the year 1920 in the decision of [the Engineers' Case]." Again in another High 
Court decision: Payroll Tax Case (1971) 122 C.L.R. 353, Wmdeyer J at 396 was able to 
say: "As I see it the Engineers' Case, looked at as an event in legal and constitutional 
history, was a consequence of developments that had occurred outside the law as well as a 
cause of further developments there." The Australian founders intention of co-ordinate 
federalism and States' Rights was abandoned for the clarity of 'legalism' by the High Court 
judges. 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance. 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (V.F.I.) refers to the fact that there is not a neat or 
complete matching of expenditure responsibilities and revenue potential for each level of 
govemment resulting in one level having more expenditure responsibilities than it can 
finance from its own sources of revenue, and the other level of govemment in the obverse 
situation with more revenue available to it than it needs to carry out its constitutional 
obligations (Wiltshire 1986: 174-5). The Australian Constitution created a fiscal imbalance 
in favour of the Commonwealth at the expense of the States; but the federal fiscal 
arrangements, and sharing of revenue between levels of governments for expenditure 
responsibilities have been increasingly made in favour of the Commonwealth; these 
changes have arisen from Commonwealth legislation which have been upheld by High 
Court decisions. 
The most contentious aspect of Australian federahsm is the vertical fiscal imbalance. 
It results from two factors. First, the Commonwealth has continued the income tax 
monopoly that was established in the Uniform Tax Case (1942) as a wartime measure but 
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sanctioned by the High Court on grounds other than the defence power and thereby 
maintained during peace. Second, because of the High Court's interpretation of 'excise 
duties', which the Constimtion (s.90) precludes the States from levying, the States are 
unable to levy broad-based consumption or general sales taxes ((jalligan 1995: 226-7). 
There have been various periods of financial assistance to the States under section 
96 of the Constitution since Federation which have increasingly favoured Commonwealth 
financial control over the States and Commonwealth interference in the activities of the 
States. This has particularly been the situation since the Uniform Tax Case (1942), where 
the Commonwealth has made general revenue grants to compensate the States for loss of 
income tax. That case established the right of the Commonwealth to attach conditions to 
grants to the States; this meant that the Commonwealth could reach into the heart of State 
governmental power. The general revenue grants were conditional on the abstention of the 
States from imposing their own income taxes (Lumb 1986: 332-3). The Menzies and 
Gorton Governments of the 1950s and 1960s made significant and increasing use of such 
grants to the States; the States increasingly resented what they saw as interference in the 
activities of the States. 
In the early 1970s, however, the Whitlam Government's use of grants to the States 
for specific purposes brought an intense States' Rights reaction from the States, 
particularly from the Western Australian Premier, Sir Claries Court, and the Queensland 
Premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen. The Whitlam Govemment amended the Grants 
Commission legislation in 1973 to require that body to report to the responsible Minister on 
grants of special assistance to a State or States for the purpose of approved regional 
organisations or local govemment bodies when this was put into action the States' Rights 
anti-Commonwealth Govemment and anti-Whitlam party political rhetoric from Bjelke-
Petersen became intense. 
The States' Rights position by Bjelke-Petersen, in not cooperating with the 
Commonwealth in federal reforms such as Malcolm Fraser's offer to give the States the 
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right to levy a top-up income tax, continued during the Fraser Govemment from the mid 
1970s to the early 1980s and then during the 1980s with the Hawke Govemment; this 
position of non cooperation with the Commonwealth validates the claim that there was no 
real attempt by Bjelke-Petersen to advance the cause of States' Rights. Bjelke-Petersen did 
not attempt to cooperate with the Commonwealth or attempt to advance a well thought out 
argument to promote from the States perspective an updated and workable co-ordinate 
federal system. Bjelke-Petersen did not attempt the introduction of a State income tax or 
genuine State taxes and charges; also he made no real attempt at sharing (or transferring) 
responsibihties to the Commonwealth to clarify a co-ordinate federal system; instead, in 
practice, he continued with party political ideological criticisms of the Commonwealth. 
The Colloquial States' Rights Case is More Rhetorical Than Considered. 
The Macmillan Dictionary of Australian Politics, within a definition of the term States' 
Rights, notes the former Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen, who was Premier 
between 1968 and 1987, and his standing as a champion of States' Rights: 
The most strident States' Rights advocate was Premier 
Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, but all Premiers, Labor and 
Liberal, have used the rhetorical weapon at some time. 
Bjelke-Petersen proved to be a fundamentalist Christian, passionately anti-socialist, 
and a fervent advocate of unfettered development, and his personal beliefs about the 
'Rights of Queensland' put him into direct conflict with the Whitlam Labor Govemment 
(1972-75). Sectional interests were seen to predominate in Queensland and such interests 
were opposed to high levels of tariff protection, restrictions on intemational capital 
movements, strong trade unions, and restrictions on land-use for conservation or 
Aboriginal land rights. These issues were able to be frequently exploited by Bjelke-
Petersen; he saw States' Rights as a local vote winner through the presentation of issues as 
Commonwealth Government interference in State matters. The Premier forcibly asserted 
"States' Rights" arguments in these and other issues on behalf of the Queensland 
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Govemment in order to 'defend Queensland' from the encroachment of the Commonwealth 
(Galligan 1986, 68). Bjelke-Petersen has been an advocate for Queensland and for 
Queensland interests, but this has been linked with and termed States' Rights: 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen has been a consistent champion of 
States' Rights in the Australian federal system. And he has 
prided himself on being a steadfast advocate for 
Queensland's interests ahead of all others at Premiers' 
Conferences and other negotiations between the federal 
govemment and the States (Patience 1985: 13). 
During the 1970s, Premiers Sir Johannes Bjelke-Petersen (Queensland) and Sir 
Charles Court (Western Australia) had honed their skiUs in using their States' pohtical 
resources in confrontations with Prime Minister Whitiam. They had opposed Prime 
Minister Fraser and possessed few inhibitions in thwarting his initiatives (GiUespie 1994: 
80). It has been said that geographical loyalties are stronger than ideological loyalties: 
The 'States' rights' position which became increasingly 
prominent during the 1970s, particularly during the Whidam 
era, reinforces the notion that geographical loyalties are 
stronger than ideological loyalties. This States' rights' 
position, or 'Canberra bashing' as it is known, has been the 
forte of the Bjelke-Petersen govemment (Jaensch 1985: 
263). 
Bjelke-Petersen maintained a strong interest in the States' (that is Queensland's) 
residual constitutional powers arising from Queensland's historical experience in the 
formation and development of Australian federalism. This is very well illustrated by his 
role in challenging the constitutional security of the Whitlam govemment, particularly 
during the events leading up to the dismissal of that govemment by the Governor-General 
in November 1975. There are many other less dramatic events that have highlighted many 
important federal issues. Bjelke-Petersen has contradicted the federal govemment on many 
and varied questions of federal policy impacting on the States: Bjelke-Petersen's original 
stand against Medibank, his opposition to federal funding of women's shelters, his 
blocking of land rights for Aborigines, his policies against environmental protection and his 
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promotion of mining of areas such as the Great Barrier Reef and Fraser Island. Bjelke-
Petersen's opposition was loud and continuous to the Whitiam Government's new 
federahsm policies of financing through grants, the traditionaUy State-controlled areas such 
as education, health, and local govemment. Often Bjelke-Petersen forced the federal 
govemment to withdraw from federal issues involving Queensland (Patience 1985: 13). 
Allan Patience, writing in 1985 about State politics in Australia, saw Queensland 
under the leadership of Bjelke-Petersen as part of an emerging crisis in Austrahan 
federalism. He came to the conclusion that 
the Queensland govemment has, under the Bjelke-Petersen 
Premiership, tested the outer hmits of Australian federalism 
and drawn the line on further centrahsation of the Austrahan 
federal system. Premier Bjelke-Petersen has been 
remarkably successful in re-defining the residual 
constitutional powers of the States and asserting their pre-
eminence in the federal system (Patience 1985, 13). 
Who Is Bielke-Petersen? 
Sir Johannes (Joh) Bjelke-Petersen (1911— ) was a Queensland State National 
Party politician, and outspoken States' Rights advocate; he was vocal in his opposition to 
the Labor Party and his denunciation of the evils of socialism. He played a leading part in 
the events leading up to the 1975 dismissal of the WTiitiam govemment as the Premier of 
Queensland (1968-1987). Bjelke-Petersen was a strong proponent of States' Rights and an 
advocate of the Australian federal system of govemment with its co-ordinate division of 
powers between the Commonwealth and the States. He was also an advocate of the use of 
the Senate as a States' house. 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen was bom at Dannevirke in the North Island of New Zealand in 
1911 and migrated to Kingaroy, Queensland with his family three years later. His parent's 
intention was to farm land at Kingaroy, however much of the farm work was left to Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen because his father, a Lutheran pastor, was ill and his family was 
desperately poor. At thirteen Bjelke-Petersen left school to work the family farm full time. 
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Bjelke-Petersen diversified the work of the farm and moved into land clearing, contract 
fanning, peanut growing, and aerial seeding; he became a local businessman. In 1946 
Bjelke-Petersen was elected a member of the Kingaroy Shire Council. He entered the 
Labor-dominated State Parhament in 1947 as the Country Party member for Nanango, at 
the time, a fairly marginal electorate. In the 1949 redistribution Nanango was abolished 
and from 1950 he was M.L.A. for Barambah, a new seat which incorporated most of his 
old electorate. The Country Party-Liberal Party coalition gained power in 1957 and Bjelke-
Petersen was Minister for Works and Housing from 1963 to 1968. In 1968 he became 
deputy leader of the Country Party and, following the death of Premier Jack Pizzey, on 2 
August 1968 was elected unopposed as Pizzey's successor and leader of the party. He 
thereby became Premier of the State. This was despite strong moves to have the Liberal 
Party Leader and Deputy Premier Gordon Chalk succeed Pizzey as the new Premier but 
Bjelke-Petersen had the numbers to be elected Leader of his party and also Premier 
(Fitzgerald 1984: 244). 
In 1970 Bjelke-Petersen narrowly survived an attempt by his own colleagues to 
depose him in the party room; he remained Premier of Queensland continuously for a 
further seventeen years. The Queensland govemment was the only instance of a non-Labor 
coalition in which the National Party was the dominant partner and after 1983 the Nationals 
governed alone until 1987. Bjelke-Petersen (aided by favourable electoral boundaries) in 
electoral terms, was extremely successful, first decimating the Labor Party (in 1974) and 
then his former coalition colleagues. Bjelke-Petersen's policies were extremely 
conservative and this, combined with his State chauvinism, often aroused controversy. 
Some notable examples of his conservatism are: his lack of support for Aboriginal land 
rights or for conservation issues, his attacks on the union movement, his stringent and 
authoritarian actions taken against demonstrators during the 1971 South African Rugby 
Union tour (which culminated in the declaration of a state of emergency). In 1972 Bjelke-
Petersen raised States' Rights issues in the form of rhetoric against the policies of the 
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federal Whitlam Government. In 1974, Bjelke-Petersen launched an effective and
consistent assault against the State and federal Labor Parties.
Bjelke-Petersen was particularly vocal in his opposition to the Labor Party and his
denunciation of the 'evils' of socialism. Bjelke-Petersen played a leading role in the events
leading to the dismissal of the Whitlam Government in 1975. In 1975 Bjelke-Petersen
contravened established convention by appointing Pat Field (not the A.L.P. nominee) to the
Queensland Senate vacancy created by the death of the Labor Senator, Bert Milliner; he
escalated his assault on the federal A.L.P. government with personal attacks on Gough
Whitlam. This contributed to instability and eventual downfall of that government with its
dismissal by the Governor-General. Bjelke-Petersen also did not hesitate to extend his
criticisms to Liberal federal governments when he felt their policy to be detrimental to
Queensland State interests.
In 1977 with three cornered electoral contests in Queensland, with most electorates
contested by Labor, Liberal, and National Parties, the Nationals identified their main enemy
as the Liberals. In 1982 in Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982): 153 C.L.R. 168, the
High Court sanctioned Commonwealth legislation outlawing racial discrimination that
overruled Bjelke-Petersen's competing State land title legislation. In 1983, after the new
Liberal Party Leader Terry White was rejected by Bjelke-Petersen, and the coalition
agreement ended, the National Party under the leadership of Bjelke-Petersen won the
Queensland State election in its own right. In 1985 Bjelke-Petersen sacked electricity
workers; this dispute escalated into an electricity strike and a bitter dispute with the federal
Hawke Labor Government. In the Queensland Electricity Commission Case: Queensland
Electricity Commission v. Commonwealth (1985) 159 C.L.R. 192, the High Court held
that the Commonwealth legislation was invalid because it breached the implied federal
implicationof not discriminating against a State or State instrumentality.
In 1986 with the Queensland Nationals safely re-elected and once again able to
govern in their own right, Bjelke-Petersen, aided by intense media speculation, turned his
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attention to federal politics in a drive to bring the hard-hne conservatism that he espoused to 
Canberra. After many years of advocating States' Rights and the interests of Queensland in 
a co-ordinate federal system, Bjelke-Petersen showed his underlying party pohtical 
ambitions and willingness to use the federal political system and mn for election to the 
central Commonwealth govemment In early 1987 his efforts and those of his Queensland 
and New Right backers, met initial success when they succeeded in destroying the federal 
liberal-National coalition and undermined the position of the federal National Party leader, 
Ian Sinclair. With the surprise calling of an early federal election however, the bubble 
burst and the 'Joh for Canberra' campaign was revealed as lacking a solid organisational 
base and significant nationwide support. Bjelke-Petersen's subsequent ignominious 
withdrawl from the campaign in May 1987, and the strong swing to Labor in (^eensland 
in the July 1987 federal election, indicated that he had seriously overreached himself. 
The revelations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry into Illegal Activities and Pohce 
Misconduct in Queensland damaged irretrievably the image of Bjelke-Petersen as Premier 
and the National Party in general in Queensland. After a leadership battie Bjelke-Petersen 
was forced to resign by his own Cabinet colleagues, Mike Ahem then replaced him as 
Premier in December 1987. In November 1990 Bjelke-Petersen became the first Austrahan 
Premier to be charged with comiption, as a result of evidence given before the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry. 
Post Bjelke-Petersen Queensland. 
After Bjelke-Petersen left the political scene there has developed in Queensland a 
greater willingness to cooperate and work with the Commonwealth Govemment. The 
party political ideology, anti-Labor, anti-Commonwealth and States' Rights views of the 
former Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen did httie to advance the cause of co-
ordinate federalism and intergovernmental relations in Australian federalism. 
Confrontations that Bjelke-Petersen had with the Whitiam Govemment in the early 1970s 
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over co-ordinate federalism and States' Rights issues continued, in a less dramatic fashion, 
with the Fraser Govemment in the mid 1970s to the early 1980s and continued with the 
Hawke Govemment in the early 1980s to late 1980s. 
The confrontational style and antagonistic anti-Commonwealth rhetoric from 
Bjelke-Petersen brought about a freeze in Queensland's relationship with the 
Commonwealth and forced the Commonwealth to be more inventive in the development, 
and be more assertive in the implementation, of its policies involving the States. Many of 
the State Government's High Court challenges to Commonwealth legislation have failed 
and have further consolidated the dominant position of the Commonwealth over the States. 
The Goss Labor Govemment (1989-96) in Queensland was far more willing than the 
Bjelke-Petersen Govemment to cooperate with the Commonwealth Govemment. 
The Queensland Labor Premier Wayne Goss cooperated in the Special Premiers 
Conference (S.P.C.)/Council of Australian Governments (C.O.A.G.) initiative launched 
by the Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke in 1990 (supported by the Liberal Party New 
South Wales Premier Nick Greiner) and created in 1992, and in the Labor Prime Minister 
Paul Keating's 1994 initiative of a new partnership and sharing of responsibility between 
the Commonwealth and the States, and C.O.A.G.'s adoption of the Hilmer Report 
recommendations in 1995. Premier Goss followed a cooperative approach in order to get a 
sensible, rational relationship with the Commonwealth and to get a better outcome for 
Queensland within the federal system. Even the Borbidge Govemment (1996--), although 
more wilhns to raise States' Rights as an issue and also more confrontational with the 
Commonwealth than the Goss Govemment, has so far been wilting to negotiate; more 
often than not, in the end, this govemment was prepared to cooperate with the Liberal 
Commonwealth Govemment led by Prime Minister John Howard within the federal 
system, as was seen on State legislation following National Gun Laws. The issue of 
Native Tide Land Claims for Aborigines which the Wik Case: The Wik Peoples v. The 
State of Queensland & Ors: The Thavorre People v. The State of Oueensland & Ors (1996) 
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05.08.97 Matter No. S45 of 1996, the Court (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, 
McHugh, Gummow, and Kirby JJ) held that Native Titie can coexist with pastoral leases 
on Crown land, may be a more difficult issue to attain cooperation between the States and 
the Commonwealth. 
Recent Developments. 
The Hawke Labor Government's New Federalism in the early 1990s was an 
ambitious attempt at improving intergovernmental relations; it has taken the focus off die 
Bjelke-Petersen style advocacy of States' Rights and co-ordinate federalism and placed it 
on a cooperative approach to federalism. The Commonwealth's overriding purpose was to 
promote microeconomic reform, as Prime Minister Hawke noted: 'The goals are to improve 
our national efficiency and intemational competitiveness, and to improve the dehvery and 
quality of the services governments provide'. Hawke insisted that if Australia was to have 
a more competitive economy, 'we must improve the performance of the structures which 
underpin the national economy ~ means better ports, a more modem transport system, 
faster communications, cheaper power' (Hawke 1990: 1-3). 
At the heads of govemment meeting in May 1992, there was an agreement to 
establish a Council of Australian Governments (C.O.A.G.). At its second meeting in June 
1993, although dominated by dramatic clashes over the Mabo Case: Mabo v. Queensland 
(No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, the rationalisation agenda continued. The States agreed to 
proceed with legislation to open up a national market in goods and services, to eliminate 
existing regulatory impediments, and to establish a National Road Transport Commission 
to develop uniform national regulations. They moved toward unifying rail (the N.R.C.) 
and the States' electricity grid systems (The National Grid Management Council). All these 
steps fell within market-based moves towards micro-economic reform. The shift from 
fiscal equahsation also continued (Gillespie 1994: 87). 
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In February 1994, Prime Minister Keating outhned his version of New Federalism 
by advocating 'a new partnership, a new sharing of responsibility for change' (Keating 
1994, 6). His new relationship with the States was based on four principles. The first was 
a recognition that 'the States have a vital role as units of government in Australia'. The 
second was that the States participate in the process of change because of advantages for 
the States. The third was that appropriate roles and responsibilities should be established. 
The fourth was that there would be no compromise on the Commonwealth Government's 
monopoly over income tax. In Hobart in 1994, the third C.O.A.G. meeting produced 
further agreements on microeconomic reform, most notably the principles of competition 
policy as articulated by the HiLmer Report (Galligan 1995: 211-13). 
Finding. 
Federation in Australia has evolved since 1901 from a classic co-ordinate federal 
system, which was the original intention of the founders; it has since drifted away from that 
intention with the shift in the federal balance away from the States toward the 
Commonwealth. The resultant fight back in the 1970s by the States, led by Bjelke-
Petersen with his States' Rights views and rhetoric against the Whitiam Govemment did 
not contribute to the further development of States' Rights and co-ordinate federalism. It 
continued however, the ambiguity of States' Rights that has existed in Australia since 
federation; this is despite the clear intention of the founders to establish a co-ordinate 
federal system. Recent developments in cooperative federahsm in Austraha have been 
more beneficial for federal-State relations and the development of Australian federalism 
than the Bjelke-Petersen style of States' Rights advocacy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORIGINAL INTENTIONS OF THE FOUNDERS FOR CO-ORDINATE 
FEDERALISM 
What Did The Constitutional Framers Want? 
States' Rights arguments have their origin in the concept of co-ordinate federalism 
and in the nineteenth century constitutional debates which settled upon this formula for 
Australia. The framers constmcted a "co-ordinate federalism" which was a compromise 
solution where the States were to be coequal with the Commonwealth and were to retain 
separate and independent identity and constitutional powers. The compromise solution was 
to be a mix of the British Westminster system and the federal system of the United States of 
America. In the Australian system of co-ordinate federalism, the central (federal) 
govemment and the regional (State) governments are all, under the Constitution, in theory, 
sovereign within their own sphere of responsibility. 
The Australian Constitution outlined the functions and powers of the federal 
govemment and the remaining (residual) powers were left to the States. There are however 
shared functions between the federal and State governments. The Constitution was 
designed to aUow the former Colonies to continue to exercise considerable political and 
constitutional independence. It is generally agreed that the framers of the Australian 
Constitution accepted that the Australian federation could not be achieved without the six 
Colonies accepting some loss of sovereignty, but they were not prepared to abandon a great 
deal of that sovereignty (McMillan et al 1983:39). 
LaNauze, and others, has demonstrated that federation was essentially acceptable 
to the Colonies because it created some institutions which were in the Colonies' common 
interests: a federation of defence forces and a common tariff and fiscal policy (La Nauze 
1972: 8-9, 11). The Colonies agreed to give up a hmited number of powers to create a nation 
state with a federal system, on the condition that they retained the bulk of their powers as 
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individual states of a Federation of States. Greenwood, amongst others, has suggested that 
the representatives of the Colonies at the Constitutional Conventions of the 1890's, realised 
that Federation would have to be bought at a price to the Colonies and the future States 
(Greenwood 1976: 39). 
The price paid (by the States in the future federation) to the centi^ or federal 
govemment was pointed out by one of the most prominent advocates for the Colonies, Sir 
Samuel Griffith. Griffith, from Queensland, was also one of the most important founders 
of the Australian Federation and in the 1890's noted the price to be paid by the Colonies or 
future states in the coming federation: 
The advantage of federation, like everything else will have 
to be paid for; we cannot get them without giving 
something in return, and every power which may be 
exercised by the Federal Govemment with greater advantage 
than the separate governments involves a corresponding 
diminution in the powers of the separate Governments and 
Legislatures (Victorian Pariiamentarv Papers, 1890:10). 
The founders of the Australian Federation set up a co-ordinate federal system in the 
Australian Constitution where the future States and Commonwealth would operate largely 
independently of each other in their separate constitutionally allocated functions. The 
Australian Commonwealth and co-ordinate federal system as set out in the Constitution was 
a response to the Colonies' demands for protection against centralised power in the future 
federation. The founders also saw in the future a potential threat to smaller Colonies 
(future States) from the combination of other Colonies (future States). The early 
constitutional debates on revenue and the Senate were major concems for the Colonies and 
Colonial pohticians before Federation (La Nauze 1972). 
Different Views From Two Framers Of The Constitution (eg. Clark, Griffith). 
La Nauze, amongst others, has demonstrated that two of the founders of the 
Australian Federation who also helped to draft the Australian Constitution, were Andrew 
Inghs Clark and Sir Samuel Griffitii (La Nauze 1972: 17, 24, 25, 28, 48, 49). Both of 
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these founders of the Australian Federation in the Constitutional debates, and afterwards, 
favoured the American Federal system and the strong powers given to the Senate and the 
High Court (La Nauze 1972: 25, 40, 56). 
Andrew Inglis Park Advocate For The Australian Federation And For States' Rights. 
Clark's Views On Federalism. 
Andrew Inglis Clark (1848-1908) was a great Federationist and advocate of a system 
of co-ordinate federalism; he contributed substantially to the Australian Federation and 
helped direct the Australian Federalist movement toward the American federalist model 
(Reynolds 1958; Neasey 1969; La Nauze 1972). Clark was one of two Tasmanian 
representatives to the Melboume Federation Conference (1890). He gave a speech which 
contained a clear picture of the sort of Constitution and co-ordinate federal system which he 
proposed for a future Australian Federation. Clark was next a Tasmanian delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention (1891) where he was chairman of the Judiciary Committee and 
member of the Drafting Committee. Before the 1891 Convention, he circulated a draft 
Constitution, much of which found its way, in similar or altered form, into the final 
document (Reynolds 1958: 67-75; LaNauze 1972, 26). Clark had the strongest influence 
on the Australian Constitution which was to take the United States, rather than the 
Canadian, form of federalism (Reynolds 1958: 64; Neasey 1969: 17; La Nauze 1972: 28). 
Despite being previously so enthusiastic for federation, in 1898 Clark, opposed Federation 
in the referendum on the ground of finance. Clark was concemed for the financial security 
of the small Colonies, in particular Tasmania. 
Clark was very strongly in favour of equal representation of the Colonies in the 
Senate, a matter bitteriy opposed by some large-Colony delegates at both Conventions. 
He advocated the principle, as did large-Colony delegates such as Barton and Wise, 
because it was essential to Federation and to the small Colonies. Clark spoke of the cmx 
of the problem of Federation as being, how to reconcile the interests of small and large 
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Colonies. Clark gave convincing reasons for the view that the only solution was a national 
parliament with a bicameral legislature with taxing power and an executive of its own. 
Clark preferred Barton's phrase "State interests" because the phrase "State Rights" had 
occasioned a good deal of misapprehension among some delegates at the 1891 Convention 
(Neasey 1969:12). Clark beheved that the Senate should have a full power of veto over all 
bills including money bills but this view proceeded from his understanding of the U.S. 
Constitution rather than extreme states-rightism. Clark could see clearly that the Colonies' 
interests might be endangered if they did not have equal representation in a Senate which 
had a co-ordinate power of veto over legislation (Neasey 1969: 6-12; La Nauze 1972: 25). 
Sir Samuel Walker Griffith Advocate For Australian Federation And States' Rights. 
Sir Samuel Walker Griffith's View On Federalism. 
Sir Samuel Walker Griffith (1845-1920) was a strong advocate of co-ordinate 
federalism and States' Rights; he was one of the main drafters of the Bill forming the basis 
of the Australian Constitution (La Nauze 1972; Crisp 1983). Griffith was a member of the 
Legislative Assembly in Queensland (1872-93), Attomey-General (1874-78), Leader of the 
Liberal Opposition (1879-83), and Uberal Premier (1883-88 and 1890 to 1893). He retired 
as Premier to become Chief Justice of Queensland from 1893 to 1903. With the 
establishment of the High Court in 1903 he became the first Chief Justice of Australia from 
1903 to 1919, in which role he constantiy supported States' Rights against die 
Commonwealth. 
Griffith was an unusual politician who compelled respect for his professional 
ability. He might be criticised for his record as a past Queensland Premier but people did 
not forget that he was not only legally qualified but an able and leamed lawyer, calm, 
cautious, and clear in exposition. At the Melboume Conference in 1890, if the discussion 
turned to actual forms of Constitutions, it was Griffith who was expected to instmct the 
Conference (La Nauze 1972:13). When he introduced the draft Bill of the Constitution into 
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the Convention of 1891, Griffith stated that, from a States' Rights perspective, the list of
powers ceded to the Federal Government needed little elaboration; he simply cited the
heads of power stressing the minimal nature of the grant of exclusive powers and the
breadth of concurrent powers (Official Report of the National Australasian Convention
Sydney 1891: 524).
At the 1891 Convention, a similar States' Rights view to Griffith was taken by
another founder of Australian co-ordinate federalism, that is, Deakin who made the point
that the Australian Colonies had not yet reached a point at which they desired amalgamation
but they had reached a point at which they desired closer union. The Colonies were willing
to surrender authority on certain matters of common concern but they refused to part with
their powers on all questions where their local self-government could operate efficiently. It
was clear that certain unities had become essential at the time and the concept of federation
was largely the result of an attempt to secure them with a minimum loss of local powers.
The question for the Colonies' delegates was what price they were willing to pay to secure
a measure of unified action? The price was to be stated in terms of the exercise of
diminished control by each of the self-governing States. The reality that federation would
have to be bought was clearly realised by the delegates of the Colonies (Greenwood 1976:
38-9).
Concerns Of Small Vis-a-vis The Large States/Colonies.
The founders of the Australian Federation had incorporated in the Constitution an
aspect of equality and balance between the States whether of large or small population size.
The origin of co-ordinate federalism had not only been a defence against the
Commonwealth but a defence against other States. At the time of Federation the small
Colonies of South Australia, Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania feared the
numerical superiority of the large Colonies of New South Wales and Victoria (La Nauze
1972: 140,147). Deakin, also identified the concern of the Colonies, that is, the
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combination of the two populous states New South Wales and Victoria to oppress the other 
states. At the Adelaide Convention in 1897, Deakin said the foUowing: 
*&• 
All arguments against us (i.e. those favouring a stronger 
central government) are based upon imaginary extraordinary 
instances in which two populous states united to oppress 
their fellows, a contingency which will never, in my 
opinion, occur (Federal Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897: 
510). 
It was felt that there had to be a balance to the democratic rule of the many ~ the simple 
majority of the total Australian population. This could be done by priviligeing democracy 
with the result of the rule of a selected few Colonies or an oligarchy of a selected few of 
the population on selected grounds such as property ownership. The first was decided 
upon; hence the Senate had to guarantee equal membership to all the Colonies whether they 
were large or smaU (La Nauze 1972: 73; Crisp 1983: 325). 
The federal principle required the dividing of power so that the general and regional 
govemment — that is, the Commonwealth and the States (large and small) — were each 
within a sphere co-ordinate and independent The Senate had to represent the Colonies and 
the policies of the Colonies. The Senate had to provide a counter balance to the people's 
house, that is, the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives had to 
represent a majority of the national population. The small Colonies were guaranteed their 
Colonies policies by equal representation in the Senate. This prevented the views of voters 
from the small Colonies from being constantly outvoted by the large Colonies within the 
federal framework (Greenwood 1976: 52). 
In Australia at the Constitutional Conventions of the 1890's, the small Colonies had 
to be reassured that they could join the central or Commonwealth govemment in the 
Federation without fearing the overwhelming voting superiority of the population of the 
lar<Jest Colonies, New South Wales and Victoria. There was a choms of "large States 
versus small" from the delegates of the Colonies at the Constimtional Conventions 
(R.Garran: Senate Select Committee on Standing Committees 1929-30, Evidence: 37). 
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This was an echo of the States' Rights calls from the American Constitution of Philadelphia 
where the thirteen states a century earlier agreed to form the American Federation. The 
point of having a Federal Govemment was to aUow constituent Colonies, large and small, 
to retain their separate identity and constitutional functions which were deemed to be 
properly theirs. At the same time, federation would create a National Govemment with 
executive authority which would exercise functions which the Colonies, even acting in 
consort, could not. Both Parkes and Barton, when introducing the resolutions to the 
respective Constitutional Conventions, claimed that Federation would simultaneously create 
a national govemment and expand the scope of the Colonies' powers (La Nauze 1972; 
Crisp 1983). 
Concems Of States/Colonies Vis-a-vis The Commonwealth. 
The founders of the Australian Constitution, many of whom were Colonial 
politicians, had given years of service to the pubhc life of their respective Colonies. They 
did not intend to cripple their famihar and tmsted institutions of Colonial responsible 
govemment for some proposed, as yet untested authority. Under the proposed 
Constitution the new authority was to be the Commonwealth in a new Federation, to which 
the Colonies felt no comparable allegiance. The founders of the Australian Constitution 
intended to keep as much of the powers of the Colonies as possible within the new Federal 
arrangement (La Nauze 1972). 
The division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States are set out in the 
Constitution with the functions of the Commonwealth specifically listed and the States 
(previously Colonies) were to retain the residue of constitutional functions; nevertheless 
where there was a conflict between the State and Commonwealth law, the Commonwealth 
law would prevail. The integrity and sovereignty of the States was to be preserved and 
protected by the Senate under the Constitution. The States' House, or Senate, in the 
Constitution was the prime example of the retention of Colonial sovereignty in the new 
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Federation. Indeed the retention of as much of the existing Colonial functions as possible 
may be seen as an attempt by the founders of the Australian Federation to vindicate dieir 
own past as Colonial pohticians (McMillan et al 1983:40; Crisp 1983:17). 
The argument for decentrahsed power, or a balance between the "centre" and the 
"periphery," was concisely put to the 1891 Convention by Cockbum from South Austraha. 
Cockbum indicates that the balance should be in favour of the "periphery" or regions, that 
is, the Colonies against the power of the centre. Govemment by the people cannot be 
govemment at the centre. Cockbum states that 
We know that the tendency is always to the centre, that the 
central authority constitutes a vortex which draws power to 
itself. Therefore all the buttresses and all the ties should be 
the other way, to enable the states to withstand the 
destruction of their powers by such absorption... 
Govemment at a central and distant point can never be 
Govemment by the people, and may be just as cmshing a 
tyranny under republican or Commonwealth forms as under 
the most absolute monarchy (cited in Cockbum 1901: 155, 
157). 
Problems Identified By The Founders At The Constitutional Conventions. 
The founders at the Constitutional Conventions in the 1890s set out the ideas in 
defence of Colonial or future States functions within the co-ordinate federal system which 
were entrenched in the Constitution. The founders set down in the Constitution the 
division of powers between the States and the Commonwealth. This division of powers 
and functions between the States and the Commonwealth was an obvious problem for the 
founders and was to continue to be a problem for intergovernmental relations between the 
States and the Commonwealth (La Nauze 1972). The Colonies, or future States, were to 
play a major role in the new Federation and were to retain much of their independent status; 
and the institution which was set up to protect the interests of the States was the Senate. 
The founders, however, also indicated that the Senate was hkely to develop a problem in its 
operation of fulfihngits constitutional role due to the rising significance of political parties, 
instead of the intended Colonies or States as the basic element (Official Record of the 
30 
National Australasian Convention, Sydney 1891: 434, and Debates of the Australasian 
Federal Convention. Adelaide 1897: 100, 173-4, 297-8). Deakin, as one of die founders, 
also appreciated that Party rather than State would be the central factor in the Senate (La 
Nauze 1972). 
Problems Of Co-ordinate Federalism: 
(i) Division Of Powers Between The Commonwealth And The States. 
The division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States in the 
Constitution was a problem identified by the founders at Constitutional Conventions. The 
line of demarcation between the Commonwealth and the States was not as clearly defined 
as the Colonies would have liked. The States were not allocated specific powers in the 
Constitution and were to share functions with the Commonwealth as well as to yield to the 
Commonwealth where their laws conflicted. Quick and Garran (1901), in The Annotated 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, asserted the argument of co-ordinate 
federalism, which outlines a clear line of demarcation in the Constitution between the 
Federal and State powers or spheres and there was to be equality between the governments 
in their separate status and constitutional functions (Quick and Garran 1901). The Federal 
govemment has some exclusive powers outlined primarily in section 51, but most are 
concurrent with the States, the residual powers are left to the States (McMillan et al 1983: 
42-3; Lumb 1986:353-5). 
Griffith outlined the problem of the division of powers when he stressed the 
minimal nature of the grant of exclusive powers and the breadth of concurrent power; he 
thought it both unscientific and impossible to list the powers which remained with the 
States (Official Report of the National Australasian Convention, Sydney 1891: 524, 525). 
The area of residuary power of theJStates Quick and Garran (1901: 935) described as 
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embracing "a large mass of constitutional, territorial, municipal and social powers". 
Among the areas within this power are, according to Lumb (1986), the fohowing: 
Agriculture and forests Land 
Charities Licenses 
Constitutions of the States Mining 
Courts Municipal institutions 
Departments of State Governments Pohce 
Education Prisons 
Factories and shops Taxation 
Fisheries Trade and commerce 
Game (including transport) 
Health State works 
It is important to note however that due to the increasing use by the Commonwealth 
of the grants-in aid power (s. 96), the appropriation power (s.81), and the incidental power 
(s.51, xxxix), which affects many of these areas, it is difllcultto say today that any area is 
within exclusive State competence. Also, Commonwealth Ministerial portfohos embrace 
some of these areas (for example, education and health) (Lumb 1986: 355-6). If there is 
conflict between Federal and State laws, section 109 of the Constitution guarantees that state 
laws will "to the extent of the inconsistency be invalid (Quick and Garran 1901: 938-9; 
Else-Mitchell 1961: 44-5). This was to be a major problem for the States in the Austrahan 
Federation when the Commonwealth intended to legislate in areas of State constitutional 
functions. 
It is generally agreed that, in regard to the Constitutional Conventions which 
preceded the adoption of the Australian Constitution and the creation of the Australian 
Commonwealth, federation was to be a co-ordinate system; this stmcture, had basic 
agreementfrom the Colonies, as the contracting parties to the Federal Agreement (La Nauze 
1972). The founders of the Australian Federation had in their minds to surrender certain 
limited powers to a central govemment so that unified action could be taken on matters of 
common concem. The six Australian Colonies joined together in a hmited union, giving 
up some of their previous independence and Colonial powers to a newly created central 
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federal govemment but retaining a substantial portion of their pre-federation powers and 
functions of govemment in the Constitution (Scott 1983: 1). The resolutions placed before 
the Constitutional Convention of 1891 showed the basis upon which the Federation was to 
be founded. The resolution which was placed first by J.Munro (Victoria) reads: 
That the power and privileges and territorial rights of the 
several existing Colonies shall remain intact, except in 
respect to such surrenders as may be agreed upon as 
necessary and incidental to the power and authority of the 
National Federal Govemment (Victorian Pariiamentarv 
Pa2eiil891:ll). 
(n) The Financial Powers Of The Commonwealth And The States. 
The founders of Australian co-ordinate federalism intended that fiscal arrangements 
between the Commonwealth and the States were to be fair. Co-ordinate federalism was to 
be preserved in the federal/state financial arrangements. According to one of the 
parliamentary draftsmen at the time of Federation, Sir Robert Garran: 'the conditions 
which a perfect system of federal finance should satisfy' were: 
(1) be fair to all States — not only at the date of union, but in 
view of their probable growth and other contingencies; (2) 
be so far final as to offer no encouragement to constant 
tinkering or agitation for 'better terms' on behalf of one State 
or another; (3) be nevertheless so far elastic as to be 
adaptable to changing conditions; (4) reduce dealings 
between the federal govemment and the State governments 
to the narrowest and the simplest possible basis (Garran 
1897:161). 
Sir Robert Garran himself noted that finality and elasticity were inconsistent but 
argued that both were necessary and recommended a 'golden mean' that would avoid either 
extreme. Garran proposed principles reducing deahngs between govemments and faimess, 
which mainly meant horizontal sharing of surpluses among the States. According to 
Garran: 'it is only by finding a basis of apportionment which will be fair to each State in 
the proposed Federation that an acceptable scheme of union can be reached' (Garran 1897: 
168). It is generally agreed that the Australian Constitution that was subsequently produced 
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did not meet Garran's principles for the longer term because the arrangements were largely 
unspecified and concuirentness and faimess was not assured (Galligan 1995: 226). 
The financial powers were weighted in favour of the Commonwealth over the 
States in the Constitution. It was intended by the founders of the constitutional 
conventions that, after Federation, the power of raising revenue by tariffs would pass to the 
federal govemment alone and the States would therefore lose their most important single 
source of revenue. The States would be reheved of some expenditure but this would be 
much less than the revenues they currentiy received from their various tariffs. The result 
would be that while most of their obUgations would continue, the federal govemment 
would have a considerable 'surplus' revenue from customs and this 'surplus' revenue was 
to be retumed to the States. The problem was how should the revenue be divided? There 
were two possible formulae: distribution in proportion to population, or distribution in 
proportion to the contributions of the States to the total customs revenue of the federal 
govemment This problem was to plague the debates in the 1890s about a Constitution for 
the next decade leading up to the federation of the Australian Colonies (La Nauze 1972: 
54). 
The solution to the problem of financial powers between the Commonwealth and 
the States was identified by the founders at the Constitutional Conventions and was written 
into the Constitution. The Constitution itself outiined a senior role for the Commonwealth 
over the States in regard to the raising and distribution of revenue. It is generally agreed 
that the seeds of financial supremacy of the federal govemment over the States was planted 
in the original Constitution itself when the Commonwealth Govemment was given the 
major revenue source of the time, that is, excise duties, as an exclusive power (section 90) 
(C^ick and Garran 1901: 835-40), together with a concurrent general taxing power (section 
51, ii) (Quick and Garran 1901: 549-56; Hse-Mitchell 1961: 247-73). The former was 
essential for a central govemment which had the responsibility of ensuring interstate free 
trade (section 92) (Quick and Garran 1901: 844-60; Else-Mitchell 1961: 275-92). It was 
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also decided that a central govemment needed full power over 'trade and commerce with 
other countries and among the States' (section 51, i) (Quick and Garran 1901: 515-48, 
847-57; Else-Mitchell 1961: 34-5, 129-55) together with tiie responsibility to constiiict a 
uniform national tariff (Groenewegen 1983: 173). These powers together tilted the balance 
towards the centre. In 1902 Alfred Deakin, in his 'The Chariot Wheels of the Central 
Government', predicted Commonwealth financial supremacy, and hence its general control 
over the States (Deakin 1902). 
(iii) The Senate's Powers And the States Equal Representation. 
Another problem for the second Constitutional Convention was a serious issue 
raised by the founders, that is, the threat to modify equal representation of the States in the 
Senate. The realities of the Federal agreement were that no State had to join: all States were 
contracting parties, equal in status. Nevertheless, some States were more equal than 
others. If a sticking point was reached, it would be a case of the smaU States yielding or 
staying out of the federation. Fortunately for the Australian Federation however, there 
would be few such sticking points. Although the Australian Constitution and co-ordinate 
federal system was formally the child of the Constimtional Conventions, the eighty-four 
delegates of 1891 and 1897-8 Conventions, the 'framers' were actually Clark, Griffith, 
Barton, O'Connor, Isaacs, Higgins, Symon and a few others (La Nauze 1972: 147, 275). 
Agreement amongst this group was easier to achieve. 
Preserving the federal balance was another problem raised by the framers of the 
Australian Constitution. The founders were intent on preserving the sovereignty of the 
original Colonies and preventing the federal balance from shifting in favour of the centre 
and against the States. The protection of state sovereignty was foremost in the minds of the 
majority of delegates to the Constitutional Conventions and that majority won most of the 
cmcial divisions in the committees against the liberal nationalists in the 1890's. 
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Since federation, the original intention of the founders for the protection of State 
sovereignty within a co-ordinate federal system has changed however, with the federal 
balance shifting in favour of the central or Commonwealth Govemment. The States now 
have far less independence from the Commonwealth than when the Constitution was 
originally adopted. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DRIFT AWAY FROM CO-ORDINATE FEDERALISM. 
Co-ordinate Federalism Has Tipped In Favour Of The Commonwealth At The Expense Of 
The States. 
The drift away from the original intentions of the founders for co-ordinate 
federalism commenced soon after Federation (1901); this drift has been particularly evident 
since the Engineers Case (1920) and the influence of Griffith Gl on the High Court. The 
Engineers Case (1920) resulted in the overthrow of the doctrines of implied immunities and 
reserved powers. The Court held that the Commonwealth Parliament had power under 
s.51 (xxxv) to make laws binding the States (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Higgins, Rich, and Stark 
JJ; Gavan Duffy dissenting). The majority claimed that the earlier Court under Griffith CJ 
had departed from the ordinary canons of statutory interpretation and introduced issues of 
political judgment which were outside the proper function of a court of law (Zines 1981:7). 
Of course, the problem with the claim that judges should work outside of political 
considerations was that the High Court judges are all appointed by the Commonwealth. 
The High Court was more than an ordinary court of law resolving legal disputes; it was a 
constitutional court intended to act as the federal referee, policing the division of powers, 
interpreting the Constitution, and maintaining a co-ordinate federal balance between the 
Commonwealth and the States and acting as the superior court in Australia (McMillan et al 
1983: 9). 
There had been a drift away from co-ordinate federalism because of the pattem of 
High Court decisions and the extension of the vertical fiscal imbalance. The drift away 
from the founders' intention for co-ordinate federalism has continued from the time of 
Federation; supported by High Court decisions, the Commonwealth has increased its 
influence in the activities of the States. Since federation there has been a continual shift in 
the federal balance toward the Commonwealth at the expense of the States, and the High 
Court decisions since the Engineers Case (1920) have generally (witii a few exceptions), 
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supported a widening of the powers of the Commonwealth; this has been at the expense of 
maintaining a co-ordinate federal system with a balance between the Commonwealth and 
the States (Zines 1981: 13). This drift culminated in a dramatic confrontation between die 
Commonwealth and the States in the 1970's. The States - led by the Queensland Premier, 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen, mainly through negative anti-Labor, anti-Commonwealth, and pro-
States' Rights language - fought back against die Commonwealth, Whitiam Labor 
Govemment, and its interference in State activities. 
The increasing centralism, with concentration of powers in the Commonwealth, 
undermined the co-ordinate nature of Australian federalism; this trend was supported by the 
High Court decisions which changed the federal balance and the fmancial arrangements 
between the Commonwealth and the States. It is outside the scope of this thesis to prove 
the extent of vertical fiscal imbalance but it is important to understand that Judicial review 
since World War II created an acute vertical fiscal imbalance, mainly through the 
Commonwealth's use of the Taxation power (supported by the High Court's decisions: 
First Uniform Tax Case: South Australia v. Commonwealth (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373 and 
Second Uniform Tax Case: Victoria v. Commonwealth (1957) 99 C.L.R. 575. The drift 
away from co-ordinate federalism continued despite the use of States' Rights language by 
States' Rights advocates, such as State Premiers from the resource rich and small 
population States of Westem Australia and Queensland. 
The federal compact of 1 January 1901 created Australia as a co-ordinate federation 
made up of the Commonwealth and the States, as relatively equal partners. The original 
federal balance was shifted to the Commonwealth due to later legal and financial 
developments. The principles outiined in the Engineers Case: Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129 were foUowed m 
subsequent years in a series of cases: Clyde Engineering v. Cowbum: Clyde Engineering 
Co. Ltd. V. Cowbum (1926) 37 CX.R. 466; Gamishee Case: New South Wales v. 
Commonwealth (No. 1) (1932) 46 C.L.R. 155; Broadcasting Case: R. v. Brislan; ex p. 
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Wilhams (1935) 54 C.L.R. 262; Burgess Case: R. v. Burgess: ex p. Henry (1936) 55 
C.L.R. 608; First Uniform Tax Case: South Australia v. Commonwealth (1942) 65 
C.L.R. 373; these cases applied principles which were advantageous to the 
Commonwealth. After the post-war caution of the Dixon CJ Court, there was a return to a 
Commonwealth approach again in the Barwick CJ Court with the Payroll Tax Case: 
Victoria V. Commonwealth (1971) 122 C.L.R. 353; Concrete Pipes Case: Strickland v. 
Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 C.L.R. 468; and the Off-shore Sovereignty Case: 
New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1975) 8 A.L.R. 1. Principles favourable to the 
Commonwealth were adopted by the Gibbs CJ Court with the Koowarta Case: Koowarta 
V. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 39 A.L.R. 417; and the Tasmanian Dam Case: Commonwealth 
V. Tasmania (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 450. This pattem was again recentiy repeated under the 
Brennan CJ Court with the Ha v. N.S.W. Case: Ha and anor v. State of N.S.W. & Ors, 
WalterHammond& Assoc, v. State of N.S.W. & Ors. (1996) 05.08.97 Matter No.S45 
of 1996. 
Financial arrangements also changed in favour of the Commonwealth. After an 
initial period of 10 years, the Braddon Clause (s.87) expired, and the Commonwealth 
enacted the Surplus Revenue Act; the Commonwealth abolished the obligation to remra 75 
per cent of customs and excise duties to the States; in its place it brought in a system of per 
capita grants under which each State received an annual grant, which continued until 1927. 
The Financial Agreement was introduced whereby the Commonwealth contributed to the 
interest on debts of the States. From 1933 the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
advised the Commonwealth on the amounts to be provided to the 'necessitous' or 
'claimant' States to compensate them for their geographic position or paucity of resources. 
The 'New Federalism' policies of the Whitiam Govemment caused conflict with die States 
over the use of State grants to implement Labor policies. In 1973 the grants commission 
legislation was amended to allow the commission to report to the responsible Minister on 
grants of special assistance to a State or States for promoting regional development through 
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approved regional organisations or local govemment bodies. The 'New Federalism' 
policies of the Fraser Govemment reduced the conflict with the States but continued the 
extensive use of State grants for specific purposes. From 1976 substantial changes were 
made to the financial arrangements and State Grants Commissions recommended the 
distiibution of a portion of the grants within each of die States (Lumb 1986: 231-2). In die 
early 1990s the 'New Federalism' of the Hawke Labor Govemment made an ambitious 
attempt at improving intergovernmental relations; this was because the Commonwealth's 
overriding purpose, microeconomic reform, required a close partnership between the three 
levels of govemment In 1992 Prime Minister Keating agreed to establish the Council of 
Australian Governments (C.O.A.G.), which was a weaker version of the Council of 
Australian Federation originally proposed. C.O.A.G. has become a major institution on 
intergovernmental policy coordination (Galligan 1995: 203,211). These developments 
essentially featured the growth of central power and the further extension of constitutional 
functions in essential legal and financial functions of the Commonwealth at the expense of 
the States, in essential legal and financial functions. The drift away from co-ordinate 
federalism has been caused by many social, economic, and political factors throughout 
Australian history. These political and economic factors — such as the need for the 
Commonwealth to coordinate national policies, to set national standards across all States, to 
fulfil national objectives, and to fulfil national obligations from intemational agreements 
within a world economy ~ have been taken into account by the High Court in its decisions. 
Scholars (such as Greenwood 1976: 81, 278, 340; Groenewegen 1983: 173; and 
Wiltshire 1986: 174-5, 178) attribute to two factors. The first factor is the Constitutional 
stmcture with its division of Commonwealth and State powers and the judicial review of 
Constitutional cases by the High Court. The second factor is the financial arrangements 
between the Commonwealth and the States and the resulting Vertical Fiscal Imbalance. 
Groenewegen, amongst others, has demonstrated that central power has greatiy increased 
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in Australia since Federation through the federal financial mechanisms, aided (on 
occasions) by judicial interpretations of the High Court (Groenewegen 1983:173). 
A classic treatment of this subject is by Sir Robert Menzies, a leading constitutional 
lawyer and the Prime Minister who himself presided over a period when the 
Commonwealth greatiy consolidated its financial powers. R.G.Menzies wrote Central 
Power in the Australian Commonwealth/An Examination of the Growth of Commonwealth 
Power in the Australian Federation (1967). Menzies' emphasis in this book is on the 
growth of central power by judicial interpretations beginning with the Engineers Case: 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129 
and continuing with the Commonwealth's use of the defence and extemal affairs powers. 
The Engineers Case (1920) was a benchmark case that established the authority of the 
Federal Arbitration Court over State arbitration courts; it became the precedent for other 
cases increasing Commonwealth power. The change in attitude resulted from a change of 
membership of the High Court. R.G.Menzies led the Commonwealth's case. Menzies 
(1967) provides an illuminating analysis of the role of State grants, uniform taxation, the 
financial agreement, and the Loan Council, in the advancement of Commonwealth powers 
vis-a-vis the States. 
Judicial review of the High Court and the Commonwealth's financial ascendancy 
have impacted on the States independence and their position in the federation. In important 
constitutional cases involving a conflict between the Commonwealth and the States there 
has been a shift in the federal balance in favour of the Commonwealth over the States. The 
most obvious starting point was with the Engineers Case in 1920. From the Engineers 
Ose in 1920 to the 1940s the High Court pursued a broader interpretation, allowing 
Commonwealth powers to expand. Since the 1940s, the High Court has used both narrow 
and broad interpretations, although from the late 1970's a broad view of Commonwealth 
powers appears to have been dominant on the bench. The second reason for the decline of 
the States has been the development of the financial arrangements between the 
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Commonwealth and the States. The result has been that the federal balance has changed m 
favour of the Commonwealth. This has created a vertical fiscal imbalance, where die 
Commonwealth raises the revenue but it is the States tiiat have the Constitutional 
responsibihties for spending most of the revenue. 
The High Court And Some Decisions Detrimental To The States. 
High Court decisions have, at times, favoured the States ~ this was so during die 
Griffith CJ Court; and during the post-war time of the Dixon CJ Court but at most times the 
Court has favoured the Commonwealtii. Important High Court decisions have, at times, 
greatiy shifted the federal balance toward the Commonwealth at the expense of the States. 
High Court decisions have shifted from originally being generally in favour of the States, 
through turning point cases, to now being generally in favour of the Commonwealth; this 
Commonwealth leaning of the Court is seen in the division of powers and particularly in 
regard to federal/State finance. 
The early High Court from its origin in 1903 to the Engineers Case (1920) adopted 
what has been termed a "States' Rights" approach, to defend the States from the 
Commonwealth in the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. This term is not entirely 
correct, however, because the early judgements of Griffith CJ, Barton J., and O'Connor 
J. asserted the supremacy of federal powers and institutions of govemment as well as 
maintaining the federal balance. 
In D'Emden V. Pedder (1904) 1 C.L.R. 91 the Commonwealth was protected from 
stamp duties applied to receipts given to Commonwealth public servants for their salaries 
and the doctrine that was applied was known as the doctrine of the immunity of 
instmmentalities. The High Court upheld the immunity of national powers from State 
regulation and also held that State operations were exempted from Commonwealth 
interference (Railway Servants Case: Federated Amalgamated Govemment Railway and 
Tramway Service Association v. New South Wales Traffic Employees Association (1906) 
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4 C.L.R. 488). This exemption was to give way in cases of political necessity (R v Sutton 
(1908) 5 C.L.R. 789. 
The early Griffitii CJ High Court (1903-20) held a Federalist and mostly a States' 
Rights philosophy that supported and attempted to maintain the co-ordinate federal system. 
The Court held that the Constitution was an agreement or compact of peoples of the 
Colonies who had conceded only specific powers to the new Federal Parliament. This 
"compact" or "partnership" theory of federation provided the philosophic basis for the 
doctrine of immunities and an associated doctrine known as the Doctrine of Implied 
Prohibitions or State Reserved Powers ( Lane 1980: 522). 
The appointment of the additional judges Isaacs J. and Higgins J. created a 
divergence between the federalist and the nationalist judicial approaches. The Engineers 
Case (1920) brought to an end the older doctrines; it introduced a strict "legalism" that 
interpreted a Commonwealth grant of power as complete as the natural meaning of the 
words would allow, without being restricted by the residue of traditional State powers 
(Lumb 1983:113-4). This case brought to an end the States' Rights approach, or a federal 
balance approach, by the High Court; it brought about the drift in favour of the 
Commonwealth. The sharing of the legislative authority between the Commonwealth and 
the States makes it inevitable that there will be some overlap and conflict between State and 
Commonwealth legislation. Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Stark JJ referred to s. 109 as 
giving 'supremacy, not merely to any particular class of Commonwealth Acts, but to every 
Commonwealth Act, over not merely State Acts passed under concurrent powers but all 
State Acts' (Engineers Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129 at 155). 
The precedent that was set in the Engineers Case (1920), and foUowed in 
subsequent decisions of the High Court, brought about a marked shift in the balance of 
power between the Commonwealth and the States. The system of co-ordinate federalism in 
Australia with its constitutional stmcture — including its distinctive division of powers 
between the Commonwealth and the States ~ has been, at times, interpreted by the High 
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Court to favour the Commonwealth over the States particularly in cmcial decisions 
involving federal-state relations. An administration of national issues requires a degree of 
central decision-making and the Commonwealth was set up to do this, not the States. 
The taxation power has placed the Commonwealth in a financially powerful 
position and indeed in a superior position to the States. This predominance has been 
achieved particularly through the Gamishee Cases (1932) and the First Uniform Tax Case 
(1942). The High Court's decision in the First Uniform Tax Case (1942) can be regarded 
as the financial high-water mark of the doctrine followed from the earher Engineers' Case 
(1920). The First Uniform Tax Case (1942) affirmed tiie earher Engineers Case (1920) 
decision; hence it affirmed the effective superiority of the Commonwealth over the States 
within the Australian federal system. The Court was not concemed that its strictiy legal 
reading of S.96 could be exploited by the Commonwealth Parhament so as to reduce the 
States to total economic (and policy) subservience; in other words, it refused to consider 
that its decision involved a political question that needed to be resolved politically. The 
First Uniform Tax Case (1942) was confirmed by all seven members of the High Court in 
The Second Uniform Tax Case (1957). In the Second Uniform Tax Case (1957), the Court 
upheld the priority given to Commonwealth taxes over State taxes. The Court also was 
united in upholding the States Grants (Tax Reimbursement) Act (1946) (Cth) (Hanks 1991: 
267-8). 
The Extemal affairs power has also placed the Commonwealth in a dominant 
position over the States in regard to domestic law. The predominance of the nation over the 
States has allowed the Commonwealth to change Australian law so as to address matters 
which are on the intemational agenda (matters of intemational concem). There has been a 
continual growth in the law-making power of the Commonwealth Parliament, at the 
expense of the residual legislative powers of the States; this has occurred whenever the 
Commonwealth entered into new agreements with other nation states (Hanks 1991:338-9). 
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In the Seas and Submerged Lands Case: New South Wales v. Commonwealth 
(1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, Barwick CJ outlined Australia's progress towards full 
intemational status. Barwick CJ stated: 
The progression from colony to independent nation was an 
inevitable progression, clearly adumbrated by the grant of 
such powers as the power with respect to defence and 
extemal affairs (Seas and Submerged Lands Case 1975: 
373). 
The assumption made by those who drafted the Constimtion was articulated by 
Dean J. in the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983). Particular reference was made by Dean J. to 
Henry Parkes' assertion that 
One great end...of federated Australia is that it must of 
necessity secure for Australia a place in the family of 
nations, which it can never attain while it is split up into 
separate colonies...(Tasmanian Dam Case 1983: 255). 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity was not 
invoked to protect the State of Tasmania from Legislation affecting the right of a State 
instrumentality (the Hydro-Electric Commission) to constmct a dam on public land (Lumb 
1986: 17). Hence the High Court rejected its own doctrine which had prevailed in earher 
years. One might ask whether the changes in doctrine were in fact political questions 
which the Court maintained it avoided. 
The High Court Has Changed The Federal Balance In A Series Of Stages. 
Judicial review of the Constitution by the High Court has altered the federal balance 
since Federation and therefore the position and independence of the States. The 
interpretation of the Constitution and its various sections has changed from time to time, 
often coinciding with changes to the membership of the Court which has altered die 
majority. These changes to the High Court majority have brought drastic shifts in the 
federal balance, and (despite the changes in the majority interpretation) a continual decline 
of the position of the States. McMillan, Evans, and Storey (1983), amongst others, have 
demonstrated that judicial review by the High Court has passed through several phases of 
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federalism. These phases-have drastically altered the federal balance and the dependence of 
the States on the Commonwealth. 
The first phase of judicial review, was the first two decades of federation which 
preserved the powers of the States: no notable judicial reallocation of constitutional power 
occurred. Almost all justices interpreting the Constitution in this period had played a key 
role in drafting it, and had firm views about the autonomous and co-ordinate role of the two 
levels of government Two doctrines were developed by the Court to advance the cause of 
co-ordinate federalism. The Implied Prohibitions doctrine was the doctrine in which the 
express powers of the Commonwealth should be interpreted in the narrowest sense and the 
Commonwealth's intmsion into areas of State regulation kept to a minimum. In the New 
Protection Case: R. v. Barger (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41 the Court stmck down a scheme where 
manufacturers were to be exempted from a special excise if they met a stipulated standard 
of working conditions for their employees. The Implied Immunity of Instrumentalities 
doctrine was the doctrine in which the view was taken that it was implicit in the character of 
a federation that neither the Commonwealth nor the States could make laws binding on each 
other. In D'Emden v Pedder (1904), the Court held that a Commonwealth public servant 
was not obliged to pay a Tasmanian State receipt duty on his salary; and in the Railway 
Servants Case (1906) the Court decided that Commonwealth industrial arbitration could not 
be applied to State govemment railway employees (McMiUan et al 1983, 57-8). 
The second phase of judicial review, or the 'wide constmction' phase, was between 
the wars and was marked by the influence of the Engineers Case (1920). The Engineers 
Case was about the application of Commonwealth industrial law applied to State 
instmmentalities and has been regarded as the great water-shed decision in Austrahan 
constitutional history. As a result of a change in the composition of the Court and the 
resulting dominance of the views of justices Isaacs and Higgins, both the 'Imphed 
Prohibitions' and 'Implied hnmunities' doctrines were rejected. These doctrines were 
replaced by the doctrine that Commonwealth powers specified in the Constitution were to 
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be given theirfuU force and effect (without any assumption about matters being 'reserved' 
for the States), and that valid Commonwealth laws were able to bind the State 
govemments. A series of cases followed in subsequent years which yielded an advantage 
to the Commonwealth, following the basic Engineers Case principles. These cases 
included: Forty Four Hours Case (1926): Clyde Engineering v. Cowbum: the Gamishee 
Case (1932); the Broadcasting Case (1935); the Burgess Case (1936); and the First Uniform 
Tax Case (1942) (which is regarded as the high-water mark of the Court's 'wide 
constmction' phrase) (McMillan etal 1983: 58-9). 
The third phase of judicial review, was a period of post-war caution with the 
influence on the court by Sir Owen Dixon, though he did not become Chief Justice until 
1952. Dixon's judicial approach is best known from his statement on taking that office: 
'There is no other safe guide to judicial decisions in great conflict than a strict and complete 
legalism'. Dixon undoubtedly favoured the 'federal balance' and against the maximisation 
of either central or State power. The expansionist interpretation of the previous phase was 
not directiy overmled, however a number of new Commonwealth initiatives were quashed. 
For example the Uniform Tax Scheme survived a second challenge in 1957 and the 
Commonwealth successfully extended its 'broadcasting" power into television. A series of 
cases followed that resulted in the disadvantage of the Commonwealth, according to 
McMillan, Evans, and Storey (1983: 59-60), following the Dixon Court's federal 
balance' principle. A new approach had a number of Commonwealth initiatives quashed, 
and some examples of these cases included: The Airiines Case: Australian Nadonal 
Airways Ptv Ltd v. Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 29; the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Case: Attorney-General (Victoria): (ex. rel. Dale) v. Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 
237; the State Banking Case: Melboume Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R. 
31; and the Bank Nationalisation Case (1948 and 1949): Bank of New South Wales v. 
Commonwealth (1948) 76 C.L.R. I (High Court); upheld (1949) 79 C.L.R. 497 (Privy 
Council)(McMillan etal 1983: 59-60). 
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The fourth phase of judicial review, was from the accession of Sir Garfield 
Barwick to the Chief Justiceship in 1964, until the present time. This phase has witnessed 
a great willingness, at least in constitutional matters, to have explicit regard to the economic 
and other consequences of its decisions. This phase marked a retum to a more evidendy 
Commonwealth-oriented approach. The trend was not unambiguous, with money 
decisions narrowly split between majority and minority opinions, and with a number of 
cases being resolved in favour of the States (most notably Gazzo Case: Gazzo v. 
Comptroller of Stamps (Victoria): ex p. Attomey-General for Victoria (1981) 38 A.L.R. 
25). The most important cases of this phase almost invariably favoured the 
Commonwealth. These cases included: the Payroll Tax Case (1971); the Concrete Pipes 
Case (1971); die Off-shore Sovereignty Case (1975); and the Koowarta Case (1982). The 
latterfound valid the Racial Discrimination Act (1975), enacted in reliance on the extemal 
affairs power, and upheld against a Queensland challenge (McMillan et al 1983: 60-61). 
The Tasmanian Dam C^se: Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 450, 
followed from the Koowarta Case (1982) decision. The Tasmanian Dam (3ase (1983) 
decision tumed on the interpretation of the extemal affairs power involving the Hawke 
Labor Govemment and the Gray Tasmanian Liberal Govemment over building a 
contioversial hydro-electric dam on the Gordon river, below its junction with the Franklin 
river, in Tasmania's south-west wildemess. The High Court upheld major provisions of 
the Worid Heritage Properties Conservation Act (1983) (section 10 dealt with the protection 
and conservation of property) (Lumb 1986: 137). The Court held in favour of a broad 
reading to the 'external affairs' power, s.51 (xxix) and the 'corporations' power, s.51 
(xx), and the 'Aboriginals' power, s.51 (xxvi), by a four to three majority (Galligan 1987: 
240-241). 
Sir Anthony Mason CJ, in his University of Virginia speech in 1986, said diat 
'unlikethe American States which were notionally considered to be sovereign States... the 
Australian States are not, and never have been, sovereign States' (1986: 25). He continued 
m 
thus: 'The States have been described from time to time as parties to the federal compact, 
but this means no more than that they are constituent elements in the federation that die 
Constimtion brought into existence' (Mason 1986: 25). The views of Mason CJ are 
interpreted by David Solomon (1992: 145) to mean that it is not a function of the High 
Court to preserve any sort of federal balance and perhaps not even to ensure that the States 
are not discriminated against by the Commonwealth. Also according to Mason CJ, the 
pressures of modem life are likely to result in a continuing increase in Commonwealth 
powers, if necessary, at the expense of the States. 
In 1988 the High Court in Cole v. Whitfield (1988) 165 C.L.R. 360 invoked die 
history of the Constitutional Convention debates (for the first time since Griffith CJ left the 
Court) to demonstrate why successive High Courts had, for more than a cenmry, 
misinterpreted section 92 of the Constitution. Over the next two years the Court resorted to 
the use of the Convention debates on at least three more occasions. In the Corporations 
Case: New South Wales v. The Commonwealtii (1989-90) 169 C.L.R. 482 the majority 
of the Court used the debates to help determine that the Commonwealth could not legislate 
to control the formation of companies, only to regulate those companies which were 
already 'formed'. In Cole v. Whitfield (1988) and die Corporations Case (1989-90), die 
Court used history, and referred to the Constitutional Convention debates and the views of 
the founders, to bolster an argument which might otherwise have been quite thin; in this 
case precedent either pointed to a different answer (in Cole v. Whitfield) or was of dubious 
value (in the Corporations Case) (Solomon 1992: 183). This suggests that there may be 
greater use in the future of the federation debates to justify High Court decisions. It 
certainly means that the Court has moved a long way from the strict legalism of the Dixon 
CJ High Court era. It is not clear that diis trend will develop into a strategy of attempting to 
revive the founders' original intentions for co-ordinate federalism and a Griffith CJ High 
Court, States' Rights philosophy. 
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In a recent High Court decision. Ha v. New South Wales: Ha and anor v. State of 
New South Wales & Ors. Walter Hammond & Assoc, v. State of New South Wales & 
Ors^ (1996) 05.08.97. Matter No.S45 of 1996, the Court ruled tiiat hcencefees imposed 
by State govemments for the past 50 years were actually excise duties and therefore 
unconstitutional, because the imposition of tax and excise duties can be carried out only by 
the Commonwealth. The High Court decision to abolish State licensing fees - which had 
been imposed on tobacco, alcohol and petrol ~ thus removed $5 billion from State coffers. 
This decision further increased the Commonwealth's financial control over the States and 
increased the vertical fiscal imbalance. 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (V.F.I.) 
The second major feature of the Australian federal system is the vertical fiscal 
imbalance which has affected detrimentally the position of the States in the Australian co-
ordinate federal system. The fiscal provisions of the Constitution have contributed to the 
shift in the federal balance toward the Commonwealth and the evolving vertical fiscal 
imbalance. The basis of much of the States' defence of their financial position against the 
Commonwealth has involved the financial arrangements which has favoured the 
Commonwealth at the expense of the States since Federation. The States, through State 
Premiers, have attempted to defend their position against the Commonwealth and its 
interference in the activities of the States. State Premiers have complained publicly about 
the continual drift away from co-ordinate federalism and the relative financial independence 
of the States to a position of financial dependency on the Commonwealth. The most 
difficult areas for the Australian Constitutional founders, in their debates in die 
Constimtional Conventions, were the fiscal parts of the Constitution. The power of the 
Senate over money bills was the single most troublesome issue for the Australian founders; 
it almost caused the breakdown of both Federation Conventions (La Nauze 1972). The 
financial assistance to the States under section 96 (Quick and Garran 1901: 868-71; Haiman 
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in Else-Mitchell 1961: Ch. IX) of die Constitution has caused an ongoing problem for die 
financial independence of the States; it resulted in a loss of grant income for the States. 
As stated previously. Vertical fiscal imbalance refers to the fact that there is not a 
neat or complete matching of expenditure responsibilities and revenue potential for each 
level of govemment As a result, one level ultimately has more expenditure responsibilities 
than it can finance adequately from its income sources. This is the situation with the States 
in Australian federahsm because the States have more expenditure responsibilities than 
they can finance. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, has more revenue potential 
available to it than it needs to discharge effectively its constitutional obligations. The 
Commonwealth has found that the taxing powers allocated to it, under the constitutional 
division of powers, produces a vast surplus after paying for its allotted functions of 
govemment. The States, however, have expense responsibilities, as allocated under the 
Constitution, which require more finance than can be raised using the taxing powers 
allocated to them (Wiltshire 1986:175). 
According to Quick and Garran (1901: 91), the 'intercolonial tariff, and the coasting 
trade' had topped the list of federal matters requiring the national assembly, proposed by 
Wentworth's Constitutional Committee as early as 1853. For one of the founders, James 
Service, a common tariff was the lion in the path of Federation, however in the Federation 
debates, it was dealt with surprisingly easily. A consensus soon developed to create a 
national customs union by giving the Commonwealth an exclusive power over customs and 
excise (section 90). The central purpose of Federation, for many at the time of Federation, 
was creating a national customs union; this was done by abolishing the Colonial border 
customs houses and setting up a national economic union based on commercial free trade 
within Australia (La Nauze 1972: 213-4). 
The historian, J.A.La Nauze (1972: 39), dismissed Service's early concems as die 
'paper tiger of intercolonial fiscal jealousies'. Cheryl Saunders, an academic lawyer, has 
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endorsed Higgins' dismissal of his peers' handiwork in fiscal design; it was 'a general and
unholy scramble'. Saunders notes that:
Considered purely from the standpoint of a federal system,
the financial arrangements between the Commonwealth and
the Australian States are bizarre. The moneys raised in
taxation and other charges by each level of government do
not even approximate their respective constitutional
expenditure responsibilities. The circumstances in which the
actual division of tax powers has come into existence has
precluded and continues to preclude any attempt to match
types of taxation to the capacity and goals of the level of
government by which they are imposed. No adequate
framework for co-operation and consensus between the
levels of government exists (Saunders 1992: 120-1).
Australian fiscal federalism's established distributions and arrangements cannot be
directly grounded in the Constitution but as a result of a century of evolution (Mathews and
Jay 1972). Australian fiscal federalism has shifted away from the arrangements at the time
of the Federation; it has brought about periods of change and responses from the States that
included a defence of their State's position within the co-ordinate federal system.
Australian fiscal federalism may be summarised into eight historical periods.
Stages Of The Fiscal Drift To The Commonwealth.
There have been several stages in the historical development of the drift away from
the founders' original intentions for co-ordinate federalism and the federal fmancial
arrangements. There has been a continual drift of fiscal control away from a federal
balance and State financial independence toward Commonwealth financial control. Many
authors (such as: McMillan, Evans and Storey 1983; Hannan in Else-Mitchell 1961: Ch IX;
Evans 1977: 18-19, 39-40, 61-62, 308; Groenewegen 1983, amongst others), have
demonstrated that fiscal federalism and financial control has passed through several periods
leading to greater Commonwealth financial control over the States. The drift away from
co-ordinate federalism, and a federal balance, has led to State Premiers advocating greater
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financial independence for the States and the establishment of a federal balance, within a 
more actively promoted co-ordinate federal system. 
The first period was the 'surplus revenue' period (1901-1910), where die 
Commonwealth's sole source of revenue was customs and excise duties (McMillan et al 
1983:118,120). During the first ten years of Federation the Constitutional safeguards were 
sufficient, because up to 1910 the Commonwealth levied only customs and excise; and from 
the revenue collected, the Commonwealth provided the States with the three quarters share 
of the total guaranteed by the Braddon clause (s. 87) (Quick and Garran 1901: 825, 869; 
Lumb 1986: 331). This clause expired on 31 December 1910, and die new federal 
financial assistance agreed after the Premiers Conference (1909) went into operation 
(Groenewegen 1983:174). 
The second period was the 'per capita grant' period (1910-27); following the expiry 
of the Braddon Clause the system of revenue payments to the States was replaced in 1910, 
by one in which per capita grants per head of population were paid to the States (McMillan 
et al 1983: 121). The first major crisis of the new nation was World War 1; this helped 
significantly with the drift away from the co-ordinate federal system and the position of the 
States was World War I, which further provided the impetus for the growth of financial 
centralism. This centralism resulted not only because of increased need for defence 
expenditure but also because of the Commonwealth's use of its general taxation and 
borrowing powers. The I920's were years of considerable change in the federation and 
brought an end to per capita grants to the States (Groenewegen 1983:174-5). 
The third period, was the initial 'Financial Agreement' period (1927-42), where the 
framework for intergovernmental relationships was altered greatiy by the Financial 
Agreement (1927) (Hse-Mitchell 1961: 252); which was confirmed through a Constitutional 
amendment foUowing a successful a referendum question on State debts in 1928. The 
Commonwealth ceased making per capita grants to the States and took over the State debts; 
the Commonwealth gave assistance to the States for interest and redemption payments 
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(McMillanet al 1983:121). The signing of the Financial Agreement (1927) (which set up die 
Loan Council), along with the spread of special grants to financially disadvantaged States, 
and the Commonwealth's use of its conditional grants power (section 96) (to give financial 
assistance to the States for specific purposes), brought considerable changes in fiscal 
federalism. The 1930's brought the national crisis of the Depression, which severely 
affected the Australian economy; this was a period of close Federal/State co-operation 
(Groenewegen 1983: 175-7). The grants to the States were put on a more scientific basis 
with the establishment of the Commonwealth Grants Commission to advise the 
Commonwealth on the amounts which should be provided (see Commonwealth Grants 
Commission Act 1933) (Lumb 1986: 331). 
The fourth period was the "Uniform Taxation reimbursement' period (1942-59), 
where the Commonwealth ~ under the 1942 Uniform Tax Scheme took over the raising of 
all income tax in Australia and compensated the States by giving them general revenue 
grants (McMillanet al 1983:122). World War II saw the further extension of the drift away 
from the co-ordinate federal system and the move towards centralisation of the uniform 
taxation legislation. Of all the war time measures, under the defence power, taken by the 
Commonwealth, the most important for the States' position in the co-ordinate federal 
system was the imposition in 1942 of the Uniform Tax Scheme. In retum for guaranteed 
grants (see section 4 of the Grants Act), the States ceased levying their own income taxes. 
The Uniform Tax Case (1942) established the right of the Commonwealth to attach 
conditions to grants to the States; this clearly reached into State government power. The 
Court upheld the validity of the Commonwealth's uniform taxation legislation and 
distinguished between a coercive law (unconstitutional) and a law which merely provided 
an inducement to a State; the latter could be the offer of financial assistance to a State, not to 
exercise its power in a particular way (Lumb 1986: 333). The Uniform Tax scheme was 
initially implemented as a short-term war measure but has been continued by every 
Commonwealth Govemment and Parliament to the present day. In fact, it has become the 
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modem comer-stone of Australian Federal-State financial relations, along with the 
Commonwealth's management of the fiscal policy of the Australian economy (McMillan ei 
al 1983: 51). 
The Menzies era of Liberal-National Country Party Govemment (1949-72) did not 
seek to expand Commonwealth power, (as the Labor Govemment had done previously 
with considerable conflict with the States and the High Court) but nevertheless it did 
expand Commonwealth power; it expanded Commonwealth power without conflict from 
the States. Professor Mathews (1976: 31), comparing the Labor with the Liberal-Countiy 
Party Govemments has said 'it was only the pace of change which varied and not its 
direction'. The Menzies era however, substantially increased specific purpose (or 
conditional) grants to enable the Commonwealth to become involved in State activities not 
only in roads but in health, in social welfare, in mral industries, in water resources and in 
tertiary education (McMillan et al 1983: 52). In die Second Uniform Tax Case (1957) die 
Court upheld the Continuation of uniform taxation 'as a settled part of Australian 
federalism'. 
The fifth period was the 'Uniform Taxation financial assistance' period (1959-72), 
where the Commonwealth introduced a system of financial assistance grants in place of the 
tax reimbursement arrangements. Grants, under the new system, increased by reference to 
changes in the population and wages; they also increased but also in accordance with a 
'betterment' factor. The changes were introduced in the hope that they would avoid annual 
disputation at the Premiers' Conference. This was not realised however (McMillan et al 
1983:122). The Menzies Govemment saw the benefits to itself and to the Australian people 
in general, of a system of one govemment imposing and collecting income tax at uniform 
rates across the nation; nevertheless, it offered the retum of the power to the States only to 
find the offer declined (Wiltshire 1986:47). 
The sixth period was the period of tax sharing under the Whitlam Govemment 
(1972-75). During this period financial assistance grants continued in accordance with the 
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formula containing the betterment factor; general revenue payments to the States increased 
very rapidly, along with a substantial increase in specific purpose grants (McMillan et al 
1983: 122). The Whidam Labor Govemment planned to alter the scope of federalism 
through three means. First, there was to be a de facto reduction of the States' powers. 
There was to be an increase in central control. Third there were proposals for new regional 
and local govemment initiatives designed to increase equality of opportunity and bring 
govemment closer to the people. These objectives were to be achieved largely through 
Commonwealth spending through conditional grants (Groenewegen 1983: 186). Whidam 
proposed to reduce the powers of the second tier (the States) to be replaced with Regions 
and Regional Govemments and increase the powers of Local Governments, under this 
proposed new federal stmcture there would be strong emphasis on centralism. Direct 
grants were given by the Whitiam Govemment to local govemments in order to reduce their 
financial rehance on the States and to increase their independence. 
In the 1970's there was a tremendous increase in specific purpose payments; section 
96 of the Constitution (as interpreted by the High Court) was used by the Commonwealth 
to expand its activities into traditional State functions such as education (from 1950-1 
onwards), healtii (from 1948-9 onwards and greatiy expanded in the 1970's), and a series of 
otiier activities. The Whitiam Labor Govemment, in particular during the mid 1970's, used 
the specific purpose payments to change the Federal-State financial relations; the States 
reacted by asserting their independent position in the co-ordinate federal system (led by 
Bjelke-Petersen from Queensland) (Groenewegen 1983: 177-180). This period mainly due 
to the changed financial arrangements, brought a great deal of conflict between die 
Commonwealth and the States. After the continued drift away from tiie original intentions 
of the founders for co-ordinate federalism, in this period there was an attempted fight back 
led by Bjelke-Petersen, to achieve a more co-ordinate federal system with the separate and 
equal position of the States, led by Bjelke-Petersen. 
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The seventh period was the period of tax sharing under the Fraser Govemment 
(1975-83), where financial assistance grants were replaced by personal income tax sharing 
arrangements (McMillan et al 1983: 118-23). Fraser supported the States ~ at least with 
rhetoric. There were to be two stages within this period. The States became entitied to a 
specified percentage of personal income tax collections, shared between the States on the 
basis of their per capita relativities in the financial assistance grants. The first stage was 
implemented in legislation in 1976. The Commonwealth also proposed to allow each State 
to impose a percentage surcharge, or a percentage rebate, on a taxpayer's individual 
income. The second stage meant the States would suffer a loss of income which resulted in 
no State taking advantage of the potential taxing power (McMillan et al 1983, 123). The 
attempted fight back to a more co-ordinate federal system by Bjelke-Petersen during the 
Whitiam Govemment had not succeeded because, during the Fraser Government, the 
Commonwealth maintained its fiscal dominance over the States. 
According to the political scientist, Brian (jalligan (1995: 203), the eighth period, 
was an attempt at improving intergovernmental relations under the Hawke/Keating Labor 
Govemments (1983-96); where the Commonwealth's overriding purpose was micro-
economic reform. The Hawke Govemment pragmatically accepted the fact of federalism, 
particularly with the A.L.P. in govemment in most of the States. Increases in the overseas 
debt however have made the Commonwealth pressure the States to cut spending: the 
proportion of Commonwealth grants to both State and local govemments declined from 
50.3% of receipts in 1984-85 to 45% in 1988-89 (Australian National Accounts 1988-89, 
No.50). The goal of economic reform through improving intergovernmental relations 
was outhned by Prime Minister Bob Hawke as follows: 'The goals are to improve our 
national efficiency and intemational competitiveness, and to improve the delivery and 
quality of the services govemment provide.' Hawke (1991: 1-3) insisted if Australia was 
to have a more competitive economy, 'we must improve the performance of the stmcmres 
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which underpin the national economy ~ it means better ports, a more modem transport 
system, faster communications, and cheaper power'. 
The Commonwealth made sweeping reforms in its jurisdiction, such as 
deregulating the financial system, phasing out tariffs, deregulating aviation, introducing a 
competitor into telecommunications, and restmcturing business enterprises; but the next 
stage of microeconomic reform required co-operation with the States, because they had 
jurisdiction over the relevant areas. Hawke proposed 'A closer partnership between our 
three levels of govemment — Commonwealth, State and Local'. Hawke also offered the 
States, for their co-operation, the overhaul of Commonwealth-State fiscal relations, 
changes to the Premiers' Conference arrangements, and a review of tied grants programs 
with a view to removing duplication of effort (Galligan 1995: 203-4). 
The vertical fiscal imbalance between the Commonwealth and the States is a major 
aspect of Australia's Federal/State fmancial relations; it has impacted upon the co-ordinate 
federal system and the position of the States and the States' Rights claims of Bjelke-
Petersen against Whitiam. The Commonwealth, under the Fraser, Hawke, and Keating 
Govemments, maintained and extended its fiscal dominance over the States; the attempted 
fight back to a more co-ordinate federal system with greater independence for the States, 
led by Bjelke-Petersen in the 1970's, had failed. Bjelke-Petersen, therefore has not 
contributed to the future development of States' Rights or a more co-ordinate federal 
system in Australia. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE STATES FIGHT BACK AGAINST COMMONWEALTH 
INTERFERENCE. 
The States Fight Back Against The Commonwealth Infringing On 
Their Constitutional Functions. 
The 1970s saw the Commonwealth Govemment greatiy intmde on State 
Govemment constitutional functions through the Commonwealth's use of conditional 
grants to the States. There was an increasing centialism starting with the Liberal Party 
under Prime Minister John Gorton (1968-71) (Patience 1985: 269). After the Gorton 
Govemment, there was again greatiy increased centralism with the Labor Party under 
Prime Minister Gough Whitiam (1972-75). The States and the Commonwealth have been 
dissatisfied, at times, since Federation both with the division of powers in the Constitution 
and with federal funding. These became major political issues in the 1970's. These issues 
were taken up by State Premiers, particularly Bjelke-Petersen, who were mainly reacting to 
Whitiam and his new federalism. 
The drift away from the founders' original intentions for co-ordinate federalism 
eventually resulted in the confrontation between the States and the Commonwealth in the 
1970's. Except for the Gorton Govemment — with its more centralist tendencies, and 
financial conflicts in the Loan Council, and at Premiers' Conferences ~ the period of 
conservative rule was largely a co-operative federalism period (Groenewegen 1983: 185). 
Gorton called to those dedicated to States' Rights not to blame him but to blame the 
Constitution as interpreted by the High Court; he called on them to act in accordance witii 
die High Court interpretation in order to get Commonwealth-State co-operation; die 
altemative he claimed was to have gradual Commonwealth Govemment dojnination of 
policy and administrative fields (Gorton 1983: 27). 
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In 1970, Sir Rupert Hamer, Premier of Victoria (1972-81), introduced into the 
Victorian Parliament a resolution calling for a constitutional convention to draw up 
amendments to the Australian Constitution. The resolution was as follows: 
That the Legislative Council of Victoria, recognising that the 
present relationship between the Commonwealth of Austraha 
and the States call for an urgent review and that a durable 
and acceptable adjustment of powers and responsibilities 
within the Federal System can only be achieved by effective 
amendments to the Commonwealth Constitution, requests 
the Govemment of Victoria to invite the other States to join 
with the Victorian Parliament in preparing such 
amendments, and subsequently in conferring with the 
Commonwealth Parhament with a view to submitting agreed 
amendments to a referendum of the Australian people 
(Hamer 1983: 57-8). 
Hamer sought common action by all States and the Commonwealth, to address and 
agree upon changes to the Constitution to bring it into the twentieth century; these changes 
would be brought about by the very means that the Constitution had been brought into 
existence in the first place, that is, through the process of a series of conventions. The first 
resultant constitutional convention came into being in Sydney in September 1973. Prime 
Minister Whitiam however, aroused partisan feelings by asserting, at the outset, the kind of 
reforms which the federal Labor govemment would or would not accept (Hamer 1983: 58-
9). 
Hamer was not the leading figure in the campaign of the States during the 1970's. 
As we have said, the fight back by the States to attain a more independent position in the 
Australian federation in the mid 1970's was led by Premier Bjelke-Petersen from 
Queensland (Kelly 1976; Lunn 1987; Groenewegen 1979; Patience 1985). Bjelke-Petersen 
used the Senate and States' Rights and co-ordinate federalism rhetoric to attack the Whidam 
Govemment and coincidentally defend conservative forces such as local business interests 
in Queensland. As Conroy (1985: 269) notes, the concepts of centrahsm and States' 
Rights played a prominent part in federal-State relations, especially during the Bjelke-
Petersen era. Much of the States' Rights argument between 1972 and 1974 however, was 
in many ways rhetorical; but at a federal level it was a necessary form of political debate 
60 
for the Commonwealth to become aware of State issues. The 1975 constitutional and 
political crisis saw the high water mark of the Bjelke-Petersen form of confrontational 
States' Rights approach against the Commonwealth, the A.L.P., and the Whidam 
Government. 
Rhetoric is the art of composing and delivering persuasive speeches and this is what 
Bjelke-Petersen did in regard to States' Rights issues (Lunn 1987). Rhetoric is the art of 
using words in speaking or writing so as to persuade or influence others (Oxford 
Dictionary). Kenneth Burke (1945: 393) designates political rhetoric as 'secular prayer' 
and declares that its function is 'to sharpen up the pointless and blunt the too sharply 
pointed. Murray Edelman (1964: 124) notes that language sometimes directiy encourages 
behaviour contrary to people's interests. The employment of political speech and writing 
as a ritual, dulls the critical faculties rather than awakening them. The chronic repetition of 
cliches and stale phrases, serve simply to evoke a conditioned uncritical response is a time-
honoured habit among pohticians and a mentally restful one for their audience. In an essay 
devoted to the proposition that 'political writing is bad writing,' George Orwell remarked: 
If the speech he [a politician] is making is one that he is 
accustomed to make over and over again, he may be almost 
unconscious of what he is saying, as one is when one utters 
the responses in church. And this reduced state of 
consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any rate favourable 
to political conformity (1954: 172) . 
This is surely the situation with Bjelke-Petersen and much of his use of political 
rhetoric and in his advocacy of States' Rights. The political rhetoric of States' Rights diat 
was spoken by Bjelke-Petersen was persuasive in convincing people in Queensland, as 
well as other States, that they were being disadvantaged by the financial arrangements set 
by the Commonwealth. Edelman, on the topic of political language indicates that 
The employment of language to sanctify action is exactly 
what makes politics different from other methods of 
allocating values. Through language a group can not only 
achieve an immediateresult but also win the acquiescence of 
those whose lasting support is needed (1964: 114). 
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The States' Rights language used by Bjelke-Petersen was rhetoric that gained a lot of media 
attention; it created the illusion that Bjelke-Petersen was an advocate for the States and their 
constitutional position (Lunn 1987; Patience 1985). 
The Bjelke-Petersen rhetoric was aimed at reducing the size and influence of the 
Commonwealth and increasing the financial independence and influence of the States (Lunn 
1987; Patience 1985). The reality however, was that the States did not accept greater 
financial responsibility it was this failure to accept greater responsibility that kept the 
Commonwealth in a strong political and economic position. The Commonwealth was left 
to make the difficult decisions for all the States. An example of the States failing to 
successfully fight back against the Commonwealth occurred when the Second World War 
was over. The Victorian Liberal Premier Sir Henry Bolte (1955-72), a States' Rights 
advocate, thought that the power to raise income taxes should revert to the States and 
brought an action in the High Court to get it back. The result of the case was that the Court 
held that Victoria, or any other State, could raise its own income tax; but it was also held 
that the Commonwealth income tax had priority and that the Commonwealth was not 
obliged to reimburse any State from the proceeds of that tax (Gorton 1983: 17). Bolte and 
the other State premiers did not take up the financial responsibility of raising revenue to 
meet their State expenditures. So the rhetoric of State Premiers did not match their actions. 
Another example of the States failing to successfully fight back against the 
Commonwealth occurred in 1951. Sir Robert Menzies offered to the States to terminate the 
system of uniform taxation, on the condition that the State govemments agree to a new 
system- There was no real consideration of his offer by the States because the four 
smaller-population States knew that the existing airangements were quite advantageous to 
them. Again, under the Fraser Government's 'New Federalism', an offer was made to 
allow the States to raise their own income tax and become less dependant on the 
Commonwealth; again this offer was rejected by the States (Gorton 1983: 18, 12). 
Politically, this situation has allowed State leaders to contrive to blame the Commonwealth 
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for the decisions that they did not like or to create some political or economic difficulties for 
the Commonwealth. 
States' Rights advocates such as Bjelke-Petersen complained about die 
Commonwealth's infringements upon the States' constitutional functions and about its 
increasing power at the expense of the States. Bjelke-Petersen has been hailed by the 
media as a champion of States' Rights; in reality he was a political opportunist who used 
States' Rights rhetoric as a tool against the Commonwealth; more particulariy this rhetoric 
was used constantiy be used against the Whitiam Labor Govemment on party political and 
ideological grounds. Whidam made some valid points in September 1974 when he said 
that Bjelke-Petersen should "stop his tantmms and posturing"; he called for "less 
vaudeville, less invective and less vote rigging"; what was needed he said was "not a full-
time Queen of Queensland but a full-time premier of Queensland" (Lunn 1987:161). The 
trouble for Whitlam was that in Queensland every day for nearly two years, on every 
conceivable subject message, the Bjelke-Petersen stage-managed invective and vaudeville 
had been reaching the Queensland people. Bjelke-Petersen's opposition to the central or 
national govemment and its policies, particularly when they disadvantaged the State of 
Queensland, was very much part of his domestic political style. 
An issue which caused conflict was the role of the Senate; the Senate was viewed 
by Bjelke-Petersen as the States' House. The Senate was used to great effect by Bjelke-
Petersen in the Gair Affair, in the replacement of a Labor Senator, and in the 1975 
constitutional and political crisis; all of these were part of a campaign to bring down a 
federal A.L.P. Govemment, the Whitiam Govemment (Lunn 1987: 170-76, 215-29). 
Another issue which caused conflict was the name change of the federal govemment to the 
Australian govemment by Whitiam; this was interpreted by the conservative Queensland 
premier as a move towards republicanism and a denial of the "Commonwealth of States", 
which federation meant. For Bjelke-Petersen there is more than one Australian govemment 
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~ the govemment of Queensland is an Australian govemment ~ and there is State-federal 
competition within the federal system (Lunn 1987: 161). 
The Coming To Power Of Whitlam And His Approach To Federalism. 
The platform of the Australian Labor Party from 1918 until 1971 explicidy required 
the abolition of the federal Constitution in Australia and the vesting of sovereign power in 
the Australian Commonwealth Parliament. Whidam, as deputy leader and then leader of 
the federal A.L.P., set out on a campaign from 1965, to reform the stmcmre of the A.L.P. 
and update its platform. At the Launceston Commonwealth A.L.P. Conference in June 
1971, his views were adopted. The unification platform was removed from the A.L.P. 
platform. A much vaguer aim was substituted in the A.L.P. platform, which was as 
follows: 'The amendment of the commonwealth constitution to clothe the parliament of 
Australia with such plenary powers as are necessary and desirable to achieve intemational 
co-operation, national planning and the Party's economic and social objectives'; then 
followed a passage referring not to constitutional change, but to 'alteration of administrative 
arrangements' so as to 'balance the functions and finances of the Commonwealth, the State 
and local govemments to ensure adequate services and development of resources'. Then 
there was mentioned a number of instmmentalities to be used for these purposes; local 
govemments and semi-government authorities were promised representation on the Loan 
Council (Sawer 1977: 3). 
The Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitiam, in various speeches and lecmres, 
explained why even in the existing Federal system, the Commonwealth should set all major 
priorities and policies for ensuring better education, cities, health care, public transport, 
housing, urban services, environmental control, resource development; the same applied to 
making a more equitable distribution of financial resources, and the burden of servicing 
public debt, and so on (Whitiam 1977; Sawer 1977: 5). His argument was basically tiiat 
the States lacked adequate and independent revenue sources to provide these services; in 
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addition they were depriving Local Govemment of funds for services that the latter 
supphed. This situation also resulted in increasing public debt and cost of services 
(McMillan et al 1983: 144). The most far-reaching proposal for regional govemment was 
made by Whitiam, before he became Prime Minister in 1972, when he stated that 
The state boundaries airanged at Whitehall in the middle of 
the last century and the local Govemment boundaries 
devised in the State capitals early this century have htde 
relevance to today's needs. Ideally, our continent should 
have neither so few state Govemments nor so many local 
Govemment units. We should have a Federal system of 
overlapping Parliaments and a delegated but supervised 
system of Local Govemment. We should have a House of 
Representatives for intemational matters and nationwide 
national matters, an assembly for the affairs of each of our 
dozen largest cities, and regional assemblies for the few 
score areas of mral production and resource development 
outside tiiose cities (Whitiam 1977: 153). 
When Labor came to power in 1972, a Department of Urban and Regional 
Development (D.U.R.D.) was hurriedly created to put into practice the new government's 
urban and regional policies. As promised in Whitlam's policy speech, independent 
statutory commissions for education, health, cities, social welfare, and so on, were 
appointed to report on the needs of those services and to recommend appropriate grants to 
be made to the States by the federal government. D.U.R.D. was instmcted to prepare a 
plan for the division of the six States into regions. Sixty-eight regional organisations were 
created using, where possible, existing State regional divisions and amalgamating them 
with a number of local govemment authorities (Groenewegen 1979: 56, 60). 
The most important element in the Whitiam Labor Govemment's new approach to 
federahsm was the intention to use section 96 grants to force the States into carrying out 
Federal policy priorities. The rise in specific purpose grants in the Whitiam years appeared 
to indicate reduced State independence in budgetary decision-making (Groenewegen 1979: 
57). As Jay has pointed out, however, many of these grants had all the features of general 
revenue assistance and freed State revenue for other purposes (Jay 1976: 34-5; 1975: 42-
9). The second element in Whitlam's new federalism was an attempt to make Local 
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Govemment an effective third tier of Govemment. The third element in this new 
federalism was support for regionalism. The fourth and final element in this new 
federalism was the use of Commonwealth commissions to advise on policy (Emy 1978: 
1(X)-101). During his 1972 policy speech Whitiam stated the following: 
My basic proposition is this: that any basic service or 
function of our community which can be hitched to the star 
of the Commonwealth grows in quality and affluence. Any 
function which is financially limited to the States will grow 
slowly or even decline (Whidam 1972 Policy Speech). 
At the 1973 Premiers Conference, Whitiam stated that the national Govemment 
would intervene in policy fields that had previously been left to the States: 
From now on, we will expect to be involved in the planning 
of the function in which we are financially involved. We 
believe that it would be irresponsible for the national 
Government to content itself with simply providing funds 
without being involved in the process by which priorities are 
met, and by which expenditures are planned and by which 
standards are met (Whitiam 1973 Premiers Conference). 
The States lost relatively littie from the financing of Whitiam's new federalism 
policies; they actually gained a great deal including a growth of general revenue assistance, 
the take over of $1000 million of State debt in 1975, and considerable improvements in 
loan allocations for capital works (Groenewegen 1979: 57). Prime Minister Whidam used 
the Australian Constitution and worked within the Australian federal system to achieve 
Labor's legislative aims; there were no successful High Court challenges against Labor 
legislation. Whitiam, in govemment (1972-75) — rather than attempting to abohsh 
federalism which had previously been Labor's unrealistic dream ~ proposed a "new 
federalism" altemative. 
Whidam, like previous Labor leaders, promoted and attempted constitutional 
changes by popular referenda; constitutional amendment was frequently atjempted by 
previous Labor Govemments and almost all met with failure which was a largely fruitless 
practice and part of a tradition of routinely pursued and failed constitutional amendment by 
previous Labor administrations. Whidam thought, and proved that the Labor Party could 
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live with a federal system by carefully exploiting existing constitutional powers. This was 
possible because the whole orientation of Labor's reform policies had changed under the 
leadership of Whitiam (Galligan 1987: 220). The States reacted to the success of Prime 
Minister Whitiam's use of the Constitution to implement Labor policies by using States' 
Rights rhetoric. Whitiam used Commonwealth constitutional powers to impose Labor 
Govemment policies on the States. In particular. Premier Bjelke-Petersen from 
Queensland reacted to the Whidam Labor pohcies, through the use of anti-Commonwealth 
and anti-Labor language that was part of his ideologicaUy based party political States' 
Rights rhetoric. 
AfterWhitiam's experience on the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review from 
1956 to 1959, he came to believe that much could be done within the stmctures imposed by 
the Constitution. By 1961 Whitiam was able to conclude a speech in optimistic terms. He 
said the foUowing: 
The Australian Govemment has as much constimtional 
freedom as any other national govemment to plan the public 
sector in Australia and to make arrangements with other 
countries. Through its fmancial hegemony it can create 
better conditions in transport, housing, education and health; 
it can create new industries; it can create new communities. 
Through intemational arrangements it can share in the more 
orderly and equitable production, distribution and exchange 
of goods and skills. Socialists have to play the most 
dynamic role in the relatively skilled and affluent community 
inhabiting our remote dependent and unevenly developed 
continent (Whitiam 1977: 310). 
Whitlam's New Federalism. 
In 1971 the A.L.P., under Whitlam's leadership, underwent a sudden change from 
an anti-federal to a pro-federal stance (or at least an acceptance of the States and the 
Australian federal system). Under the leadership of Whidam, the A.L.P. obtained a pohcy 
favouring the continuance of the States and an active program of building up the latter's 
financial and administrative resources. This was to be achieved within the general 
parameters of the existing federal system. Co-operative federalism, involving the existing 
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States, was explicitiy incorporated into the general and specific objectives of the Labor 
Party (Sawer 1977: 4). Whitiam announced a 'new federalism' of very different intent from 
the traditional Labor policy of abolition of the States; nevertheless he began with the 
customary Labor attack on the limitations of federalism: 
The Commonwealth and most State govemments are 
insensitive to the mounting fmstration among ordinary 
Australians who no longer know which level of govemment 
they are to hold responsible for the growing inadequacy of 
the schools, and other pubhc facilities on which the quality 
of their lives depends. The buck-passing between the 
Commonwealth and the States has eroded the foundations of 
democratic responsibility and accountability (WTiidam 1971: 
6-7). 
The Commonwealth required no additional powers so long as it retained financial 
power and economic contiol over social services by the machinery of conditional grants 
under s.96 of the Constitution. The conditional grants allowed the Commonwealth control 
in areas not otherwise within their federal power. Whitiam was a tireless exponent of the 
1971 platform which was affirmed in 1973 and 1975; and from December 1972 until 
November 1975, he led a Govemment which actively attempted to carry out what that 
platform intended (Sawer 1977: 4-5). 
Whitiam proposed a "new federalism" that would "rest on a national framework for 
the establishment of investment priorities and a regional framework for participation in all 
those areas which most directly determine the quality of our lives" (Whitiam 1971: 17). The 
key to Whitlam's new federalism was local govemment, which was the legislative creature 
of jealous States; and it was the States that were said to starve local govemment of funds. 
The solution provided by Whitiam was quite simple: target abundant federal money to 
needy regions. Worthy public welfare programs, determined by federal commissions, 
would be allocated to local govemments and funded by the federal govemment: this would 
establish local govemment as a "full partner in the federal system" (Whidam 1977:307). 
The Whitlam Labor Govemment's support for the regional principle for distributing 
general-purpose grants to local govemment and implementing the Australian Assistance 
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Plan (A.A.P.) -- by 1974 had aroused Queensland Government suspicions. The Bjelke-
Petersen Government in Queensland had suspicions that both the regional organisations
and local government itself might be brought into an alliance with the Whitlam Labor
Government against the States. When Whitlam proposed that the Loan Council be
reconstituted to permit direct representation of local government, Bjelke-Petersen
responded, in January 1974, with an announcement that the State government would, if
necessary, introduce legislation to prevent local government dealing directly with the
federal government. This did not happen, but the attitude of the Premier remained after the
Whitlam Government's demise in December 1975 (Tucker 1985: 211).
Bjelke-Petersen also declined, on behalf of Queensland, to join the Advisory
Council for Intergovernmental Relations (A.C.I.R.), because local government was
conceded parity of representation with the States under the Fraser Government's legislation
in 1976. (Queensland did finally join the A.C.I.R. in June 1979). There were other signs
of rejection of Whitlam's new federalism by Bjelke-Petersen after the mid 1970's. In mid
1977, the Queensland Government, under Bjelke-Petersen, announced that regional co-
ordination councils would be abolished and they were removed from the Statute in 1978
(Tucker 1985: 211). According to Harris, after the Whitlam era, the retreat from
regionalism to centralisation was not surprising, given the antagonism shown by State
governments to regionalism during the Whitlam Government (Harris quoted in Tucker
1985: 211).
The incursions into state policy domains by the Whitlam Government using the
section 96 power sparked opposition from non-labor State Governments. As a result, the
Whitlam Government reverted to the strategy of making direct grants of funds using section
81 appropriation power to bypass recalcitrant States. This strategy was adopted for
particular those States that opposed the establishment of regional structures under the
Australian Assistance Plan and the provision of Legal Aid through the Australian Legal Aid
Office (Galligan 1987: 222).
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Sawer (1977), shows that the emphasis was on using the existing Constitution as 
well as using the methods of co-operative federalism. The principal technique suggested or 
implied in the platform was the Commonwealth conditional grants system. The methods of 
conditional grants had already been developed by the Menzies Govemment and successive 
Liberal govemments, particularly the Gorton Government; but these conditional grants 
were to be carried much further under the Whitiam Govemment (Whitiam 1977; 
Groenewegen 1979; Patience and Head 1979). There was to be much more conditional 
grants, more complex conditions reflecting Commonwealth administiative choices of 
policy, more supervision of the spending, and more direct grants to local govemments. 
Also there was to be an extension of the principles already inherited from the Federal 
States Grants Commission (with local government added) and Universities Commission; 
there were to be more decisions at Commonwealth level as to the general distribution within 
Australia of the revenue and loan resources already overwhelmingly within Commonwealth 
control (Sawer 1977: 5-6). These initiatives and actions of the Whitiam Labor Goverament 
brought about a conflict with the States and a response from the latter that involved a cry 
that the Commonwealth was interfering in States' Rights. 
Whitiam's Discovery Of A Path Around The High Court By Relying On 
The Extemal Affairs Power. 
Whidam made extensive use of Intemational Treaties in order to achieve Labor's 
legislative aims in Australia without High Court interference (the problem for previous 
Labor Govemments such as the Chifley Govemment). The use of Intemational Treaties 
gave the Commonwealth, through the use of the extemal affairs power (section 51 (xxix)), 
the chance to overmle the States and make decisions not previously considered within the 
Commonwealth's constitutional functions (Lumb 1986: 158-67; Hanks 1991: 338-53). 
Whitiam wanted a Labor govemment to make more use of the extemal affairs power to 
extend its legislative competence; it could do so by implementing conventions and treaties 
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such as those made through the Intemational Labor Organisation (I.L.O.) and the Worid 
Health Organisation (W.H.O.). Many of the treaties were signed and put into legislation 
by the Whitiam Government. Whitiam believed, with good reason, that the High Court 
would not be prone to invalidate Commonwealth legislation in such fields because of the 
extemal affairs power (Whitiam 1977: 40-41). This behef by Whitiam was later affirmed 
by the High Court in two major cases affecting the position and independence of the States 
within the Federal system, after the Whitiam Govemment had lost office. The two cases 
were the Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) case and the Tasmanian Dam (1983) case. 
For Whitiam, the U.N. and its specialised agencies were constmcting a world 
framework of laws, order, and justice, through intemational instruments variously called 
treaties, conventions, agreements, and protocols. Many Australian citizens, according to 
Whitiam, stood to benefit from the conventions drawn up, for example, by the Intemational 
Labor Office on industrial matters, U.E.S.C.O. on education and cultural property, by 
from the World Health Organisation and by the Food and Agriculture Organisation on the 
subjects within their competence (Wliitiam 1985: 174-5). Australia, under the Whidam 
Govemment, would be more effective in drawing attention to and securing comphance 
with, human rights. The failure for not doing this Whitiam blamed on Australia's federal 
system and conservative parties (Whitiam 1971: 1977). The I.L.O. was, according to 
Whitiam, the only specialised agency that made special provision for federal States. 
Whidam, from the late 1950's, became irritated with the failure to ratify human rights 
conventions during the Menzies, Holt, Gorton and McMahon Govemments (Whidam 
1985: 175). During the time of the Whitiam Govemment this failure was to a large extent 
remedied but Whitlam's success was to cause future problems for the independence of the 
States. 
In January 1969, The Intemational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination had already entered into law. In February 1975, the Attomey-
General, Enderby, who had succeeded Murphy, introduced an improved Racial 
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Discrimination Bill. As had been foreseen, the first test of the Federal Govemment's and 
Parliament's jurisdiction under the extemal affairs power came in a challenge to the Racial 
Discrimination Act before the High Court. The High Court Koowarta Case (1982) arose 
from, according to Whitiam, a blatant act of discrimination by the Queensland Govemment 
(Whidam 1985). The Bjelke-Petersen coalition Govemment of Queensland, the Sir Charles 
Court Coalition Govemment of Westem Australia, and the Thompson Liberal Govemment 
of Victoria, mounted the challenge. The case impacted on the independence of the States 
and was reported as Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) on 11 May 1982. The majority of 
four justices (Stephen, Mason, Murphy, and Brennan) upheld the legislation. The minority 
of three justices (Gibbs CJ, Aickin, and Wilson) pointed out that, at least as far as 
aborigines were concemed the Federal Parliament could have overridden the Queensland 
legislation at any time, since the aborigines referendum was carried in 1967 (Whitiam 1985: 
179). 
Following the Whitiam strategy of using the Constitution and intemational 
agreements to consolidate the power of the Commonwealth and to implement Labor 
policies, the Hawke Government, immediately after its election in 1983, embarked on 
legislation which would confirm the Federal Govemment's and Parliament's authority 
under the extemal affairs power. Another case that impacted on the independence of the 
States was the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983), reported as Commonwealth of Australia v 
State of Tasmania on I July 1983. The High Court upheld the World Heritage Properties 
Conservation Act (1983). implementing U.N.E.S.C.O.'s 1972 Convention conceming the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; the Whitiam Govemment had 
ratified this convention in August 1974 and it entered into law in December 1975. The 
Federal Govemment was allowed to stop the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania 
flooding portions of the Westem Tasmanian National Parks which had been inscribed on 
the World Heritage List maintained under the Convention. The decision was again by a 
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majority of four justices (Mason, Murphy, Brennan, and Deane) to a minority of three 
justices (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, and Dawson) (Whitiam 1985:180). 
Whitiam And Section 96 Grants To The States. 
In the Australian Constitution, section 96 provides a means of implementing 
programs in areas where Commonwealth direct legislative power is Umited. Section 96 
was of particular significance to Labor's social welfare programs in respect to education, 
which was a matter constitutionally reserved for the States. The Whitiam Govemment 
rather than attempt to establish the 'benefits to students' provision in s.51 (23A) as a fully-
fledged education power ~ embraced the established system of 'tied' grants to the States 
(Crommelin & Evans 1977: 39). Such grants, of course, under Whitiam were extended and 
used as instmments of Commonwealth influence. The High Court's earlier decisions 
regarding s.96 had already paved the way for such a development. The decisions included: 
Victoria V. Commonwealth (Roads case) (1926) 38 C.L.R. 399; Deputy Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (New Soutii Wales) v. W.R.Moran Ptv. Ltd. (1939) 61 C.L.R. 
735, affirmed (1941) 63 C.L.R. 338 (P.C.); Soutii Australia v. Commonwealth (First 
Uniform Tax Case) (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373 (Evans 1977: 39-40). 
The use of s.96 grants to achieve the Whitiam Labor Party Govemment Policy 
objectives (not simply in the social welfare field) can be seen in the following table. 
73 
Items 
Universities 
Colleges of Adv Ed 
Tech & Further Ed 
Schools 
Employment Grants 
Aboriginal Advancement 
Housing 
Growth Centres 
Land Acquisition 
Sewerage 
Roads 
Urban Public Transport 
1970-71($'000) 
75,224 
33,906 
12,535 
50,572 
~ 
7,002 
141,681 
-,« 
— 
__ 
218,000 
~ 
Source: Payments to or for the States (1975-6 Budget Paper No.7 
1974-75('$'000) 
443,980 
349,165 
44,997 
433,917 
40,003 
37,049 
392,389 
61,247 
41,095 
117,713 
368,037 
45,259 
) Table 172. (Evan 
1977: 40). 
Whitiam's (1971) paper 'A New Federalism' does not lay out any further 
implications for the existing Constitution. Most of the education and health proposals of 
the A.L.P. already lay within Commonwealth power, that was set out in the Constitution. 
Whitiam's first and boldest passage regarding the States in Australian federalism was as 
follows: 
Ideally our continent should have neither so few State 
govemments nor so many local govemment units. We 
should not have a federal system of overlapping Pariiaments 
and a delegated but supervised system of local govemments. 
We should have a House of Representatives for intemational 
and nation-wide matters, an assembly for the affairs of each 
of our dozen largest cities, and regional assemblies for the 
few score areas of mral production and resource 
development outside those cities. Vested interests and legal 
complexities should not discourage or deter us from attempts 
to modernise and rationalise our inherited stmcture (WTiitiam 
1971:11). 
The Whitiam Govemment embarked on an adventure to test the limits of federal 
powers in relation to its 'spending' power founded upon sections 61 and 81 of the 
Constitution. Given the Commonwealth's financial dominance in the Australian Federal 
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system, it was obvious that the establishment of an unlimited power to appropriate and 
disburse federal funds would signify a vital shift in the federal balance of power. This shift 
in the federal balance of power relieved the Commonwealth of the necessity to involve the 
States in non-regulatory programs. The first seventy years of Federation had witnessed, 
perhaps surprisingly, littie discussion on the hmits apphcable to federal spending (Evans 
1977:41). 
The extent of the A.L.P. Govemment's grants (both their scale and their detailed 
specification was, according to WTiitiam, more than justified by the problems faced by 
Australian cities and towns. The way that the grants were made showed how a reform 
Labor govemment could operate effectively within the Australian Constitution. The A.L.P. 
used the grants to meet the most pressing needs of the Australian people by increasing 
greatiy the percentage of tied grants — from about 30 per cent to over 50 per cent of the total 
of all grants. The A.L.P. did so to ensure that the problems identified by expert inquiries 
were tackled promptly and effectively; according to Whitiam, these actions resulted from 
the expressed wishes of the electorate, rather than from any wish to dictate from the centre 
(Whitiam 1977:308). The scale of general purpose ( 'untied') grants in relation to specific 
purpose ('tied') grants altered dramatically in the period of the Whitiam Govemment This 
can be seen in the following summary table: 
1960-1 (%) 1970-1(%) 1974-5 (%) 
General Purpose 77 70 49 
Special Purpose 23 30 51 
(Crommelin & Evans 1977: 40). 
A Critique Of Whitiam's 'New Federahsm'. 
In Gareth Evans' edited book Labor and the Constimtion 1972-1975, a critic of die 
Whitiam Govemment and of the Geoffrey Sawer article "Towards A New Federal 
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Stmcture?", John Carrick, raises the questions ~ 'Did the A.L.P. decide to work within die 
Constitution towards a tme co-operative federalism?' and 'Did the A.L.P. decide that 
within the existing powers of the Constitution it could achieve its former socialist and 
unificationist goals?' (Carrick 1977: 17). The answer for Carrick is obviously no to the 
first question and yes to the second question. By contrast, Sawer says that the answer to 
the first question is yes. Whitiam's words of 1972 that 'Section 96 is the charter of public 
enterprise' (Whitiam 1972) are interpreted by Sawer as a suggestion that 'tied grants' are 
'instmments of Federal-State co-operation' (Sawer 1977:18). Carrick rejects this. He says 
that tied grants 'are in fact, as all States know, the weapons of centralist coercion and the 
massive and continuous erosion of State sovereignty'; he adds that 'no State can refuse to 
do something which is electorally attractive' (Carrick 1977: 18-19). He concludes that the 
consequence of the proliferation of s. 96 grants is that 'the Commonwealth widens its 
domination over State functions' (Carrick 1977:19). 
In seeking to define his concept of co-operative federalism, Sawer notes the need 
for the States to have 'a degree of guarantee of the area of autonomy which the centre and 
the regions in the system are respectively given' (Sawer 1977). For Carrick however, this 
area of autonomy is precisely what the s.96 grants erode and destroy. Another observation 
is made by Carrick about the Commonwealth's financial power in relation to the States with 
a comment on income tax-harvesting. Carrick states that 'the philosophy of tax-harvesting 
by the Whitiam Govemment was itself conceived as a major centralist weapon, aimed at 
significantly increasing the size of the pubhc sector and the thrust of central policies' 
(Carrick 1977: 19). The following table, according to Carrick, tells this important story 
about the Whitiam Govemment's tax-harvesting: 
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TOTAL INCOME TAX RECEIPTS 
1970-71 (Actual) $ 3,178.2 miUion 
1971-72 (Actiial) $ 3,768.5 milhon 
1972-73*(Acttial) $ 4,089.5 miUion 
1973-74 (Actiial) $ 5,490.3 milhon 
1974-75 (Actiial $ 7,714.0 milhon 
1975-76 (Estimate) $ 10340.0 milhon 
*LastL/CP Budget (Carrick 1977: 19). 
The Whitiam Govemment in three years almost trebled total receipts of personal 
income tax, while customs tax, excise and sales tax doubled; consequentiy 'the 
Commonwealth dominated the revenue-collection arena, to the absolute exclusion of any 
concept of co-operative federalism in that field which is critical to the test of sovereignty or 
subjection (Carrick 1977: 20). Carrick also notes that a pattem of central domination by the 
Whitiam Govemment was also evident; this could be seen in a wide field of Whitiam 
Govemment legislation; in general there was no attempt to achieve with the States a 
consensus or co-operation. State-oriented functions ~ such as national parks, wildlife, and 
environment ~ were overrun and dominated by Commonwealth legislation, often using a 
dubious constitutional power. The extemal affairs power, and particularly intemational 
treaties, were used to assert centralist authority and Labor policy. 
Labor's appointment to the High Court may similarly be seen as centialist m 
philosophy because both appointees demonstrated opinions favourable to an expansive 
constmction of the powers of the Commonwealth (Carrick 1977). Sawer asserted that the 
main constitutional problem was not the reach of federal power but the stmcture of the 
Senate; the main enemy for Labor was the Senate because Labor policy, traditionally, 
required the abolition of the Senate (Sawer 1977). Carrick beheved that Whitlam's main 
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writings envisage the abolition of the Senate as an objective. According to Carrick, this 
objective is the very antithesis of federalism; he claimed that Labor mistmsted power in the 
hands of the States or local govemment (or regions); in other words, the Labor Party was 
dedicated to centralism or unification (Carrick 1977: 20, 21). 
The Whitiam Govemment's legacy to Australian federalism was the precedent of 
wider use of the Australian Govemment 's financial powers. Before the Whitiam Labor 
Govemment came to office it was common place for tied grants under s. 96 of the 
Constitution to be made to the States, but tied grants were of a limited extent. What had not 
been attempted before was the use of those grants to achieve far-reaching reforms in 
education, medical services, hospitals, sewerage, transport, and other urban and regional 
development programs (Whitiam 1977: 308). Indeed the aim was to implement the whole 
of the wide-ranging A.L.P. platform of policy objectives. 
A number of the Whitiam Labor Government programs in the social welfare area 
relied upon the acceptance of a broad view of the spending power. Under the National 
Employment and Training (N.E.A.T.) system, for example, the sum of $17,818,000 was 
appropriated by the Appropriation Act (No.l) (1974-75). Also, the Australian Legal Aid 
Office was established upon an administrative basis, without any express legislative 
sanction other than the appropriation of the necessary funds. More significant was the 
Australian Assistance Plan (A.A.P.) which was also instituted upon an administrative 
basis. The A.A.P. had no legislative support other than an item in the Appropriation Act 
(No.l) (1974-75). The essence of the A.A.P. was its creation of Regional Councils, with 
the authority to assess the social welfare needs of the people in the regions (Evans 1977: 
41). 
By 1978 despite the disappointing record of his own govemment, Whitiam said 
there was nothing that a Labor govemment would want to do that could not be done under 
the existing Constitution. Whitiam claimed that "The major obstacles against a program of 
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reform are not constitutional but political. Even the Federal system itself, for all its 
restrictions, limitations, and fmstrations, need not prevent reform" (Whitiam 1978: 6). 
The Oueensland Premier, Bjelke-Petersen's Reaction/Resistance To The 
Whitiam Govemment. 
Bjelke-Petersen found it politically convenient to use the language of States' Rights. 
Bjelke-Petersen, reacted to the increased use of section 96 grants that appeared to interfere 
in the activities and priorities of the Queensland Govemment; as we have said, these grants 
provided the funding of constitutionally guaranteed State functions but tied to priorities set 
by the Whitiam Commonwealth Govemment (Groenewegen 1979; Patience 1979). The 
reaction by Bjelke-Petersen was to attack the Whitiam Labor Govemment on the grounds 
of Commonwealth centralisation of power and its interference in the constimtional 
functions of the States (Patience 1985; Lunn 1987). Bjelke-Petersen also reacted to the 
new Labor Party Commonwealth Govemment and their priorities and policies by criticising 
them on party political grounds the latter was identical to the way he had approached the 
Labor Party in Queensland (Evidence of this claim is provided in the next chapter). 
Bjelke-Petersen resisted the Whitiam Govemment by the constant use of anti-Labor 
and anti-Commonwealth language. The use of such language was brought together in a 
pro-States approach that may be considered to be an approach that is, on the surface, 
similar to a co-ordinate federalism approach. Bjelke-Petersen's advocacy of the 
independence of the States was given the label "States' Rights" by the media. His style of 
criticisms was used against the federal A.L.P. and the Whitiam Commonwealth 
Govemment on a regular basis for partisan political purposes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
BJELKE-PETERSEN AND STATES' RIGHTS. 
Bjelke-Petersen's Reaction/Resistance To Whitlam. 
Bjelke-Petersen in the 1970s led the States' Rights fight back against the drift away 
from the original intentions of the founders for co-ordinate federalism; the drift away from 
co-ordinate federalism was evident in the Whitiam Govemment's interference in the 
activities of the States. The Whitiam Govemment used tied grants to the States and the 
signing of intemational agreements to implement Australian Labor Party policies. The 
Whidam Govemment had greatiy decreased the traditional and constimtional areas of the 
States; the States, as a result, became highly critical of the Whitiam Goverament. The 
Premier of Westem Australia, Sir Charles Court, and particularly the Premier of 
Queensland, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, became antagonistic; they used party political 
language to attack Whitiam on a personal basis. Premiers Sir Rupert Hamer (Premier of 
Victoria 1972-81) and Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen both refused to give up control of disputed 
areas to the federal govemment in the matter of the contiol of offshore waters. They 
resented the Commonwealth's claim to know best merely because it was the centre and 
disputed the view that national priorities need' or should' be determined by the centre 
alone. The more that the federal govemment impugned upon States' Rights, the more the 
State Premiers asserted them. Bjelke-Petersen allegedly instructed his Queensland 
departmental officers not to have any independent dealings with their counterparts in 
Canberra. The State govemments of Victoria, New South Wales, Westem Australia, and 
Queensland each appointed a minister specifically to handle State-federal relations; these 
four States also agreed to set up a permanent secretariat in Canberra to deal with the federal 
govemment (Emy 1978: 86). 
Bjelke-Petersen was a party politician first and was a States' Righter second when 
he used States' Rights language to attack the Whitiam Govemment, its policies, and its 
views on federalism. States' Rights language, or rhetoric, was used by Bjelke-Petersen to 
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persuade people to believe what he had to say. Murray Edelman (1964), writing about the 
language and perception of politics discusses political rhetoric. Edelman (1964: 125), 
notes that 'Once a term becomes a vehicle for expressing a group interest it goes without 
saying that it is in no sense descriptive, but only evocative.' Rupert Crawshay-Williams 
(1947:72), indicates that when one person speaks of 'governmental control' and 'private 
enterprise' and another of 'private control' and 'government enterprise', we leam notiiing 
from their speech about political economy but we leam something about the group values 
with which each identifies. When Bjelke-Petersen speaks about States' Rights we leam 
nothing from his speech but we leam something about the group values which he and his 
supporters identified. 
The rhetoric used by Bjelke-Petersen, to defeat his opponents, was not a form of 
classical sophistic oratory or the use of great debating skills with the use of logical rational 
argument to defeat his opponents, it was the use of illogic and emotionalism. Edelman 
(1964: 13), puts forward the view that no matter what incidents occur, and which are 
reported, they will fit nicely as evidence to support people's preconceived hopes and fears. 
Harold Lasswell wrote that 'Politics is the process by which the irrational bases of society 
are brought out into the open'. Laswell also stated that 'The rational and dialectical phases 
of politics, are subsidiary to the process of redefining an emotional consensus' and 
suggested that 'Political demands probably bear but a limited relevance to social needs' 
(cited in Edelman 1964: 29). These views applied to Bjelke-Petersen's use of political 
rhetoric as he exploited peoples fears for his advantage. The Bjelke-Petersen political 
rhetoric was a form of fallacious reasoning using inaccurate terms, incomplete facts, and 
detail based on emotionalism, biases, prejudices and Christian fundamentalist values. His 
political rhetoric, including the language of States' Rights, was aimed at his core 
constituency, that is, uneducated, uninformed people such as farmers who believed in basic 
tmths, based on blind faith without proof by testing assumptions through investigation. 
81 
After the attack by Bjelke-Petersen on the Whitiam Govemment and the downfall of 
that government, the States position and Queensland's position within the co-ordinate 
federal system, did not improve. The advocacy of States' Rights and the direct criticisms 
of the Commonwealth by State Premiers continued but it declined in intensity after the 
dismissal of the Whitiam Govemment, despite the effort of Bjelke-Petersen. This change 
was probably because (unlike the Whitiam Goverament) the Fraser Govemment did not 
attempt a fundamental shift of power and policy initiative to the centre; it usually pulled 
back before using Commonwealth powers to overmle the States. Also the Hawke 
Govemment, unlike the Whitiam Govemment, had basically accepted the federal system 
and attempted to work within it. Hawke had actually, in 1979, argued for a major 
reorganisation of financial resources to bolster the autonomy of the States (Gillespie 1994: 
80-81) Bjelke-Petersen probably damaged the cause of States' Rights in Austrahan 
federalism with his confrontational approach, forcing the Commonwealth to assert the 
importance of national co-ordination of policies and the High Court to defend the 
Commonwealth's position in the federal system. But we have told too much of the story. 
Let us retum to the beginning. 
In 1972 the federal Labor Govemment was elected with detailed plans under 
Whitiam's 'New Federalism' (Whitiam 1977: 161) to alterthe scope of Federalism through 
a de facto reduction of the powers of the States. Whitlam's 'New Federalism' intended an 
increase in central control along with proposals for new regional and local govemment 
initiatives. The Whitiam Labor policies under 'New Federalism' were designed to increase 
equality of opportunity and bring govemment closer to the people; these goals were to be 
achieved through Commonwealth spending by way of conditional grants. The Whidam 
Govemment also sought a constitutional extension of its powers by attempting to gain 
control over prices and incomes (defeated at a referendum in 1973) and to give direct 
financial assistance to local govemment (defeated as a referendum proposal in 1974) (Evans 
1977; Whitiam 1977). 
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The policies of the Whitiam Govemment were intended to increase to 
unprecedented heights the specific purpose payments to the States largely in the areas of 
education, health, and urban and regional development The Whitiam Government's 
attempts to enter State areas of constitutional responsibility by funding means were strongly 
resented by the State Govemments, particularly by New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, and Westem Australia ~ these political leaders described the federal 
government in the most derogatory terms. As a result of reopening the hostilities between 
the States and the Commonwealth, the States with conservative govemments particulariy 
New South Wales and Queensland ~ co-operated with the Federal Liberal-Country Party 
Opposition to undermine and remove the Whitiam Labor Govemment (Groenewegen 1983: 
186). 
The States' Rights language and anti-Labor Party language used by the Queensland 
Premier, Johaimes Bjelke-Petersen, in the Queensland Parliament in the 1970's, were often 
associated with a personal attack on Whitiam (Lunn 1987). The Bjelke-Petersen criticisms 
of the Commonwealth and the federal A.L.P. policies reached its peak at the time of the 
Whitiam Goverament Bjelke-Petersen, as Premier of the State of Queensland within the 
Australian Federation, set out on a campaign to bring down a national government, that is, 
the Whitiam Federal A.L.P. Govemment The events leading up to the dismissal of the 
Whitiam Govemment, and Bjelke-Petersen's attempted use of the Senate when filling a 
casual Senate vacancy contributed to a false image of the strength of the States. 
Dean Wells (1979), noted that the appointment of Senator Albert Patrick Field, 
demonstrated in a drastic way that Bjelke-Petersen operated on an assumption that few 
Australian pohticians share. According to Wells (1979: 25), the assumption upon which 
Bjelke-Petersen operated was that the state is a moral unit, possessing rights which it is 
entitied to assert against its own citizens. Wells (1979), overstating his case against Bjelke-
Petersen asserts that a remark by the former Premier in September 1977, indicates that he 
had a totalitarian concept of the state. Bjelke-Petersen said: 
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1 wasn't elected to allow chaos and violence in the streets 
and the denigration of law and order. I was elected as 
Premier to uphold your freedom, and my freedom, and the 
freedom of the State (cited in Wells 1979: 25). 
The anti-Commonwealth Government language, used by Bjelke-Petersen at the time 
of the Whitiam A.L.P. Govemment, was extreme and did not contribute to ^ood 
Federal/State relations. In the Queensland Parliament, Bjelke-Petersen spoke about die 
Whitiam Govemment in the following terms: 
The Commonwealth Govemment has proved an arrogant 
and destmctive centralist force which has divided, rather 
than united Australia. It is certainly bent on destroying the 
States...Hitler sought the same thing. In the first instance he 
sought to gain control of the economy. Having achieved 
that, he then did away with the States. That is history. We 
are experiencing much the same attimde and activity in die 
Federal sphere today (O.P.D. 21 November 1973:1832). 
Bjelke-Petersen's personally believed that the "Rights of Queensland" allowed the 
Queensland Govemment to act within its constitutional powers in an independent way from 
the Commonwealth. This put him into direct conflict with the Whitiam Govemment (1972-
75, particularly during 1974-75). Sectional interests were predominate in Queensland, and 
such interests were opposed to high levels of tariff protection, to restrictions on 
international capital movements, to strong trade unions, and to restrictions on land-use for 
conservation or Aboriginal land rights. Apart from the 1975 crisis, Bjelke-Petersen has 
contradicted the federal govemment on questions of policy ~ for example, his original 
stand against Medibank, his opposition to federal funding of women's shelters, and his 
blocking of land rights for Aborigines. More often than not he forced the federal 
govemment to back away. By doing so, according to Patience, Bjelke-Petersen tested the 
outer limits of Australian federalism, re-defined the residual constitutional powers of the 
States, and asserted the States' pre-eminence in the federal system (Patience 1985: 13). 
These issues had great scope for Bjelke-Petersen in (^eensland; he pursued Queensland 
issues as States' Rights virtually as a means of instigating Federal-State confrontation. The 
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Premier forcibly asserted "States' Rights" arguments in these and other issues on behalf of 
the Queensland Govemment in order to "defend (^eensland" (Galligan 1986: 68). 
In response to a question in the Queensland Parliament, Bjelke-Petersen spoke in 
1973 about the Whitiam Commonwealth Govemment's attimde towards States' Rights and 
the Rights of Queensland generally: 
...I have always worked for State Rights, and 1 shall 
continue to work towards maintaining and holding the rights 
that we in Queensland enjoy...I know that the people beheve 
that the Opposition in Queensland has become the agent of 
Canberra in the transfer of power and rights to the Federal 
sphere. I believe that the people of Queensland have a right 
as well as a responsibility, to take a firm stand on all the 
privileges, rights and responsibilities that we now have in 
Queensland. I again challenge the Opposition to come out 
and stand firmly and squarely with the people of Queensland 
in protecting what is theirs by tradition, and also under the 
Constitiition (O.P.D.. 26 October 1973:1315). 
According to Bjelke-Petersen, the same ideological forces, which originally 
promoted unification, had continued to be very sympathetic to any centralist Govemment 
mnning Australia from Canberra. Unification however, according to Bjelke-Petersen, 
received a body blow with the disasters and ultimate failure of the Whitiam Govemment. 
Bjelke-Petersen contended that under the Whitiam Govemment the assault on the States 
came to a head, and peaked in riotous scenes when that Govemment was constitutionally 
dismissed by the Govemor-General. The Governor-General used his reserve powers from 
the Australian Constimtion to break a political impasse brought on by Whitlam 's proposal 
to govern without supply. The WhitiamGoverament's proposal to govera without supply 
was according to Bjelke-Petersen (1983:65), in defiance of the Australian Constitution, the 
ethics which underlie that Constitution, and the conventions of Westminster Parhamentary 
practice. 
In December 1974, Bjelke-Petersen won a cmshing State electoral victory in 
Queensland by campaigning chiefly against the Whitiam Federal Labor Party's alleged 
centialist and authoritarian pohcies, and the resulting adverse consequences for 
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Queensland. The conservative Queensland Premier however, was not the only State 
Premier to benefit by dissociating themselves from the problems of the Whitiam Federal 
Labor Goverament. The State Labor Party in South Australia, only retained office in June 
1975 with the aid of the Speaker's casting vote; it survived by dissociating itself completely 
from the policies of Prime Minister Whitlam's Federal Labor Party (Emy 1978:84). 
The views of Bjelke-Petersen on the events of the 1975 political and constitutional 
crisis are essential to an understanding of his States' Rights views and his concept of 
Australian federalism. The events that led up to, and culminated in, the 1975 Whitiam 
Govemment dismissal highlighted Bjelke-Petersen's attack on Whitiam's partisan politics; 
Bjelke-Petersen's attacks on Whitiam were based on partisan politics rather than a States' 
Rights fight back to the original intentions of the founders for co-ordinate federalism. 
Bjelke-Petersen believed that there was no constimtional crisis in 1975, this is evident when 
he stated that 
There was no constitutional crisis in November 1975. No 
element of the Constitution was disturbed in the process of 
disnussing the Govemment of that day (1983: 67). 
According to an article that appeared under the name of Bjelke-Petersen (1983: 67), 
in 1975 there was a political crisis but not a Constimtional crisis in Australia; the political 
crisis involved the Federal Govemment and the Opposition parties. Bjelke-Petersen 
explains the difference between a political crisis and a constitutional crisis by noting the 
following about the Whitiam Govemment's dismissal: 
'o 
One can judge the events of 11 November with dispassion 
now that the manufactured and superficial hysteria of those 
days has subsided into the backwash of history. What 
occurred in November 1975 was a political crisis, not a 
constitutional crisis. A political crisis occurs when political 
parties fight, as is their right in a democracy, to obtain or to 
retain power. A constitutional crisis occurs only if and when 
the constitutional order laid down in the Constimtion of the 
Commonwealth, or those of the various States, is attacked 
and changed fundamentally by actions which are basically 
illegal (1983: 66-67). 
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The Queensland Premier's part in the battle to contain, discredit, and remove the 
Whidam Govemment helps to explain the complete dominance Bjelke-Petersen had 
achieved in Queensland by the end of 1975 (Hughes 1980: 179). Bjelke-Petersen was 
reported in the National Times as saying: "I don't want to be political, but you can't tmst 
the A.L.P." (quoted in Fitzgerald 1984: 253); neither did he tmst Prime Minister 
Whitiam's "reformist" policies. The "States' Rights" Premier opposed everything he 
considered that the "socialist centralist" Prime Minister represented; the former campaigned 
relentiessly against the Federal Labor Goverament, finally providing the key to its downfall 
in 1975. Bjelke-Petersen took the view that the Whidam Labor Government was leading 
Australia (and therefore Queensland) down a path to communism and centralised 
Govemment power; this would culminate in the destmction of decentralised Goverament 
power and Australian Federalism. The Premier saw it as his duty to undermine the 
national Labor Govemment whenever possible. He opposed Whitiam on a host of issues, 
including such Federal policies as Australia's recognition of Communist China, and the 
termination of conscription; he made as much as possible out of the occasions which he 
could portray as involving the "Rights of Queensland" (Fitzgerald 1984: 253). 
The Bjelke-Petersen State Govemment launched an effective and consistent assault 
on the Whitiam Labor Govemment. In the Premier's words, the State election of 7 
December 1974 was fought on "the alien and stagnating, centralist, socialist, communist-
inspired policies of the Federal Labor Goverament" (cited in Lunn 1978: 163). The 
campaign, in which Whitiam participated heavily, was an electoral disaster for the State 
Labor Party; in a Parliament of eighty-two members it was reduced from the thirty-three 
seats, it had held in 1972, to a "cricket team" of eleven M.L.A.'s (Fitzgerald 1984: 256). 
The Premier saw his constant attacks on the Whitiam Govemment as party political: 
I didn't let them consolidate ~ and tiiis is where I differed 
from a lot of colleagues...I kept Whitiam on the hop and the 
people alert to what was.going on. Why sit back and accept 
his policies and then in the last three montiis before an 
election try to teU the electors they are unacceptable?...You 
launch your assault immediately (cited in Lunn 1978:146). 
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During the time of the 1975 crisis, before Whitiam's dismissal, Bjelke-Petersen 
introduced a motion into the Queensland Parliament that attacked in no uncertain terms the 
Whitiam Govemment (see O.P.D. 17 October 1975:1285). In making this partisan attack on 
the Whitiam Govemment he also outlined many of his States' Rights ideas (couched in a 
negative way). The motion however, shows that Bjelke-Petersen was not genuinely 
interested in developing States' Rights and co-operative federal/State relations in Australia. 
In practice, it was an outright party political attack by a State Premier against an unpopular 
Labor Federal Govemment. It was aimed at electoral gain in Queensland. Bjelke-Petersen 
said: 
I move -
That this Parliament, having observed with deep concem the 
increasing tempo of action by the Commonwealth 
Government to -
(i) erode this State's sovereignty; 
(ii) inhibit this State's capacity for effective development of 
its resources and consequent provision of additional 
employment opportunities; 
(iii) distort the Federal partnership concept basic to the 
Australian Constitution by use of fiscal and other pressures 
against this State; 
(iv) display gross dereliction of duty and incompetence, 
which have resulted in record inflation and massive 
unemployment, thereby inflicting consequent hardness and 
misery on the people of this State; and 
(v) permit its Ministers to willingly and repeatedly disregard 
and evade their legal and Constitutional responsibilities, 
therefore considers 
(1) that the opportunity for the electorate to pass judgment on 
the Federal Govemment should be provided as a matter of 
urgency; and 
(2) that whatever can Constitutionally be done to induce a 
House of Representatives election should be done, wherever 
and whenever the occasion for this arises (O.P.D. 17 
Octoberl975: 1285). 
From the above quote from Bjelke-Petersen we can see the intensity of his 
antagonism toward the Whitiam Govemment and the manner in which this is fused with his 
advocacy of co-ordinate federalism and States' Rights. The first claim tiiat die 
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Commonwealth Govemment was eroding the State of Queensland and its sovereignty ~ 
was clearly a statement of States' Rights and an assertion of the independence of the State 
of Queensland. The second proposition ~ that the Commonwealth Govemment was 
inhibiting Queensland's capacity for effective development of its resources — reveals that 
Bjelke-Petersen opposed the Labor govemment's interference in Queensland economic 
development. The third statement ~ that the Commonwealth Govemment was distorting 
the Federal partnership concept basic to the Australian Constitution, by fiscal and other 
pressures ~ was a statement that the Commonwealth had undermined the co-ordinate 
federal system. The Commonwealth had drifted away from the original intentions of the 
founders and was using fiscal and other pressures against the States in an inappropriate 
way; these actions that both undermined the original Federal compact and forced an 
increasing financial dependence of the States on the Commonwealth. The fourth claim — 
that the Commonwealth Govemment was displaying gross dereliction of duty, and 
incompetence, resulting in record inflation and massive unemployment, thereby inflicting 
hardship and misery on the people of the State of Queensland — was a political attack on 
'the policies of the A.L.P. and the Whitiam Govemment. The same can be said about the 
fifth statement ~ that the Commonwealth Govemment was permitting its Ministers to 
willingly and repeatedly disregard and evade their legal and Constimtional responsibilities 
another unveiled attack on the Whitiam Government and its Ministers. Bjelke-Petersen 
then calls for another federal election for the House of Representatives and for the Whitiam 
Goverament to be voted out of office. So the motion was a combination of party political 
attacks and States' Rights claims. We have argued that the former was the driving force. 
Bjelke-Petersen and His Use of the Senate. 
A brief statement about the purpose of the Senate is required, preliminary to the 
specific argument about Bjelke-Petersen's use of the Senate to fmstrate Whitiam. The 
Australian Senate was designed by the founders of the Australian Federation to be a States' 
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House, to protect States' Rights, and to review and suggest amendments to federal 
legislation (Quick and Garran 1901). The Senate was not to reject completely supply 
(money bills) — as was set out in section 53 of the Australian Constitution — and thereby 
bring down the popularly elected representative Whitiam Govemment This was based on 
the long-held belief or convention that there was a lack of such a power in the British 
House of Lords; this power in 1910 was permanentiy removed from the House of Lords 
(Whitiam 1977, 1985). The Senate in Australia has to a large extent, outiived its original 
purpose as a States' House, but still has a role to play as a House of Review. The Senate 
is a body of elected members, as is the House of Representatives; it can provide necessary 
public accountability as a second chamber, with the opportunity to review and delay 
legislation. The Senate provides a check on the House of Representatives, by bringing to 
the attention of the pubhc possible defects in legislation and by acting in a "watchdog role" 
against possible abuses of power by the House of Representatives. 
The modem Senate is neither a House of independent review nor a house of, and 
for, the States. It has become a partial replica of the party-dominated House of 
Representatives and can be described as either an echo or an obstmction (Jaensch 1984: 
221). Early in the life of the federation, party discipline was established in the House of 
Representatives. Party discipline soon spread to the Senate where divisions were, 
thereafter, decided on party rather than State lines; and the chamber generally lost whatever 
States' House character as it might have had. The Senate was obstmctive whenever the 
govemment was in a minority in the Senate (Emy 1978: 195). The impact of the 1975 
Constitutional crisis shows clearly the problem involved in Australia's Federation as 
outiined in the Constitution. The problem for Australian govemment administiation and 
States' Rights is co-existing views on govemment organisation; these conflicting views, 
derived from the British Westminster and the American federal models. As Sawer (1976: 
70) says, in his Modem Federalism, the problem in Australian federalism is that: '...the 
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politics of Federalism, is concentrated in the Upper House, and the politics of responsible 
Parliamentary Govemment, is concentrated in the Lower House'. 
One of the major problems in Australian federalism, is the perceived conflict 
perceived by States' Rights advocates of the conflict between federalism and responsible 
govemment in Australian federalism. The original conflicting views of the founders in the 
pre-federation Constitutional debates, that is. States' Rights views versus unification 
views, stiU persist in Australia. The conflict is resolved, according to Quick and Garran 
(1901: 706-7), by granting the priority to responsible govemment over federalism. 
According to Bjelke-Petersen (1983: 63), on the other hand, 'There is a strong element 
striving to destroy the States and convert them into administrative extensions of a 
centralised bureaucracy in Canberra'. Bjelke-Petersen indicates that in November 1975 the 
Whitiam Govemment lost the confidence of a Govemor-General who saw his duty as 
preserving the Federal Parliament, in which the Senate is equal in power to the House of 
Representatives. In 1896 Sir Samuel Griffith had foreseen this possibility due to the fact 
that the dead lock provision in the Constimtion for resolving deadlocks is very slow (see 
section 57). Griffith stressed that a fundamental principle of federation was that no change 
to existing or future law by the Commonwealth Govemment would be made without die 
consent of the people and the States. The Australian Federation grew and mamred with this 
concept deeply embedded in its Constitution (Bjelke-Petersen 1983: 63, 70, 71). 
The Senate was originally designed by the founders of the Australian Constimtion 
as a States House representing the constimtionally independent position of the States; it was 
also to provide a check on the House of Representatives. It was given equal powers to the 
House of Representatives, except for the provision of section 53 which prevents the Senate 
from proposing laws appropriating revenue or moneys, or imposing taxation. The 1975 
crisis was triggered by the Senate's failure to pass the Federal Govemment's supply bills; it 
took over the power to block supply, a power that had been considered no longer active, 
and one not available to the British House of Lords since 1910 (Whitiam 1977: 256-7). 
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The significance of the Senate is vital to understand Australian Federalism and 
Bjelke-Petersen's attack on Whitiam and the Commonwealth A.L.P. Goverament. The 
intentions of the founders of the Australian federation for the Senate may be found in the 
authoritative Quick and Garran's (1901) The Armotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth. In Australia, the Senate as a "Council of States" took precedence over its 
role as a house of review. Quick and Garran noted that the Senate: 
...is the Chamber in which the States, considered as separate 
entities, and corporate parts of the Commonwealth, are 
represented. They are so represented for the purpose of 
enabling them to maintain and protect their Constimtional 
Rights against attempted invasions, and to give them every 
facility for the advocacy of their peculiar and special 
interests, as well as the ventilation and consideration of their 
grievances...(l901: 414). 
The Australian Constitution also established a framework of responsible 
government and, as a result, the Senate was required to fulfil two functions: to be both a 
States' House based on the American model, and a House of Review based on the British 
model. The ambivalent position of the Senate illustrates the potential tension in the 
Constimtion between the principles of Federalism and those of responsible government 
(Emy 1978: 94). The responsible goverament principle. Quick and Garran indicated, was 
to take priority: 
...the system of responsible government as known to the 
British Constimtion has been practically embedded in the 
Federal Constitution...and...will tend in the direction of the 
nationalisation of the people of the Commonwealth, and will 
promote the concentration of Executive control in the House 
of Representatives...(1901: 706-7). 
A number of Bjelke-Petersen's actions elevated the Senate into an altemative and 
competing political power to the House of Representatives. These actions included Bjelke-
Petersen's States' Rights language, and his advocacy of the Senate as a States' House, and 
his repeated call on National Party Senators from Queensland to oppose the Whitiam 
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Govemment's legislation in the Senate. But it was actually the Senate reforms of Senator 
Lionel Murphy a few years earlierthat had breathed new life into the Senate. Nevertheless, 
it was, Bjelke-Petersen who recognised that the Senate was an institution which could be 
used to oppose the Labor Govemment; and via his influence with Queensland National 
Party Senators, he set out to fmstrate the federal goverament at every turn, for partisan 
political, not genuinely States' Rights, reasons. The Senate was used by Bjelke-Petersen 
as part of his States' Rights advocacy; the latter was based on the States preventing die 
Commonwealth taking over the tiaditional powers of the States. Bjelke-Petersen's States' 
Rights language made frequent reference to the original intentions of the founders for the 
Senate to be a States' House; he made it clear that he intended to treat it as such. The 
Senate, according to the States' Rights views of Bjelke-Petersen was best suited to 
confront and block the Whitiam Commonwealth Goverament at a federal level in die 
Federal Parliament. The Senate rejected or deferred 63 non-supply bills in the period (1901-
72) but 93 in the period (1973-75). Also, since the introduction of proportional 
representation in the Senate in 1949, govemments have controUed the Senate only in the 
periods of November 1958- July 1962 and December 1975 - June 1981 (McMillan et al 1983: 
237). For Bjelke-Petersen, the Senate was the obvious place for the confrontation between 
the States and the Whitiam Commonwealth Govemment. The language used by Bjelke-
Petersen was of States' Rights; but the hidden agenda was to use party political power in 
the Senate, on behalf of the conservative establishment, to protest against the radical 
changesintroducedby the Whitiam Federal A.L.P. Govemment 
The nationalist, or centralist, view of Whitiam was opposed to a States' Rights 
view; Whitiam claimed that the Senate's powers are inconsistent with Westminster 
principles, because they conflict with the foundation element of Westininster-style 
Govemment, namely that the formation of Govemment comes from the Lower House not 
the Upper House. The co-equal, or indeed in some aspects superior, powers of the Senate 
in relation to the House of Representatives are said to be inconsistent with responsible 
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govemment and pariiamentary representative democracy. There is an obvious conflict of 
powers when the leader of the Opposition, who has a majority in the Senate, may have 
powers equal to the Prime Minister either the Leader of the Opposition or the Prime 
Minister can call or force an election (McMillan et al 1983: 232). The problem of the 
conflict of powers is outlined by Whitlam when he states that 
The right of the people's House to form a Govemment 
means nothing if the Govemment so formed can be removed 
by another Chamber (Proceedings of the Australian 
Constitutional Convention 1976: l(X)). 
The view of the conflict of powers between the two Houses of Parliament was 
rejected by Bjelke-Petersen; he supported not the Lower House but the Upper House and 
its power to refuse supply to the Goverament (which is formed in the Lower House) and 
thereby force the Govemment to an election. The Senate and its use, figured in the States' 
Rights advocacy by Bjelke-Petersen because the Senate has the power to oust a 
Govemment from the House of Representatives if it believes it is necessary. Bjelke-
Petersen has said the following about the Senate's veto power, and therefore what he calls 
the States' veto power: 
No honest constitutional lawyer can for a moment seriously 
maintain - as distinct from pleading for professional or 
political reasons - that the Senate did not have the power to 
refuse supply. If complete proof were needed, it lies in the 
clearly expressed determination of the former prime minister 
and tils then attomey-general (Senator Murphy) to use die 
Senate in 1970 to defeat a series of money bills in order to 
oust the Gorton Goverament, in exactly the same way as 
they were ousted at the end of 1975. All of this is stated with 
clarity in several issues of Hansard (1983: 67). 
The Senate's veto power has been criticised by other political observers on the 
ground that the Senate can exploit a short-term unpopularity of a Govemment and tiireaten 
an election every six months when a major supply bill is before the Parliament (McMillan et 
al 1983:232-3). The political scientist:^ofessor Colin Hughes has called the Senate's veto 
power 
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'a Constitutional monstrosity undermining the principle of responsible Govemment'. He 
notes that the recurring threat of a supply impasse carries 'the possibility of more frequent 
elections, more frequent political crisis...and intermptions to Govemment activity which 
would have adverse economic and social consequences ( quoted in McMillan et al 1983: 
233). 
Bjelke-Petersen, however, considered the Senate's veto power to be part of the 
federal compact; for him, this power was part of the Rights of the States and an appropriate 
power for a States' House. In 1975 Bjelke-Petersen, in the Queensland Parliament, said die 
following: 
' © • 
...Mr Whitiam and other A.L.P. critics say, the action taken 
by Mr Fraser is perfectiy conditional. All the argument in 
the world does not alter the fact that the Constimtion 
empowers the Senate to withhold supply from the 
Govemment. That power was inserted in the Constitution 
by Australians at the time of Federation. It is a power 
which, of course, is rarely exercised. It is a power which 
we believe should be exercised only when extraordinary 
circumstances exist. When those extraordinary 
circumstances exist (as they do at the moment). When the 
tmst in the Govemment has gone, when allowing this 
corrupt Govemment to continue in office will cause 
increasing hardship and suffering to more and more 
Australians, then those powers to send the Govemment to 
the polls must be exercised: they must be used as Mr Fraser 
has used them (O.P.D. 17 October 1975:1287). 
The significanceof the Whitiam dismissal, Bjelke-Petersen contended, was that the 
power of the Senate (the one-time States' House) was recognised. On the significance of 
the Senate in Australia's federal system, we can see from the above that Bjelke-Petersen, 
on occasions, does have and presents a coherent view. From a States' Rights perspective, 
Bjelke-Petersen endorsed the view that: "the Whitiam sacking was the start of a climb back 
to the ideals which the Federation fathers sought for a new nation" (1983: 66). 
Bjelke-Petersen further outhned the power and uniqueness of the Australian Senate 
as a safeguard for the people and for the States. A link between the past and the 1970s, is 
attempted by Bjelke-Petersen, by use of the words of Sir George Pearce, a member of the 
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first federal Parliament. Bjelke-Petersen in the Queensland Pariiament in 1975, before the 
Whitiam Goverament was dismissed, stated the following about the power of the federal 
Senate: 
Our Australian Senate stands in a unique position as a 
powerful safeguard for the people. It is no accident that it 
enjoys the right to face the people; it is part of our heritage 
given to us by the deliberate choice of the Australians who 
formed the Constimtion. I often recall these words of Sir 
George Pearce, member of the first Federal Parliament and at 
one time Acting Prime Minister — "The Senate was 
constimted as it is, after long fighting, prolonged 
discussions, many compromises and many concessions on 
the part of the various shades of political thought throughout 
the Commonwealth, and it stands there in the Constimtion in 
a position that has no equal in any legislamre throughout the 
world"...The Senate has acted. It cannot remove a bad 
Goverament, but it can force a bad Goverament to face the 
people (O.P.D. 17 October 1975: 1287-8). 
Bjelke-Petersen, of course, does not consider the actions of the Queensland 
Goverament as unconventional or improper, even those which broke the convention on 
replacement of Senators. Bjelke-Petersen, also does not consider the inappropriate 
behaviour of the Federal Opposition and the Constimtional Conventions broken by the 
Senate in blocking or failing to pass supply, to be unconstitutional or improper. Bjelke-
Petersen, also considered that a lot of misconceived comment is made about Constitutional 
reform and the future of federalism in Australia. He considered that the events of 11 
November 1975, ensured the triumph of the Constitution, as well as the continuation of the 
Federal concept embodied in the States' house. The imphcations for Australia, according 
to Bjelke-Petersen (1983: 66), will not be soon forgotten by those who see essential 
freedoms closely tied to divided political power and the decentralised economic sector 
which makes up our Federation. Whether these comments and predictions by Bjelke-
Petersen are found to be correct, only time will tell. 
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Bjelke-Petersen and Federalism. 
Bjelke-Petersen was an outspoken critic of centralism and Labor Party politics; he 
was also an advocate of co-ordinate federalism which has a distinct legal and 
constitutional division of powers with each level of govemment having separate and 
distinct areas of responsibility under the Constitution. Bjelke-Petersen did not attempt to 
co-operate with the Commonwealth in order to develop a co-operative federalism, nor did 
he attempt to develop a co-operative approach by the States within the Australian co-
ordinate federal system. Instead, Bjelke-Petersen was confrontational and critical of die 
Commonwealth Govemment in Canberra. There was a continuing antipathy by Bjelke-
Petersen towards the Fraser Liberal Goverament, and the Commonwealth in general; the 
Commonwealth Govemment was referred to as 'Canberra' (a soul-less city), rather tiian 
'the Australian Government' situated in the nation's capital city. The Australian 
Govemment was treated by Bjelke-Petersen as the 'federal' bogey; it was significant in die 
Premier's litany of hate along with the Communists (for sounder political reasons) (Scott 
etal 1986: 67). 
Conservative and pro-federal forces in the early and mid 1970's were led by Bjelke-
Petersen who held views that included opposition to the A.L.P. and Whitiam's long-term 
preference for the abolition of the States. Whitlam's views were firmly within the 
traditional Labor view that had been sceptical of the claims of the States' Rights advocates 
that the States are 'closer to the people'. Bjelke-Petersen beheved that Canberra was too 
distant from Queensland and that centralised power under the A.L.P. in Canberra would 
disadvantage Queenslanders. Bjelke-Petersen believed that federal Labor under Whitiam 
attempted to bypass the States and to build strong links with local govemment instead. The 
Whidam Govemment and its support for a countervailing set of regional authorities aroused 
some of the most bitter antagonism at State level particulariy from Bjelke-Petersen. Despite 
his long-term aspirations, however, Whitiam in practice, intended to work with the States 
and shift Labor's program away from a rather abstract and politically unrealistic 
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commitmentto the abolition of the States (Gillespie 1994: 78). The States' Rights advocacy 
by Bjelke-Petersen therefore showed either that he did not understand the federalist 
implications and goals of the Whitiam Govemment, or that he used States' Rights rhetoric 
in an inteUectually dishonest way. 
The federal policies of the Whitlam Govemment, along with the States' reaction to 
those policies played a major part in the conflict between Whitiam and Bjelke-Petersen. As 
we have said, another part of the conflict was due to the defence of the position of the 
States in the co-ordinate federal system. State premiers like Tom Lewis (Premier or New 
South Wales 1974-76) and Joh Bjelke-Petersen, in order to get rid of Labor, were willing 
to break longstanding conventions. Emy notes that, to understand why they did so, one 
must appreciate that, to them, the Whitiam Labor Govemment was acting in defiance of the 
federal bargain and ideas of co-equal status (1978: 90). In the 1970's, the Conservative 
State Govemments (Victoria, Queensland, New South Wales, and Westem Australia), 
were at the time hostile in their reaction to Whitlam's initiatives^ smbbom resistance. 
Indeed, Whitiam's urban pohcies, the major intervention into the preserve of the States, 
were cut back by Whitiam's successor, the Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. As we 
have said, the centralising trend, of shifting the federal balance towards the Commonwealth 
and away from the States, continued in the High Court decisions, during and after the 
Bjelke-Petersen era. 
Bjelke-Petersen, along with other State premiers, had highlighted this centralising 
trend toward the Commonwealth during the Whitiam era. The Liberal Party Prime 
Minister, Malcolm Fraser, after taking office, was unable to reverse the centralising trend 
toward the Commonwealth. The campaign led by Bjelke-Petersen against die Whidam 
Goverament, and Whitiam's New Federalism policies, did not succeed because the trend 
toward centralism in the Commonwealth Govemment continued after the demise of die 
Whitiam Goverament. The increase in Commonwealth power under Whitiam did not 
mean a decline in State influence, but resulted in a new assertiveness by the States, led by 
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Bjelke-Petersen. With the Fraser Govemment there was no retreat, in many areas, from the 
Whitiam policies ~ of Commonwealth control over the States ~ and of direct 
Commonwealth intervention in the activities constitutionally reserved for the States. The 
funding and strategic management of higher education remained in federal hands; even 
when financial responsibilities was retumed to the States, as in hospitals, the 
Commonwealth never withdrew its interest in the area. Similarly, untied Commonwealth 
funding of local government continued, giving the third level of government the resources 
to show that it was more than a 'creature' of the States. 
Bielke-Petersen was not a States' Rights Spokesperson but an advocate for the interests of 
the Oueensland National Party and Local Business Interests. 
In Queensland, Bjelke-Petersen since 1968, had been the leader of a long-standing 
coahtion govemment; but he had, over time, undermined the position of his coalition 
partner, the Queensland Liberal Party. Bjelke-Petersen portrayed in rosy terms the 
National Party, and the mral bias in the economy, along with the mral way of life; this rosy 
picture came to be accepted by the average coalition voter. The political rhetoric of the 
Premier embodied the central values and aspirations nurtured in the political culture of 
Queensland; as a all-pervasive, mral conservatism (Smith 1985: 30). Bjelke-Petersen 
stated some of these values in a 1979 article in the Australian, "Go north young man", 
calling for people with enterprise and initiative to travel north and settle in Queensland, a 
land of opportunity, through hard work and development of the namral resources that a 
young man could attain prosperity: 
Go north, young man to the frontier where the future for 
growth is so great that it staggers the imagination... Where 
the spirit of adventure will triumph over adversity given the 
right economic environment, the courage of our people and 
the pioneering zeal of our great companies... Where there are 
endless opportunities for people with enterprise and initiative 
and not afraid of hard work... Where our destiny is to 
populate, occupy and exploit our opportunities as never 
before... and where the spearhead must rest with the State 
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and the vigorous thmst of private enterprise (Australian. 21 
December 1979: 7). 
In 1983 after the collapse of the coalition, the election campaign slogan "Now More Than 
Ever Queensland Needs Joh and the Nationals" reflected the National Party's recognition of 
the Premier, at least since 1974, as their greatest electoral asset (Galligan 1986: 221). In 
1987, after the abortive "Joh for PM" campaign, numerous administrative bungles in 
decision-making (Coaldrake 1989) and allegations of police corruption which were 
confirmed after the establishment of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, Bjelke-Petersen became a 
electoral liability. 
Bjelke-Petersen expressed again concem for the position of the States and their 
independence within a co-ordinate federal system. The concem of the States to control and 
administer their own functions of govemment in the Federation was the focus of much of 
theBjelke-Petersenattackon the Whitlam Govemment. Bjelke-Petersen raised the issue of 
greater financial independence for the States but did not take up the taxing opportunity 
offered by the Fraser Govemment. Bjelke-Petersen also raised a concem about federal 
goverament interference in State responsibilities but accepted federal government assistance 
in many areas (Bjelke-Petersen 1983: 64; Patience 1985). General-purpose grants, for 
example, from the Commonwealth to local government in Queensland escalated from $8.9 
milhon in 1974-75 to $82.0 milhon in 1984-85; these grants were accepted by die Bjelke-
Petersen Goverament (Tucker 1985: 206). Since federation, there had been recurring 
conceras about the independence of the States and the shifting federal balance in the 
Australian federal system. Bjelke-Petersen's public advocacy of federalism and so called 
States' Rights concerning the public interest, however, cloaked a hidden agenda of 
conservative party political ideology and a support for the Queensland National Party, and 
private interests in Queensland business and development 
Bjelke-Petersen and the Queensland Country Party (later National Party) 
encouraged part of the myth that Queensland was different from otiier States. Queensland, 
under Bjelke-Petersen, became known, in a journalist's catch-phrase as Australia's "Deep 
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North", with all die connotations attached to the "Deep Soutii" in the United States of 
America (Hughes 1980: 10). That image of Queensland - as a State with policies oriented 
toward white, male, farmer. Christian fundamentalists and business development interests -
- had a lot to do with the leadership of the Queensland Country/National Party led by 
Bjelke-Petersen. The authoritarian, racist, pro-development, pro-mining, anti-Labor party, 
right-wing political ideology of Bjelke-Petersen (Wells 1979) became the image of 
Queensland and the real agenda underiying Bjelke-Petersen's States' Rights rhetoric. The 
image of the State of Queensland and the Queensland Goverament were, to a great degree, 
associated with the policies of the Queensland Government that was dominated in tura by 
Bjelke-Petersen and the Queensland National Party (Hughes 1980; Lunn 1987; Coaldrake 
1989). These were several elements of the image of Queensland under Bjelke-Petersen. It 
was: 
...authoritarian, racist in its dealings with Aborigines, 
heavy-handed to the point of violence in its dealings with 
political dissidents, vulnerable to the pressures of 
multinational mining companies and right-wing groups 
opposed to liberal social trends which have been at work in 
post-war Australia, sensitive to States' Rights and deeply 
suspicious of national politicians and bureaucrats to the point 
of employing the antiquated machinery of the imperial 
coimection with London against changes coming out of 
Canberra, ready even to contemplate secession from the 
Commonwealth of Australia, a proposal that had not been 
floated for forty years since the Westera Australia campaign 
of the Depression years (Hughes 1980:10). 
Bjelke-Petersen continued to attack the Commonwealth Govemment in the 1980s 
on States' Rights grounds. During the Hawke Govemment in 1984 the attomey-general, 
Gareth Evans, 'having been involved very closely in 1973 with the previous abortive 
attempt to introduce a Human Rights Bill', admitted he had wanted to try again and was 
determined to 'get it right this time' (Evans 1984: 17). Evans aimounced in March 1984 
that tabling of the bill would be delayed until after an expected election in late 1984 because 
an issue of its significance deserved calm and rational debate (Canberra Times, 28 March 
1984). Evans announced that 'Cabinet thought it should not proceed until after a fair 
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amount of discussion with the States'. The political blunder by Evans was in circulating 
his draft bill in confidence to certain individuals while keeping it a secret from the public 
until after the election. Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen had obtained a copy of the draft bill and 
exploited the issue. Bjelke-Petersen told the Queensland parliament that the bill eliminated 
all the usual limits on rights justified by public safety, public order and the protection of 
public health and morals he claimed that these were to be replaced with 'a simple clause 
authorising the courts to uphold legal limitations which they, the Federal Courts, not the 
State courts, consider are reasonably justified in a free and democratic society'. As a 
result, he concluded, 'This places the citizens of Queensland, the Govemment of 
Queensland and the Parliament of Queensland in the hands of Commonwealth-appointed 
courts and judges'. Sir Joh rejected the bill of rights as a threat to the States' sovereignty 
and an attempt to subject State ministers to wide unprecedented investigatory and 
supervisory powers by a non-elected and Commonwealth-appointed Human Rights 
Commission (Galligan 1995: 154-5). He concluded by saying that 
It is an audacious attempt to restrucmre Australian political 
and social life to meet the demands of a power-hungry 
Commonwealth Govemment bent on the destmction of the 
States and the establishment of a socialist republic (Canberra 
Times. 24 October 1984: 19). 
Afterthe 1984 election, the Evans' bill of rights was abandoned, the deputy prime 
minister, Lionel Bowen, replaced Evans as attoraey-general, and Evans was moved to the 
portfolio of Resources and Energy. Cabinet approved Bowen's draft bill of rights by the 
end of September 1985, along with his proposal for a commission on constimtional 
reform. The Bowen bill was considerably weaker than the earlier Evans draft, and it was 
not to apply to the States (Galligan 1995: 155). Bjelke-Petersen had defeated Evans and 
his bill of rights with his use of States' Rights language and criticism of the 
Commonwealth legislation but he had, in the end, not stopped the Commonwealth in its 
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continual increase of centralised power and had, in effect, undermined the rights of the 
citizen for the sake of the rights of the States. 
Bjelke-Petersen, in fact, was more than a States' Rights advocate. He was an 
advocate for the interests of business and development interests in the State of Queensland 
and an ideological opponent of the Australian Labor Party. Queensland developmentalism, 
particularly under the leadership of Bjelke-Petersen, led inevitably to conflict with the 
Commonwealth Govemment (Scott et al 1986: 68). The sectional interests of the mining 
and farming industries, and of foreign capital, are not identical to industries located in other 
States or the federal goverament's view of the national interest (Stephenson 1977; Head 
1981). Bjelke-Petersen was able to advance the cause of Queensland developmentalism, 
which inevitably led to conflicts with the Commonwealth; these conflicts were with the 
Whitiam Labor Goverament's pohcies, followed by the Fraser Liberal Govemment's 
pohcies, and then, finally, the Hawke Labor Govemment's pohcies. In 1985 Bjelke-
Petersen helped push legislation through parliament designed to protect the position of the 
developer of the Sanctuary Cove resort (O.P.D. 1985-6: 2190-5). For Premiers such as 
Bjelke-Petersen, development takes precedence over most other considerations (Bennett 
1992: 118). Bjelke-Petersen was a party politician first and States' Righter second; this is 
demonstrated by the political advantage he drew from his criticisms of the Commonwealth. 
The political rhetoric, including States' Rights rhetoric, was empty talk and was not carried 
through in a practical way to encourage the fumre development of co-ordinate federalism in 
Australia. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CO-OPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
The Bjelke-Petersen style of confrontation with the Commonwealth, and his use of 
States' Rights rhetoric in the 1970s and 1980s, had failed to contribute to the further 
development of a co-ordinate federal system or to the development of the independence of 
the States in Australia. The States' Rights cause advocated by Bjelke-Petersen, and others 
— against the Whitiam Labor Govemment (1972-75), and then against the Fraser 
Liberal/National Govemment (1975-83), and finahy against the Hawke Labor Govemment 
(1983-91), did not achieve a successful implementation or recognition by the 
Commonwealth or the High Court. Bjelke-Petersen, resigned from the Queensland 
Parliament, Leader of the Queensland National Party, and as the Queensland Premier, on 
1st December 1987, after a record 19 years as Premier of Queensland; his demise was 
surrounded in political and constitutional controversy. 
After Bjelke-Petersen left the Australian political stage, the Commonwealth 
Govemment and the High Court have become even more determined to undermine the 
authority of the States and centialise power at the national level in the Commonwealth 
Parliament and the High Court. Commonwealth legislation and High Court decisions have 
increasingly considered national interests ahead of State and local interests. This has been 
necessary in a developing world economy, requiring the implementation of intemational 
laws; but it has undermined the principle of federalism and States' Rights in Austialia. 
After the departure of Joh Bjelke-Petersen from the political stage, there have been 
developments in cooperation between the Commonwealth and the States beyond a 
traditional co-ordinate federal stmcture. Recent achievements in intergovernmental 
relations and cooperative federalism underline the folly of Bjelke-Petersen's States' Rights 
and co-ordinate federalism approach; they show that more can be achieved by a non-
partisan, collaborative approach. 
104 
Observations by various authors such as Sawer (1967, 1977), Menzies (1967), 
Crisp (1970), Spann (1979), Knight (1974), and Giblin (1926), and Wiltshire (1986), 
supported the view that strict theories of government independence are false. The weight of 
these authors' comments on federalism suggest that Australia has left a situation of co-
ordinate federalism and moved into a situation described as organic federalism. The eariy 
era of Australian federalism emphasised a division of discreet goveramental powers 
between two levels; this was apphcable in a situation of minimum government activity, and 
in a society without the modem methods of resource mobility. In Australia co-ordinate 
federalism (meaning static) federalism — with a strict division between national and State 
functions ~ has moved to organic (meaning dynamic) federalism with a more dynamic or 
flexible relationship between the govemments of the Commonwealth and the States 
(Wiltshire 1986: 137). In the farsighted words of Matiiews: 
At the time the American, Canadian and Australian federal 
Constitutions were devised good govemment was weak 
govemment... powers were divided vertically along 
functional lines...There was very httle overlap in the 
allocation of expenditure functions; such overlap as occurred 
in the Australian Constimtion may be traced to the fact that 
by the 1890's govemments were at last beginning to take an 
interest in social and economic questions...our federal 
constitutions were thus based very clearly on the concept of 
divided responsibility of independent levels of govemment 
each exercising authority and providing services in 
functional fields that were designated by drawing vertical 
boundaries between jurisdictions. What has happened 
during recent years to change this simation? The main 
factors have been the extension of the range of goverament 
activities and the growth of the size of the public sector. 
These in tura have been occasioned by the growing strength 
and complexity of the economy and by community 
acceptance of the need for governments to provide greatiy 
expanded services and economic controls (1974: 115-16). 
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Recent Federalism Views From Oueensland Premiers. 
Recent changes in intergovernmental relations show that co-operation with the 
Commonwealth rather than the Bjelke-Petersen style of confrontation politics, has, in the 
end, aided the position of the States within the Australian Federation. Wayne Goss, as a 
recent Labor Premier of Queensland (1989-96), defended the position of the States within 
Australian federalism, and noted that 
The centralist option ignores the fundamental logic of 
federalism. It overlooks the advantages which accme to the 
nation from dividing power and sharing roles (Goss 1996: 
88). 
Premier Goss also rejected the Bjelke-Petersen approach to the use of States' Rights 
rhetoric; he presented a people's rights approach as citizens of both a State and a nation. 
This was the approach of the founders which has been greatiy modified by the 
Commonwealth and the High Court. Goss stated that 
Certainly there is no point chanting a state rights mantra. 
States do not have rights ~ people have rights, which they 
choose to protect by dividing the power of goverament 
across several levels, so that govemment is never so strong, 
or so remote, that it loses its connection with ordinary 
citizens. This indeed was the intention of those who drafted 
the original Constitution, but their omissions, and the 
subsequent re-inventions of federalism by Canberra and the 
High Court, have rendered that intention almost invisible 
(Goss 1996: 88). 
Goss viewed the first meeting of the Council of Australian Govemments 
(C.O.A.G.) in 1996 as an opportunity for the States to show that they were keen to discuss 
with the Commonwealth means of providing the States with appropriate revenue-raising 
powers. The concept of co-operative federalism was to be a sustainable solution for 
maintaining a middle level of goverament, despite the drift away from the founders' 
intentions for co-ordinate federalism, some restoration of the balance was required, 
especially in the area of finance. According to Interaational Monetary Fund statistics, the 
Commonwealth government raises revenue equal to 1.5 times its own spending needs, 
while the States revenue-raising capacity, is on average, 60 per cent of their program 
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spending needs. The concept of co-operative federalism, according to Goss presents a 
distinct challenge and will require commitment from all govemments to produce a better 
and more co-operative federal/State relationship (Goss 1996: 91). Goss has also stated an 
important practical and fundamental point about co-operative federalism: 
While current arrangements are unlikely to remain fixed, we 
still need strong states to aUow diversity and keep 
govemments close to the people (Goss 1996: 92). 
The thoughtful and co-operative approach advocated by Premier Goss was a far cry from 
the confrontational approach and the chant of "States' Rights" by the former Premier 
Bjelke-Petersen. 
The present Premier of Queensland and Leader of the National Party, Bob Borbidge 
(1996- ?), has spoken about the future of the Constitution and says "yes, Australia does 
still need States" (Borbidge 1996: 1). Premier Borbidge believes, like the National Party 
Premier Bjelke-Petersen before him, it is necessary to argue the case for Queensland 
aggressively in States' Rights terms, by stating that that the Commonwealth needs the 
States as a scapegoat for its fiscal problems. He says that the Commonwealth diverts tax 
receipts from the States and transfers expenditure responsibilities to the States in order to 
fund its own programs, which, in many cases, it seized from the States. Borbidge wants 
us to set up a new federal compact by returaing to many of the ideas developed and 
intended at the time of federation by Sir Henry Parkes and Sir Samuel Griffith. He wants 
there to be an appropriate and fair assignment of powers and responsibilities to the various 
tiers of government (Borbidge 1996: 1-2). 
Borbidge asks whether the federal authorities appreciate what their main 
responsibilities are. Borbidge speaks of the federal government's abuse of the foreign 
affairs power by using treaties to force onto the States what he calls the federal 
government's unwanted views and policies. He also says that he is not afraid of assuming 
the States' proper taxing and spending responsibihties he wants reform to "vertical fiscal 
imbalance", and the removal of unnecessary and wasteful duplication and overlap of 
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spending areas of responsibilities. Borbidge states that there are, according to Treasury, 
welcome gains to be had by co-operative federalism, compared with the current 
centralisation of tax powers and dictation of policy. Borbidge finally criticises the pace of 
reform of federal State financial relations through the Council of Australian Govemments 
(Borbidge 1996: 2-6). These remarks have a style similar to Bjelke-Petersen; but they also 
show a greater understanding of the problems to be faced; they also suggest a genuine 
intention to move toward co-operative federalism. 
Developments In State/Federal Relations And Co-operative Federalism In Recent Times. 
Recent developments in State/Federal relations and co-operative federalism would 
not have been possible with a States' Rights advocate such as Bjelke-Petersen. Bjelke-
Petersen had a record of non-cooperation and confrontation with the Commonwealth, he 
would not have been able to negotiate, compromise and cooperate with the Commonwealth 
for the development of a better functioning federal system, he would not have been able to 
develop a sound State/federal relationship for the implementation of necessary national 
objectives and federal reforms. The States have been overmled by the Commonwealth and 
the High Court; they have been forced to cooperate to maintain their position in the 
federation and to achieve the maintenance of States' Rights within functioning place in the 
Australian federal system. 
New Federalism, Mark III, saw an odd coalition of the New South Wales Liberal 
Premier Nick Greiner, and Prime Minister Bob Hawke. The origins of this alliance are 
murky but the Hawke Govemment surprised by it own electoral victory in 1990, was 
looking for a program to sustain its reformist drive and also Hawke wanted a major policy 
triumph he could call his own in order to put a stop to Paul Keating's leadership ambitions. 
The Hawke New Federalism was driven, at federal level, by senior bureaucrats, 
particularly those in the Department^pf Prime Minister and Cabinet, centring on its 
Secretary Mike Codd (Age, 29 October 1990). The New South Wales proposals 
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emphasised an extension of 'managerial' reforms to public administration. As full 
responsibility for programs was transferred to the relevant level of government the result 
would be the efficiency of govemment enhanced by eliminating areas of overiapping 
authority, and rationalising administration with 'vacation of fields' activity (New South 
Wales Cabinet Office 1990). The Greiner/Hawke proposals were in the bland language of 
managerialism and presented issues as objectively solvable technical questions. Their clear 
objective was to make govemment more streamlined, reduce the size of the public sector by 
rationalising Commonwealth/State functions and widening moves toward competition 
through State trading enterprises and utilities (Gillespie 1994: 82). 
An important development in federal/State relations has been the holding of 
Commonwealth-State/territory negotiations with the special premiers' conference (S.P.C.)/ 
Council of Australian Govemments (C.O.A.G.); this was launched by Prime Minister 
Hawke as an initiative at the National Press Club on 19 July 1990. Prime Minister Hawke 
promised a new era of co-operative federahsm with 'better co-operation within the 
framework of the Federal Constitution as it now stands' (quoted in Weller 1996: 96). 
Hawke noted many anomalies and inefficiencies, and mentioned six areas needing 
immediate attention: 
• mi croeconomic reform; 
• financial relations; 
• delivery of services; 
• the national agenda for social justice; 
• industrial relations; and 
• the environment (cited in Weller 1996: 96). 
Hawke convened a special premiers' conference on 30-31 October 1990. In a letter (dated 
19 July 1990) to the premiers, Hawke announced his intention to establish a 
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Commonwealth steering committee, chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet to prepare papers for the first conference (Weller 1996: 96). Hawke 
noted that 
I expect that on most issues we will not be in a position to 
reach substantive decisions at the October meeting; rather we 
should be able to agree on the direction and scope for further 
work (Hawke 1990). 
According to Hendy (1996: H I ) , C.O.A.G. was formed out of a concem to 
improve intergovernmental cooperation by Commonwealth, State and territory 
govemments. Specifically, C.O.A.G. allowed a whole-of-govemment perspective in the 
coordination of policy frameworks to be discussed by leaders and central agencies. 
C.O.A.G. has also increased the possibility for further reform in the areas of financial 
arrangements, intemational treaties, and constitutional reform in Austialia's pohtical 
system. From the perspective of the States and tenitories, there were two main reasons for 
the creation of C.O.A.G.: 
• Premiers and chief ministers had become increasingly 
concemed with the tendency towards centralisation of 
govemment processes within the federation. This is a 
tendency they believed to be the deliberate policy of the 
Commonwealth Govemment. 
• C.O.A.G. allowed an ongoing fomm to discuss non-
financial issues separate to the traditional premiers' 
conference (Hendy 1996: 111-2). 
In regard to the transfer of functions between different levels of govemment, the 
New South Wales Premier Nick Greiner argued for a major reallocation. Under Greiner's 
proposals the States would refer areas such as industrial relations into the hands of the 
Commonwealth, which in tura would withdraw from any involvement in education, health 
and housing services (Sydney Moraing Herald. 26 July 1990). Greiner followed this 
initiative three months later with an attack on his Liberal colleagues, in which he put die 
managerialist line: 'Too often we give the impression to the world that we are obsessed 
with States' Rights for their own sake' (Sydney Moraing Herald. 25 October 1990). 
Greiner in 1991, surprised his Liberal Party colleagues by calling for a de-emphasis on die 
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rhetoric of States' Rights (Macmillan Dictionary of Australian Politics: 198). This was a 
call for federal /State cooperation and was in stark contrast to the strident States' Rights 
advocacy of the former Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen. 
Hawke's New Federalism had its origins outside party programs and consequentiy 
it has been suggested that it was the high point of the A.L.P.'s long-drawn out 
'reconciliation with federalism', and a recognition that centralist fantasies of unitary 
goverament were at best unrealistic, and effective government was best served by 
improving the existing institutions (Galligan and Mardiste 1992: 71-75). Greiner's Liberal 
National coalition in New South Wales provided the Commonwealth with its most effective 
ally, but the Labor States, faced with great financial problems, were enthusiastic about any 
measure that might increase their resources (Parkin and Marshall 1992 cited in GiUespie 
1994:84). The call for Commonwealth/State cooperation by Greiner, has yet to show any 
real impact in the Liberal Party's opposition to real reform to Australian federalism. The 
Greiner/Hawke coalition however laid the foundation for further proposals in cooperative 
federalism. 
In 1994, Prime Minister Keating (1991-96), in an address to the A.N.U.'s 
Research School of Social Sciences for the Reshaping Australian Instimtions' project, 
advocated a new partnership and a new sharing of responsibility for change (Keating 1994: 
6). This new relationship with the States was to be based on four principles. The first was 
a recognition that in Australia the States have a vital role as units of goverament. Keating 
had said that 'if we didn't have States we would almost need to invent them'. The second 
was that the States participate in the process of change due to advantages of self-interest for 
the States. The third was that appropriate roles and responsibilities would be established. 
The fourth was that the Commonwealth would maintain its monopoly over income tax. 
Keating believed that uniform taxation was 'the glue that holds the federation together' 
(Gahigan 1995: 212). 
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A review of C.O.A.G. indicates that it has not been a complete success; this is 
because the Commonwealth has used C.O.A.G. to secure States' and territories' agreement 
to microeconomic reform proposals, but has been reluctant to cooperate on social issues. 
Due to the various stakeholders - in the Commonwealth and State bureaucracies and 
ministries ~ attempting to protect their vested interests - ^ there has been slow 
progress in interjurisdictional negotiations on reforming areas of health, community 
services, child care, and pubhc housing. Also C.O.A.G. has not dealt with the basic 
reform issue for Australian federalism, that is, Commonwealth/State financial 
arrangements. C.O.A.G. has been useful, however as a federal body, in cooperative 
problem-solving (Hendy 1996: 112-3). The tiiird C.O.A.G. meeting, held in Hobart 1994, 
produced agreements on a range of microeconomic reform measures, such as agreement on 
the principles of competition policy articulated in the Hilmer Report (Galligan 1995: 212-
3). 
Another development in intergovernmental relations has been the creation of the 
Leaders' Fomm, which, in a way, is an extension of the C.O.A.G. initiative; but has not 
attained a significant profile. In February 1994 C.O.A.G. leaders decided to hold regular 
meetings to achieve a more cooperative approach in their dealings with the Commonwealth. 
At their first meeting, premiers and chief ministers released a communique that declared 
that, in the decade leading up to the centenary of federation, leaders would commit 
themselves to the reshaping of a new Australian federation by the year 2001 (Hendy 1996: 
113). 
The federal/State financial arrangements, and the extent of the disparity between 
spending and revenue-raising responsibilities of each level of govemment — that is, the 
verticalfiscal imbalanceor V.F.I. ~ is another matterurgently needing to be addressed. In 
a recent study on Commonwealth/State financial powers. Access Economics state that — by 
adopting various strategies to eliminate V.F.I. — there would be a substantial impact on the 
economy. They calculate that the gain to national welfare could be about half of the $9 
112 
billion potential benefits estimated by the Industry Commission to come from the 
Hilmer/N.C.P. reforms. The Commonwealth would be the principal beneficiary of 
revenues flowing from implementation of the Hilmer reforms and, as a result, the 
Commonwealth has agreed to consider a more reasonable sharing of those benefits via so-
called competition policy grants (Hendy 1996: 114-5,117). 
The Hilmer Report flowed from the proceedings of the Independent Committee of 
Inquiry, and the report was entitied "National Competition Policy". The committee's terms 
of reference were to find ways of removing barriers to competition within Australia. As a 
result, this placed the Hilmer reforms at the centre of attempts to improve ailocative 
efficiency; if the latter was achieved, by removing obstacles to domestic competition, the 
price of essential services should decline as it converges on the tme market value. The 
Hilmer Report had profound effects for all levels of Australian goverament The six main 
proposals of the Hilmer Report were that: the Trade Practices Act should be extended; 
regulations which restrict competition should be reformed; public sector monopoly power 
should be removed or hmited; infrastmcmre should be accessed more widely; competitive 
pricing should be fostered; and a 'level playing field' should be achieved by way of 
competition between govemment and private sector businesses. The reform process has its 
critics who note that the Hilmer reforms embrace a model of 'small' govemment which is 
detrimental to welfare (Felmingham and Page 1996: 27). Mathews (1995: 16) has pointed 
to the dechne in the contribution of Commonwealth govemment outiays to Australia's 
G.D.P.: from 29.4 to 26.6 per cent over the period 1983-84 to 1993-94. Mathews also 
emphasises the unemployment consequences of this change as a result. 
Therecommendationsof the Hilmer Report were adopted by C.O.A.G. on 11 April 
1995. An Australian National Competition Pohcy (N.C.P.) was to be based on Hilmer's 
findings. The N.C.P. key characteristics reduced to the following: 
• there should be provision for prices oversight of 
govemment business enterprises (G.B.E.'s) pricing 
strategies; 
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• competitive neutrality should be the comerstone of 
competition between G.B.E.'s and private competition; 
• public sector monopolies should be reformed; 
• legislation should be reviewed to remove barriers to 
competition; and 
• third parties should be allowed access to public sector 
infrastmcmre (Felmingham and Page 1996: 28) 
Constitutional reform is yet another area that has attracted some recent 
consideration. Some of the suggestions are as follows. The Commonwealth's extemal 
affairs power, laid down in section 51 (xxix) of the Constimtion should be given less 
potency. There should be change to the stmcmre of the Senate; some even suggest a new 
Senate based on the model of the German upper house, the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat is 
composed of members of the govemments of the German Lander, or States consequentiy, 
the States and are closely involved in the review of federal legislation. This would be an 
instimtional guarantee that both levels of government participate in setting national strategic 
policy. There has also been a suggestion of increasing the role for the States in the High 
Court appointment process. Decisions of the High Court involve the national and State 
governments and the States deserve to have an input in the selection process. Another 
suggestion has been to support the concept that States should be able to propose 
constitutional amendments ~ State Government initiated referenda. This had previously 
been supported by the 1988 Constitutional Convention, and would be a significant check 
on the centralisation of power in the federal sphere (Hendy 1996: 116-7). 
These recent developments, amongst others, demonstrate that more can be achieved 
in improving intergovernmental relations - and making the federal system work better ~ by 
a non-partisan, collaborative approach by the States than the outspoken advocacy of States' 
Rights by State premiers such as Bjelke-Petersen. Recent achievements in cooperation 
between the Commonwealth and the States underiine the folly of Bjelke-Petersen's States' 
Rights approach to the pohcy process in the Australian federal system of govemment. 
Without fundamental constitutional change through amendment to the Constitution, or a 
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radical shift in the direction of the High Court on the division of powers, the fumre 
development and improvement of the Australian federal system will require substantial 
cooperation and negotiation between the various levels of govemment, particularly between 
the Commonwealth and the States. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The thesis presented above has examined the decline of co-ordinate federalism in 
Australia and traced the downfall of States' Rights in terms of (1) the original intentions of 
the founders for a co-ordinate federal system; (2) the drift away from the original intentions 
and co-ordinate federalism; (3) the fight back by the States to the original intentions of co-
ordinate federalism; (4) the failure of Bjelke-Petersen to further the cause of States' Rights; 
and (5) recent developments in cooperative federalism. The thesis shows that the 
endeavours of the former Queensland premier, Johaimes Bjelke-Petersen, did not improve 
the State goverament's position within the Australian federal system relative to die 
Commonwealth Goverament. 
There has been a steady decline in States' Rights from the intent of the founders as 
written in the Constitution, ever since federation; this is especially so since the High Court 
decision in 1920: the Engineers Case. Further, the States' Rights agenda ~ of State 
political leaders, such as State premiers, on which so much political energy has been 
expended ~ has not been enhanced. In fact, the Commonwealth has consolidated its 
position within the Australian federation; it has asserted authority over the States with the 
aid of the judicial interpretations of the Constitution by the High Court. There have been 
several factors causing the weakening of the States in the federation. As we have said, the 
decisions of the High Court have been important, especially decisions such as the 
Engineers Case (1920), the Uniform Tax Case (1942), the Second Uniform Tax Case 
(1957), the Koowarta Case (1982). and the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983). Another factor 
in the decline of the States has been the assumption of power by the Commonwealth. A 
third factor has been the failure by the States to grasp taxation opportunities when such 
were available and in fact explicitiy offered to the States. The recent High Court decision 
Ha V. New South Wales (1996) has further increased the vertical fiscal imbalance and 
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consolidated the Commonwealth's financial domination over the States; it removed a lar»e 
part of their revenue-raising capacity. 
The fight back by the States in the 1970s against the Whitiam Labor Govemment's 
interference in the activities of the States - which was led by the Queensland Premier 
Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, was dramatic and confrontational; but it did not advance the 
cause of States' Rights or stop the ever-increasing power of the Commonwealth. States' 
Rights rhetoric by Bjelke-Petersen was used against the Whitiam Govemment for party 
political reasons, that is, to the advantage of Bjelke-Petersen and the National Party in 
Queensland. The States' Rights language used by Bjelke-Petersen against the Whidam 
Labor Govemment (1972-75), was continued against the Fraser Liberal Govenunent 
(1975-83), and the Hawke Labor Govemment (1983-91). This approach only ended when 
Bjelke-Petersen left the political scene. The confrontational style of Bjelke-Petersen, and 
other States' Rights advocates, has not prevented the drift away from the founders' original 
intentions for a co-ordinate federal system. 
The thesis presented above confirms the drift away from the founders' original 
intentions of co-ordinate federahsm; on the other hand, it also shows that the advocacy of 
States' Rights has failed to produce a winding back of the power of the Commonwealth or 
a shift in the federal balance toward the States. The system of co-ordinate federalism 
proposed by the founders, in the Constitution, has declined; in its place is a system biased 
towards the Commonwealth. These changes have occurred for two main reasons: (1) High 
Court decisions, and (2) the verticalfiscal imbalance. Groenewegen (1983) and McMillan 
etal (1983) were used to support the view that there has been a drift to the Commonwealth 
at the expense of the States. The judicial interpretation of the Constitution by the High 
Court has played a major role in the changing federal balance and the dechne of States' 
Rights. Some of the more significant High Court Cases have been mentioned to in order to 
demonstrate the further consolidation of power in the Commonwealth; the thesis has shown 
that there has been an increase in the financial power of the Commonwealth at the expense 
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of the States. Groenewegen (1983), McMillan et al (1983), Lumb (1983), and Galhgan 
(1987, 1995) have been used to support this position. In the case of the vertical fiscal 
imbalance(V.F.I.), the method of distributing funds through the use of financial grants to 
the States under section 96 ~ particularly during the Whitiam Govemment's time in office -
- has been explored to demonstrate the further consolidation of the financial power in the 
hands of the Conunonwealtii. Quick and Garran (1901), La Nauze (1972), Wiltshire 
(1986), Saunders (1992), Mathews (1994), and otiiers, are used to reinforce the argument 
presented. 
There was a fight back in the 1970's by the States led by the Premier of 
Queensland, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, against the Whitiam Government's intervention in 
the activities of the States. The 'New Federalism' of the Whitlam Goverament paved the 
way for funds to be directiy allocated to the Local Authorities by using s. 96 grants. 
Further, WTiitiam exercised the extemal affairs power s.51 (xxix) to achieve the distribution 
of funds. Also by working within the Constimtion, and its framework, the Whidam 
Govemment was able to legislate to avoid the High Court overmling Labor Party 
legislation (which happened under the Chifley Labor Goverament 1945-49 with the State 
Banking Case in 1945 and with the Bank Nationalisation Case in (1948 and 1949); this 
strategy ensured that the High Court brought down decisions in favour of the 
Commonwealth and against the States, such as in die Off-Shore Sovereignty Case in 1975. 
Support for these views came the A.L.P. Plati"orm (1971), Whitlam (1971, 1977), Sawer 
(1977), and Galligan (1987). The Whidam Goverament signed Interaational Treaties and 
agreements and conventions using the exteraal affairs power s.51 (xxix) so as to place the 
High Court in a position of having to support the Commonwealth over the States; this 
government also used s.96 grants to the States so that A.L.P. policies were implemented. 
All this was to ensure that a coordinated approach was made to Local Authority areas on a 
national basis. Reference is made here to Whitlam (1971, 1977), Evans (1977), Cramelin 
and Evans (1977), Carrick (1977), and Sawer (1977). 
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When the Whitiam Goverament's intentions became obvious, the States had to 
devise a strategy to undermine the Commonwealth and its objectives. As it was obvious 
that the Commonwealth would proceed with its federal agenda and the States were virtually 
powerless to prevent the allocation and distribution of funds, Bjelke-Petersen set about a 
campaign to bring the Labor Government down. His method included constant States' 
Rights rhetoric and criticism of Prime Minister Whitiam, the Labor Party, and the 
Commonwealth; he also decided to use the constitutional facility of Senate replacement, 
along with pressure on Queensland National Party and Liberal Party Senators, to hold up 
vital legislation, including supply. The impact of Bjelke-Petersen's strategy (the dismissal 
of the Whitiam Government by the Goveraor-General, and an election defeat of the Labor 
Party) dealt a severe rebuff to the Commonwealth; this helped to stabilise relations with 
future federal governments, but it did not prevent the Commonwealth increasing its power 
at the expense of the States or reduce the V.F.I. The continuing use of States' Rights 
language did not advance the cause of States' Rights in Australia. The States' Rights 
platform — adopted in the verbal exchanges with the Commonwealth by Bjelke-Petersen ~ 
amounted to a 'status agenda' involving the prestige of Bjelke-Petersen himself, in his 
standing up for Queenslanders and his promotion of the business interests from within 
Queensland. Reference is made here to Lunn (1987), Whitiam (1977), Bjelke-Petersen 
(1983), Coaldrake (1989) and others. 
The Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen (1968-87) was a most strident States' 
Rights advocate, but a number of other State Premiers' such as: Henry Bolte (1955-72) 
from Victoria, Robert Askin (1965-75) from New South Wales, Tom Playford (1938-65) 
from South Australia, Charhe Court (1974-82) from Westera Australia, Neville Wran 
(1976-86) from New South Wales, Dick Hamer (1972-81) from Victoria, and Doug Lowe 
(1977-81) from Tasmania, have all used States' Rights language to complain about 
Commonwealth involvement in State issues (Patience 1985: 3). Robin Gray (1982-89) 
from Tasmania, was a States' Rights advocate but mainly on the single issue of die 
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Tasmanian Dam. More recent examples of Premiers who have used States' Rights 
language include: Richard Court (1993--) from Westera Australia, and Robert Borbidge 
(1996-) from Queensland, who despite some use of States' Rights rhetoric have largely 
been prepared to cooperate with the Commonwealth in federal initiatives. 
After Bjelke-Petersen, and otiier vigorous States' Rights advocates, had left die 
political scene in Australia, the States and State Premiers ~ mainly due to financial 
pressures ~ have been prepared to cooperate with the Commonwealth in initiatives to 
improve federal/State relations. There have been encouraging developments in federal/State 
relations with Special Premiers Conferences and the Council of Australian Govemments 
(C.O.A.G.) adopting the Hilmer Report recommendations. Bjelke-Petersen's attempt to 
fmstrate the federal govemment was for partisan political reasons; and his use of States' 
Rights rhetoric failed to contribute to the States' Rights cause. Recent developments show 
the folly of Bjelke-Petersen's approach; they show that more can be achieved by a non-
partisan, collaborative approach. Reference is made to Hawke (1990), Weller (1996), 
Hendy (1996), Goss (1996), and others. 
The Australian federation is in practice, no longer co-ordinate in the sense of the 
original intention of the founders, for various reasons; the most important factors in the 
change have been the growing interdependence of parts of the economy and society, and 
the need for substantially increased govemment intervention. Each level of govemment has 
significant effects on other levels, and there are a significant number of govemment 
functions which are now performed by more than one level. Co-ordinate federalism in the 
old style, may be considered to be no longer a possibility, because of the interdependence 
of all spatial and functional elements within a country such as Australia. Australia, in 
recent times, like other federations, has moved away from 'classical federalism', in which 
each level of govemment performed the responsibilities assigned to it by the Constitution in 
relative isolation from the other (Wiltshire 1986: 127). 
Mathews, speaking of developments in the 1970's in Austraha, says: 
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To those outside the political conflict, it had long been 
apparent that the growth and complexity of the public sector, 
the interdependence of decisions taken by the different 
planes of govemment, differences in the availability of 
information, and in the degree of political responsiveness, 
and the need to accommodate a varying mixture of national, 
regional, and local interests, were all combining to give 
decision making in the public sector an intergovernmental or 
multiplane dimension. This made it inappropriate for 
governments to base their actions on premises of coordinate 
or coercive federalism, or even on cooperative federalism 
where cooperation was regarded as an option for 
autonomous governments affecting only the policy fringes 
(Matiiews 1977: 16-17). 
Reid expresses it this way: 
Nowadays the scale of government intervention in our 
everyday lives, and the scale of federal functions vis-a-vis 
state and local functions, make the theories of strict 
governmental independence patentiy false (cited in Mathews 
1974: 23). 
These observations have been supported and verified by writers such as Sawer 
(1967, 1977), Menzies (1967), Crisp (1970), Spann (1979), Knight (1974), Hawker 
(1937), and Giblin (1926). These authors have tended to suggest that Australia has shifted 
from co-ordinate (meaning static) federalism and has moved toward organic (meaning 
dynamic) federalism (Wiltshire 1986: 137). The early years of Australian federation, 
before the Engineers Case (1920), may be considered to be the clearest era of co-ordinate 
federalism. It is considered that co-ordinate federalism — with its emphasis on a division of 
discrete goveramental powers between two levels ~ may be considered to have been 
applicable only in a situation of minimum government activity in general, and simple 
activity at that, in a society without the modera methods of resource mobility (Wiltshire 
1986: 128). 
The States' Rights view of Bjelke-Petersen was that the residual powers that were 
left to the States in the Constitution were extensive and reflected the founders' belief when 
framing the Constitution that the States should be the dominant level of government. Witii 
the increasing growth and complexity of Australian society, however, die residual powers 
being an open list, have altered since 1901; the federal government has moved into some of 
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tiiese areas or taken them over by various means. The views of the Australian founders 
and States' Rights advocates, such as Inglis Clark and Samuel Griffith, show that the eariy 
Australian federalists used the federal system of the U.S.A. as the model for the Australian 
federal system and the division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States. The 
founders' arguments in the Constitutional debates against unification, and against die 
strength and power of a national government, together with the desirability of preserving 
decentrahsed power was an important base from which Bjelke-Petersen developed his 
claims. Bjelke-Petersen used the States' Rights and federal views of the past to justify die 
decisions and policies of the Queensland Government; they did litde, in practice, to 
contribute to the development of States' Rights in Australia. 
The defence of States' Rights and co-ordinate federalism by the conservative 
governments, like that of the Queensland Govemment led by Bjelke-Petersen, was 
intended for private enterprise and self-interest of the States. Although cloaked by the 
ideology that States' Rights and federalism are essential for preserving the individual's 
political and economic freedom of choice, it was largely party political self-interest that was 
the driving force; the actions were intended for the interests of the individual States and the 
business interests within the States. The institutions of federalism and the advocacy of 
States' Rights in Australia, in practice — as seen by the States' Rights rhetoric of 
conservative politicians such as the Queensland Premier Sir Johannes Bjelke-Petersen ~ 
was often directed to preventing excessive federal government intervention and the 
preservation of free private enterprise and a barrier against socialism, real or imaginary 
(Groenewegen 1983: 188). 
In regard to the future development of Australian federalism, and States' Rights, it 
is useful to record how a State premier could bring about the eventual downfall of an 
Australian national govemment The historical facts demonstrate that although there was a 
temporary resurgence of States' Rights^and the States' power came through the use of the 
Senate), a long-term, or increased, benefit for the States was not achieved. The main direct 
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benefit for the States in recent times has been brought about by a cooperative or consensus 
approach developed by the Hawke Govemment and used at S.P.C./C.O.A.G. meetings. 
m 
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